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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores (i) the determinants of executive selection in the 
international labor market, (ii) how these determinants shift relative to economic and 
institutional conditions, and (iii) how they differ for various functional roles. Using 
regression-based analysis and competitive assignment matching models, I examined 
executive appointment patterns in the subsidiaries of global banks located in Central & 
Eastern Europe between 2005 and 2012. The setting and timeframe not only yielded a 
heterogeneous sample of executive appointments under a variety of environmental 
conditions but also provided the opportunity to study the impact of financial shocks in the 
environment and/or the subsidiary network on executive succession during and in the 
aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2008. 
The results indicate that there exists a substantial difference in appointment strategies 
by functional role, which remains intact regardless of the level of environmental 
uncertainty present in the subsidiary market. In examining the entire subsidiary executive 
team, the results of the two-sided competitive assignment matching model show that 
firm-specific human capital is the dominant determinant of an executive appointment 
during an economic upswing, but during an economic downturn firm-specific human 
 vii 
capital is nearly four times weaker in driving an executive—subsidiary match than 
general human capital. 
Upon limiting the sample to just subsidiary CEOs, I find that while broad economic 
shocks and subsidiary-specific performance shocks both incite CEO turnover, they 
prompt different preferences for successors’ human capital attributes. Specifically, 
country-wide economic crisis promotes a preference for local human capital, while 
performance shocks limited to the subsidiary are associated with a preference for 
expatriate human capital and for successors with broad international experience. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
An important question for managers and management scholars alike is how firms select 
the right workers. Of particular interest is the selection of executives, whose leadership 
and strategic decisions have a significant effect on their companies. However, uncovering 
the mechanisms which underlie executive selection and subsequent allocation within an 
organization is not trivial, as it is simultaneously influenced by environmental, 
organizational, and labor market conditions. 
The main goal of this dissertation is to identify and model human capital appointment 
patterns of executives to the foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies (MNCs). 
Positioned between MNC headquarters and local stakeholders, subsidiary executives fill 
a boundary-spanning role. They implement corporate strategy, address frictions arising 
from cross-country differences in cultures, systems and institutions, and satisfy the needs 
of local customers. In essence, subsidiary executives strive to reconcile the simultaneous 
demands of the external market environment and the internal organizational environment. 
Consequently, the human capital profiles of subsidiary executives tend to be varied and 
complex, making the foreign subsidiary setting useful for a nuanced examination of 
executive human capital allocation under a variety of external and internal conditions. 
Leveraging the international setting enables not only deeper understanding of executive 
appointments in the context of MNC—subsidiary relationships, but by describing how 
human capital interacts with firm resources and the external institutional environment, 
this dissertation strives to contribute more broadly to human capital theory. 
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I examined executive appointment patterns in Central & Eastern European (CEE) 
national subsidiaries of multinational banks between 2005 and 2012, which as a context 
offers multiple advantages. First, MNCs operating in the banking industry and the CEE 
region publish annual reports at both subsidiary and MNC levels, with detailed unit-level 
information which is otherwise often unobtainable. Second, the transition from centrally-
planned to market-based economies in the region rapidly changed the banking industry, 
requiring the inflow of financial expertise, technological infrastructure, and managerial 
experience from western countries. But the acquiring, western firms also inherited dense 
branch networks and a loyal clientele, who demanded a localized strategy and financial 
products in local currencies that were calibrated to local economic and institutional 
conditions. As a result, national subsidiaries faced conflicting demands and required both 
expatriate and local human capital to balance between organizational coordination and 
local differentiation.  Third, the banking industry has shown itself to be very sensitive to 
economic shocks, which makes it a useful laboratory for studying how economic 
conditions influence firms’ preferences for human capital. The findings from the 
multinational bank setting can serve as an indication of firm behavior in other, more 
general settings, and support future theory development on human capital selection and 
allocation.  
Despite continued research on executive appointments in the context of MNC—
subsidiary relationships, significant theoretical and empirical questions remain 
unanswered. Specifically, we know little about whether and how MNCs use functional 
role appointments to configure varieties of human capital within the executive team, and 
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we do not know the extent to which environmental uncertainty impacts executive 
appointment patterns. Looking next to executive succession, the relationship between 
firm performance and turnover has been studied extensively in domestic firms but 
succession strategy has not been addressed at the foreign subsidiary level. Finally, there 
is a substantial void in the literature on the nature of the relationship between human 
capital and (i) firm resources, (ii) external institutional environments. Specifically, it is 
unclear whether human capital acts as a complementary or substitutive resource, and we 
lack an empirical model of the selection process of executive appointments which would 
account for the availability of human capital and accurately represent the relationships 
between human capital, the firm, and the external environment. This dissertation attempts 
to contribute by filling at least some of these voids. 
Therefore, the main objective of the presented research is to leverage the complex 
organizational setting which foreign subsidiaries inhabit in order to define the conditions 
under which MNCs prefer to appoint certain varieties of human capital over others, and 
use these insights to identify executive appointment patterns in the subsidiary executive 
team. To fulfill this overarching objective, I have set the following main aims: 
Aim 1: Establish associations between environmental uncertainty and executive 
appointment patterns in the foreign subsidiaries of MNCs through the lens 
of team configuration. 
Aim 2: Determine whether particular types of executive human capital serve as 
substitutes for a weak institutional environment, thereby addressing MNCs 
agency concerns while operating in the subsidiary market. 
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Aim 3: Develop theory of executive succession in foreign subsidiaries, and assess 
its validity in the context of MNCs’ response to organizational and 
environmental financial shocks. 
Aim 4: Estimate the parameters of a selection model of the executive appointment 
process that (i) identify relationships between organizational resources and 
firms’ preferences for human capital, (ii) indicate how firm preferences for 
firm-specific human capital and general human capital change depending 
on external economic conditions, and (iii) specify how they differ for two 
distinct types of functional roles. 
The dissertation is organized into four papers that address the above-listed aims in the 
following manner:   
1.1 AIM 1 
To fulfill Aim 1, Chapter 2 explores the relationships between environmental uncertainty 
and subsidiary executive team configuration patterns and is entitled “Managing 
uncertainty: Executive appointments in foreign subsidiary environments”. This chapter is 
motivated by a common challenge faced by MNCs – the question of whom to appoint to 
lead a foreign subsidiary and how to strategically configure human capital among 
functional roles in the subsidiary executive team under various conditions. Specifically, I 
analyzed how the individual and combined effects of uncertainty as proxied by economic, 
administrative, political, cultural, and geographic distances between the MNC parent 
country and subsidiary host country influence human capital allocation strategies to two 
distinct types of functional roles: monitoring and implementation. Assuming that the 
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trade-off between organizational coordination and local differentiation becomes 
amplified as distance along the above-enumerated dimensions increases, I use this tension 
to hypothesize that MNCs configure subsidiary executive teams to balance between the 
two opposing strategies. I find that MNCs are unlikely to appoint local executives to 
monitoring roles, but this effect is counterbalanced by a greater preference for local 
executives to serve in implementation roles. After controlling for the strong effect of 
functional role, greater parent country—subsidiary country distance along numerous 
dimensions is associated with a higher likelihood of appointing local executives. 
Furthermore, I find that dimensions of distance differentially impact MNCs’ 
preference for bicultural and multicultural executives. For example, uncertainty 
arising from economic distance shows a positive association with bicultural executive 
appointments, while other dimensions of distance actually attenuate MNCs’ preference 
for bicultural and multicultural subsidiary executives. This chapter contributes to top 
management team theory by highlighting strategic differences and complementarities 
between different functional roles, but also to the growing literature on multicultural 
executives. 
1.2 AIM 2 
Aim 2 was accomplished in Chapter 3, which is entitled “Principal—agent relationships 
in multinational banks – evidence from executive appointments”. Delving deeper into the 
agency problems which underlie the relationship between bank subsidiaries and parent 
banks, this work investigates how foreign owners use the power to appoint executives at 
their subsidiaries to manage the parent—subsidiary relationship. In the subsidiary 
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executive appointment process, there exists a trade-off between 1) appointing parent-
bank executives (expatriates) who have objectives which are more congruent with those 
of the parent, and 2) appointing subsidiary-country executives (locals) who enjoy access 
to high quality information because of inherent insight into the local environment. Based 
on the argument that higher quality monitoring institutions facilitate monitoring by the 
parent (as evidenced by rules for bank accounting and supervision), I hypothesize and 
find that stronger monitoring institutions increase the likelihood that a bank has a 
subsidiary-country CEO. This chapter thus provides direct evidence of banks’ efforts to 
manage agency problems, and contributes to the literature on the governance mechanisms 
at play in foreign-owned banks, as well as the broader literature on international human 
resource management. 
1.3 AIM 3 
Chapter 4 entitled “CEO succession in foreign subsidiaries following organizational and 
environmental crises” asks and answers the question: What are the pairwise relationships 
between antecedent performance and (i) subsidiary CEO turnover and (ii) preference for 
successors’ human capital attributes. Here, performance is measured at the subsidiary-
level and at the level of the national subsidiary country economy. Completing Aim 3 
required developing a theory of executive succession in subsidiaries. Subsidiary 
executives differ from executives of stand-alone, domestic firms in two significant ways, 
motivating the development of a separate theory. First, although they have extensive 
delegated authority, subsidiary executives report to executives in the parent bank and not 
the Board of Directors, reducing their power arising from informational advantage. 
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Second, the varieties of being an organizational insider versus outsider are much more 
nuanced in the subsidiary context. There, insider knowledge can be derived either from 
extensive subsidiary knowledge, knowledge of another subsidiary in the MNC network, 
or from MNC headquarters experience. Alternatively, it can also originate from 
knowledge of the subsidiary-country environment. To test the conceptual model’s 
relevance, I empirically investigated executive succession patterns following two types of 
shocks: financial shocks internal to the subsidiary and shocks to the national economy of 
the subsidiary country. I then analyzed how MNCs’ preferences for particular types of 
“insiders” differed depending on the type of shock experienced. The findings show that 
while broad environmental shocks and subsidiary performance shocks both incite 
turnover in the top subsidiary leadership post, they prompt different preferences for 
successors’ human capital attributes. Specifically, country-wide economic crisis 
promotes a preference for subsidiary-specific human capital, while performance 
shocks limited to the subsidiary are associated with a preference for MNC-specific 
human capital and for successors with broad international experience. This chapter 
contributes new findings on executive succession and enhances our knowledge of MNC 
governance. 
1.4 AIM 4 
While the empirical tools used in Chapters 2–4 are regression-based, the research 
comprising Chapter 5 entitled “Estimating the determinants of executive-subsidiary 
matches” uses structural estimation and a two-sided matching methodology to ask the 
following higher-level questions: (i) what are the determinants of a job match in the 
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international context, (ii) how do matching patterns between firm and executive human 
capital attributes change between economic upswings and downturns, and (iii) are they 
consistent between appointment roles? The employed empirical strategy of competitive 
assignment games compares observed executive—firm matches relative to all other 
counterfactual matches, which could have occurred in the labor market but did not, 
thereby explicitly accounting for the availability of human capital in the labor market. 
Combining the rich subsidiary-level data on executive appointments with a novel 
methodology allows for a nuanced examination of the determinants of executive—firm 
matches along multiple human capital dimensions. In the analysis, I emphasize and 
distinguish between firm-specific versus general human capital. Overall, I find that the 
relationship between human capital and the firm’s resource base is largely 
complementary; however, the importance of firm-specific versus general human capital 
shifts depending on external circumstances. Firm-specific human capital is the 
dominant determinant of an executive appointment during an economic upswing, 
while firm-specific human capital is nearly four times weaker in driving an 
executive—subsidiary match than general human capital during an economic 
downturn. By measuring the importance of firm-specific versus general human capital 
relative to firm characteristics, I inform our understanding of executive—firm fit and 
contribute to human capital theory. 
1.5 SUMMARY 
The four chapters which comprise this dissertation share a number of unifying themes. 
First and foremost, each paper in the dissertation examines an aspect of the executive 
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appointment process in the international context of foreign subsidiaries. I specifically 
examined (i) human capital configuration by functional role, (ii) the relationship between 
human capital and the institutional environment, (iii) CEO succession strategy, and (iv) 
executive—firm fit. Second, all four studies go beyond analysis of executive 
appointments at the individual-level to uncover which particular human capital 
characteristics or combinations thereof are of paramount importance for MNCs. While 
the papers in Chapters 2—4 focus on firms’ preferences for national, bicultural, and 
multicultural human capital, Chapter 5 analyzes the relative value of firm-specific versus 
general human capital.  Third, Chapters 4 and 5 integrate industry dynamics and estimate 
the impact of changing economic conditions on firm preferences for human capital. To 
the best of my knowledge, the four studies in this dissertation offer novel insights into the 
mechanisms which underlie executive selection and allocation. Taken together, the 
studies demonstrate how human capital attributes, organizational resources, and the 
external economic and institutional environment interact to explain the executive 
appointment process in the context of a complex, interdependent system.  
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by briefly synthesizing the achieved findings, 
listing scientific contributions of the achieved research, and offering possible directions 
for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 2:  MANAGING UNCERTAINTY: EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS 
IN FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY ENVIRONMENTS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As companies expand operations into international markets, they establish foreign 
subsidiaries in multiple, heterogeneous environmental contexts. Managing the demands 
of these diverse subsidiary markets while maintaining internally consistent processes and 
structures within organizational boundaries is a fundamental objective for multinational 
corporations (MNCs) (Egelhoff, 2010; Ghoshal, 1987; Prahalad, 1990). It is a complex 
task which is further complicated by cross-national differences, which introduce 
uncertainty into managerial decision making by increasing the costs of knowledge 
transfer across national borders (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Singh, 1988; 
Zaheer, 1995). 
An important factor for successfully managing environmental uncertainty is the 
composition of the executive team (Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). However, the question of how MNCs allocate human capital 
to subsidiary executive teams in the face of environmental uncertainty remains 
unanswered in the literature. The question is important because within MNCs it is the 
subsidiary executive team which interprets and addresses the demands of the local 
external environmental in light of global organizational strategy and structure. Positioned 
between MNC headquarters and local stakeholders, subsidiary executives are bi-cultural 
interpreters of cross-national differences, but also front-line implementers (Vora, 
Kostova, & Roth, 2007) who reconcile the simultaneous demands of the external market 
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environment and the internal organizational environment (Karim, Carroll, & Long, 2013).  
Much of the previous work relating environmental uncertainty to the composition of 
the executive team considers either the domestic firm setting (Keck & Tushman, 1993), 
or analyzes executive teams in MNCs’ headquarters (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Greve, 
Nielsen, & Ruigrok, 2009; Nielsen, 2009; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). At the level of the 
subsidiary unit, the literature on executive appointments is sparser. Early research 
describes the role of expatriates and local executives in subsidiaries, and the advantages 
and disadvantages of employing each. Recent studies empirically link particular 
environmental characteristics to the propensity of the MNC to appoint expatriates versus 
locals to the subsidiary executive team (Gaur, Delios, & Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; 
Harzing, 2001). In studies of subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs, the findings show an 
increased preference for both expatriate subsidiary CEOs and expatriate staff as cultural 
distance (Gong, 2003) and institutional distance (Gaur et al., 2007) increases between the 
home and host countries. Harzing’s (2001) study of globally dispersed subsidiaries of 
Western European and Japanese MNCs shows a similar tendency: an increase in political 
distance between home and host countries is associated with a rise in expatriate 
subsidiary CEOs. 
We contribute to the above research stream in three ways. First, we explore multiple 
dimensions of cross-national distance as measures of environmental uncertainty in our 
study. Specifically, we analyze the individual and combined effects of economic, 
administrative, political, cultural, and geographic distance as they relate to MNCs’ 
preference for various types of human capital in the subsidiary executive team. In doing 
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so, we respond to a recent critiques citing misinterpretation and overuse of cultural 
distance as the focal distance construct (Shenkar, 2012; Zaheer, Schomaker, & Nachum, 
2012), and the call for scholars to consider a more complete set of dimensions along 
which countries differ (Berry, Guillen, & Zhou, 2010). Our findings thus offer a more 
nuanced understanding of how several independent dimensions of cross-national distance 
influence human capital allocation to MNC subsidiaries.  
Our second contribution is to examine human capital allocation to functional roles 
and configuration of the executive team in the presence of environmental uncertainty. 
Recently, there has been a call to explore who functional team members are, what they 
do, and whether there are different types of functional team members (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Menz, 2012). Previous work on subsidiary executive 
staffing shows a greater need for monitoring and control on behalf of headquarters 
through expatriate appointments to the CEO role (and throughout the subsidiary as a 
whole) in institutionally distant environments (Gaur et al., 2007). In our study, we 
examine local/expatriate appointment patterns in the entire executive team. Building on a 
contingency framework, we expect that MNCs’ strategies for filling monitoring roles 
versus implementation roles will be influenced by the need to counterbalance between 
coordination and adaption pressures, and we expect MNCs’ preferences to vary with the 
level of uncertainty present in the environment. As such, our focus on team configuration 
enhances and refines Gaur et al.’s observation regarding MNCs’ tendencies toward 
greater monitoring through the CEO role in the face of uncertainty. 
We make our third contribution to the literature in the second part of our study. Based 
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on the observation that today’s executives increasingly possess broad international 
experience, we hypothesize that in addition to team configuration, MNCs can also 
manage environmental uncertainty by leveraging the diversity in individual executives’ 
multicultural experiential backgrounds. Along with nationality (which we use to 
distinguish between expatriates and local executives in the first part of our study), 
educational and professional experiences shape individuals’ values and beliefs (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984), and can influence executives’ propensity to understand, interpret, and 
identify with a particular culture (Lücke, Kostova, & Roth, 2014). Therefore, instead of 
merely focusing on executive nationality type (i.e. local versus expatriate) as a signal of 
knowledge, networks, and affiliation, the second part of our study takes executives’ full 
experiential background into consideration when investigating the relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and human capital allocation strategy in the MNC context. We 
draw on the literature on executive cognition (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and the 
literature on multicultural individuals (Fitzsimmons, 2013) to hypothesize that personal 
history and diversity in nationality and cultural background via educational and 
organizational experiences enable executives’ capabilities for balancing contradictions, 
which can then be used to manage the tensions between coordination and adaptation that 
are inherent to foreign subsidiary operations, and which become exacerbated as 
environmental uncertainty increases. 
Recently, there has been an explosion of theory pieces in management literature on 
multiculturalism (Fitzsimmons, 2013; Hong, 2010; Lakshman, 2013; Lücke et al., 2014). 
Empirically, however, the topic is understudied. From existing academic work, it is 
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unclear how organizations deploy multicultural individuals. As such, our study may 
provide useful insights.  
Our paper explores these questions using a rich and unique dataset that integrates 
country-level data and firm-level information with subsidiary executives’ demographics, 
educational experiences, and employment histories for executives employed during the 
period 2005 to 2010. We test our hypotheses on a sample comprising 75 subsidiaries of 
34 U.S. and European banks located in 13 Central & Eastern European countries. The 
six-year panel has 2067 observations and contains 689 unique executives. 
Overall, by looking deeper into the workings of MNCs to examine subsidiaries’ 
individual executives, we further our understanding of how strategic human capital can 
be leveraged to manage environmental uncertainty in a setting where adaptation and 
coordination pressures coexist. 
2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.2.1 Executives as strategic human capital 
One of the main challenges for an organization is the reduction and management of 
uncertainty (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967), which is 
further encumbered by the reality that environmental pressures are always to some degree 
in conflict (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). This is particularly salient in the case of MNCs, 
which face the dual pressures of the internal environment of the organization, as well as 
the external environments of their foreign subsidiary markets. Organizational design 
theory suggests to address increasing uncertainty by improving organizational 
information processing capacity (Galbraith, 1974; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). This can be 
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achieved through structural adaptation and via appropriate configuration of the executive 
team (Karim & Williams, 2012). 
Within the organization, it is the executive team which addresses the demands of the 
external environment and devises the coordinated organizational response (Barnard, 
1938; Selznick, 1957; Thompson, 1967). The executive team is composed of individuals 
who have superior access to information, who formulate the organizational reaction 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), and who have sufficient power and influence to direct 
organizational strategy and activity (Daft & Weick, 1984; Karim & Williams, 2012; 
Mintzberg, 1979). The greater the organizational complexity, the higher are the 
information processing demands on the executive team (Michel & Hambrick, 1992; 
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). To handle the volume of information, boundedly rational 
executives fall back on personalized, selective perceptions of their task environments 
(March & Simon, 1958), which are grounded in their values and beliefs (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Indeed, Hambrick & Mason (1984) suggest that demographic effects are 
likely to be strongest under conditions of high environmental uncertainty. 
Scholars have long ago recognized that not every executive is equally capable of 
resolving all organizational situations. Instead, extant empirical research shows that given 
their cognitive base and experiential characteristics, executives are well-suited to perform 
certain tasks but not others (Karim & Williams, 2012). Executives’ demographic 
characteristics, functional experience, and job tenure have been linked to firm strategy 
(Beal & Yasai-Ardekani, 2000; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; Karim et al., 2013; 
Strandholm, Kumar, & Subramanian, 2004; Thomas, Litschert, & Ramaswamy, 1991), 
16 
 
internationalization (Anthanassiou & Nigh, 2002; Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Greve et 
al., 2009; Herrmann & Datta, 2005; Lee & Park, 2006; Sambharya, 1996), as well as 
environmental uncertainty (Keck & Tushman, 1993; Nielsen, 2009; Sanders & Carpenter, 
1998), the latter being the focus of this paper. 
2.2.2 Top management teams and environmental uncertainty 
Empirical exploration of the linkages between uncertainty management and executive 
team attributes originates with the research of Gupta & Govindarajan (1984), Strandholm 
et al. (2004), and Thomas et al. (1991), who associate executives’ personality traits, 
functional experiences, and demographic characteristics (including executive age, tenure, 
and education level) with business unit strategic orientation and environmental 
uncertainty. Scholars have linked uncertainty to executive team heterogeneity in both 
domestic firms and MNCs. In domestic firms, uncertainty in the form of technological 
discontinuity, strategic reorientations, and CEO succession is associated with shorter 
average team tenure and greater functional title heterogeneity within the team (Keck & 
Tushman, 1993). 
In studies of MNCs, some scholars have presented uncertainty as a moderator 
between headquarters team attributes and the breadth of firm internationalization 
(Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001), showing that diverse executive teams in MNC 
headquarters (with respect to international experience, educational background, and firm 
tenure) are found in more global firms. Greve et al. (2009) find that entry into new 
foreign markets leads to greater internationalization in the MNC’s executive team, in 
both the diversity of nationalities in the team and the diversity of their international 
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experience. More recently, Nielsen (2009) considers a broader range of demographic and 
experiential characteristics, namely nationality, educational background, industry 
experience, and international experience, and finds that tendency toward team 
homogeneity in the above-mentioned dimensions diminishes in dynamic industry 
environments. 
2.2.3 Subsidiary executive appointments and environmental uncertainty 
Though comparatively few have examined executive team composition in MNC 
subsidiaries, extant studies have linked greater subsidiary market uncertainty to an 
increased preference for parent country nationals in the subsidiary CEO role, where 
uncertainty can arise due to (i) greater cultural distance between the parent and subsidiary 
country (Gong, 2003), (ii) higher subsidiary country political risk (Harzing, 2001), or (iii) 
greater institutional distance between the parent and subsidiary country (Gaur et al., 
2007).  
In international contexts, uncertainty is heightened by cross-national differences, 
which impede sharing and transfer of knowledge across borders (Berry et al., 2010). 
Simply geographic distance creates certain challenges (Dastidar & Zaheer, 2010); 
however economic, political, institutional, and cultural differences also underlie 
uncertainty inherent in MNC management. Following Berry et al. (2010) and Ghemawat 
(2001), and in response to recent calls for scholars to use measures of distance in 
deliberate and appropriate contexts (Zaheer et al., 2012), we utilize five measures of 
cross-national distance which could be relevant to human capital allocation to subsidiary 
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executive teams. Our approach in this study is to unpack uncertainty by examining 
multiple dimensions of cross-national distance individually and in aggregate. 
Uncertainty is defined as, “a consequence of environmental factors that generally 
result in a lack of the information needed to assess means-ends relationships, make 
decisions, and confidently assign probabilities to their outcomes.” (Carpenter & 
Fredrickson, 2001) In the literature, as distance between the headquarters country and the 
subsidiary country increases, so does managerial uncertainty. One way to manage 
uncertainty is through greater coordination and structural and strategic alignment 
(control) throughout the multinational organization. On the other hand, the organization 
can manage uncertainty through closer adaptation to the needs of the local subsidiary 
environment. Therefore, uncertainty gives rise to tension between the need for greater 
coordination between organizational units and greater differentiation among units 
through local market adaptation. What remains unanswered is whether MNCs lean 
toward enacting one approach over the other throughout the subsidiary executive team, or 
whether they configure individuals in their executive teams to somehow balance the 
conflicting pressures for coordination versus adaptation. 
Indeed, two contrasting perspectives exist in the literature about the process of 
executive appointments in MNCs. Agency theory perspectives suggest using expatriates 
as resources for coordination and control (Edström & Galbraith, 1977; Egelhoff, 1984; 
Martinez & Jarillo, 1989). Expatriates possess a deep understanding of the parent 
corporate culture (Ando, Rhee, & Park, 2008; Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2000; 
Kobrin, 1988), and are expected to enact the dominant logic and strategy of corporate 
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leaders in a predictable manner (Boyacigiller, 1990; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Moreover, 
they have the requisite capabilities for effective knowledge transfer (Bonache & Brewer, 
2001; Franko, 1973; Tsang, 2001), and are embedded in the MNC’s informal 
communication network (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). 
In contrast, a contingency approach posits leveraging the political, institutional, 
cultural, and economic knowledge of local executives to achieve greater local market 
adaptation in the face of uncertainty. Since local executives know local demand 
preferences, are able to navigate the local institutional environment, and are embedded in 
the local network, they can effectively adapt global product ideas, and transform them 
into products better suited to local tastes (Bartlett & Yoshihara, 1988; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991; Hailey, 1996). 
As uncertainty in the subsidiary environment rises, the parent company can thus 
attempt to manage it (i) via an agency lens by placing emphasis on strategic, procedural 
and structural alignment throughout the organization – which is a management task better 
suited for expatriate executives, or (ii) via a contingency lens by empowering the 
subsidiary to make the necessary adjustments to fulfill the needs of relevant national task 
environments – which speaks to appointing local executives. Based on this tension, we 
begin our analysis by introducing competing hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1a: As the MNC faces increasing uncertainty in its subsidiary, 
the MNC is less likely to appoint local executives than expatriates to the 
subsidiary executive team. 
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Hypothesis 1b: As the MNC faces increasing uncertainty in its subsidiary, 
the MNC is more likely to appoint local executives than expatriates to the 
subsidiary executive team. 
2.2.4 Subsidiary executive team configuration 
It is unlikely that MNCs will configure a subsidiary executive team with only 
coordination or only adaptation efforts in mind, or with a uniform preference for 
expatriates or locals throughout the executive team. Therefore, we seek to expand our 
understanding of the human capital appointment process by asking: how do MNCs 
allocate local and expatriate human capital to specific functional roles in the executive 
team? We hypothesize that MNCs will manage the dual tension through different 
appointment strategies to two types of functional roles: the monitoring role and the 
implementation role – which will balance agency needs against contingency needs. 
In formulating our hypotheses, we draw upon the strategic human capital literature on 
functional roles. This is an area of research which explores role structure within the 
executive team and its impact on organizational outcomes, and as such, is considered to 
be a complement to the upper echelons perspective (Hambrick, 2007) which focuses on 
executive demographic characteristics and experience (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). For a 
recent review of the functional role literature, see Menz (2012), who writes that this is a 
young and growing area of research in need of theoretical integration. Indeed, much of 
the research on functional roles focuses on a particular role, i.e. the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), or the Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
with inadequate attention being paid to broader commonalities and differences among 
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roles and the nature of their work (Menz, 2012). 
In our review of the extant literature, we found two broad distinctions among 
functional roles based on their job descriptions and delegation of responsibilities. In 
particular, among the individual functional roles, there appears to be a difference in 
emphasis and amount of time spent on 1) control and oversight versus 2) implementation. 
In general, the tasks of the CEO, Deputy CEO, and CFO involve strategy making and 
subsequent monitoring of organizational progress, require communicating with external 
stakeholders, and are oriented toward the long-term (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). For 
example, the CFO function is defined as having “critical say in key strategic and 
operational decisions, from evaluating business unit performance, inventing new ways to 
leverage capital, […], to serving as the company’s primary ambassador to investors and 
financial analysts” (Zorn, 2004). From the definition, it is clear that CFOs are considered 
to be agents of control and oversight. 
In contrast, implementation roles, such as those of the COO, CMO (Chief Marketing 
Officer), or Chief Legal Officer (CLO) are tasked with short-term strategy execution and 
their responsibilities involve resolving operating matters internal to the firm (Hambrick & 
Cannella, 2004). The COO “is typically the key individual responsible for delivery of 
results day-to-day, quarter-to-quarter” (Bennett & Miles, 2006). Similarly, the 
responsibilities of CMOs and CLOs are to enact and support the strategies created by the 
CEO and monitored by the CFO. Therefore, these types of roles broadly emphasize 
implementation over monitoring and control. 
The dichotomous distinction between monitoring and implementation is further 
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supported by the two different theoretical lenses employed by scholars to study individual 
functional roles. Whereas agency theory is employed in examining CEOs and CFOs 
(Mian, 2001), contingency theory is invoked for COO-oriented studies (Hambrick & 
Cannella, 2004; Marcel, 2009). 
When we sought to integrate this growing literature with what is known about the 
roles of subsidiary executives, another important distinction emerged among functional 
members: internal versus external orientation. Front-line implementers in the subsidiary 
are largely internally-oriented, and responsible for maintaining close contact with the 
local stakeholders. In foreign subsidiaries, this involves awareness and close 
communication with the local customer base, subsidiary employees, or the local regulator 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1988, 1992). Front-line implementers operate at the interface of the 
subsidiary with the local market. Therefore, we hypothesize that their job demands are 
likely to be better suited to local executives, who are familiar with the needs of the local 
environment, who know the language, and can communicate directly with customers, 
employees, and local regulators, and who have an established local network. 
Whereas monitoring functional roles in single division firms often require 
communication with stakeholders who are situated outside of organizational boundaries, 
subsidiary CEOs, Deputy CEOs, and CFOs operate at the interface of the subsidiary with 
its parent company. Monitoring roles retain an external orientation with respect to the 
subsidiary, but an internal orientation relative to broader boundaries of the MNCs. We 
hypothesize that the monitoring role is likely better suited to expatriates, who act as 
boundary spanners and are able to identify and cooperate with the parent company 
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(Carlile, 2002; Vora et al., 2007).  
Hypothesis 2: The MNC is less likely to appoint local executives than 
expatriates to monitoring-oriented functional roles in the subsidiary 
executive team.1 
2.2.5 Subsidiary executive team configuration and uncertainty management 
With the distinction between monitoring and implementation functional roles in mind, we 
now turn to theorizing how environmental uncertainty may influence subsidiary 
executive appointments. In our context of parent-subsidiary pairs, we propose that 
environmental uncertainty can manifest itself in the perceived distance or difference 
between the parent company market and the subsidiary market along multiple 
dimensions. Studies of MNC response to intra-organizational alignment and coordination 
pressures frequently invoke various measures of distance, such as geographic (Ambos & 
Ambos, 2009), cultural (Ambos & Ambos, 2009; Boyacigiller, 1990; Gong, 2003; 
Harzing, 2001; Salomon & Wu, 2012), linguistic (Ambos & Ambos, 2009), institutional 
(Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Salomon & Wu, 2012), and economic distance 
(Salomon & Wu, 2012) to highlight challenges which arise from the agency problem 
inherent in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. As distance between headquarters 
and subsidiary along these dimensions increases, the information flowing between the 
two entities becomes more difficult and costly to obtain and interpret by people at each 
end who are specialists in their particular markets. The entities each face their own 
                                                 
1 Conversely, this hypothesis can also be stated as “The MNC is more likely to appoint local 
executives than expatriates to implementation-oriented functional roles in the subsidiary 
executive team.” 
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environmental influences and monitoring is confounded by differences in specialists’ 
language, behavior, and market knowledge. Thus, cross-national distance increases 
uncertainty. 
Specifically, we expect rising uncertainty to heighten MNCs’ agency needs in 
monitoring roles, which will be counterbalanced by greater emphasis on contingency 
interests in implementation roles. In other words, we expect the distinction between 
appointment strategies for the two types of functional roles to intensify in the presence of 
greater uncertainty. In particular, we expect that implementation will be led by local 
executives who are best equipped to deal with the complexity and the nuances of the 
local environment, and monitoring and control will be carried out by vetted expatriates. 
Formally, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: As the MNC faces increasing environmental uncertainty in 
its subsidiary, the MNC is less likely to appoint local executives than 
expatriates to monitoring-oriented functional roles in the subsidiary 
executive team.2 
2.2.6 Multicultural attributes of individual executives and uncertainty 
management 
In the section above, we put forth the argument that MNCs will invoke a divide-and-
conquer approach to managing uncertainty by strategically allocating the two types of 
human capital (expatriates and local executives) among the different functional roles, 
                                                 
2 Conversely, the hypothesis can also be stated as “As the MNC faces increasing 
environmental uncertainty in its subsidiary, the MNC is more likely to appoint local executives 
than expatriates to implementation-oriented functional roles in the subsidiary executive team.” 
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thereby constructing a team of functional roles which can handle conflicting demands. 
However, another possible route involves utilizing the capabilities of individual 
executives to balance the tension between coordination and adaptation. 
Multicultural individuals are defined as people who have internalized two or more 
cultural identities, which allow them to accurately interpret cultural cues in multiple 
environments (Lücke et al., 2014). As a result of deep immersion in dissonant cultural 
environments, multicultural individuals are likely to possess paradoxical frames which 
enable them to manage organizational paradox. Indeed, multicultural identity patterns 
have been linked to greater cognitive complexity (Benet-Martinez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; 
Tadmor, Tetlock, & Peng, 2009), adaptability, and flexibility (Nguyen & Benet-Martinez, 
2012). Having internalized domain-specific sets of knowledge, beliefs, values, norms, 
and habits (Markus, 1977), multicultural individuals have been found to effectively 
invoke integration processes and differentiation processes as appropriate (Brannen, 
Garcia, & Thomas, 2009). This means they can not only seamlessly customize their 
behavior and information processing in relation to a specific context, but also extrapolate 
their experience to future cross-cultural interactions (Thomas et al., 2008). As a result, 
multicultural individuals possess a unique competence to interact across cultures, and are 
effective boundary spanners (Yagi & Kleinberg, 2011) with a heightened capacity for 
solving complex problems (Fitzsimmons, Miska, & Stahl, 2011). 
We argue that executives’ educational and career histories combine into portfolios of 
experience, which to varying extents mimic the qualities of local and expatriate 
executives, and can alleviate the dual tension arising from conflicting pressures. If 
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appropriately configured, executives’ past educational and career histories allow 
executives to process conflicting information through multiple cognitive frames, and 
toggle between integrating and differentiating processes to determine where apparent 
contradictions in organizational goals, needs, and opportunities can perhaps be 
reconciled, and where making a trade-off is simply unavoidable or even preferred given 
the circumstances. 
In summary, we expect that as environmental uncertainty increases, so will the dual 
pressures of adaptation and integration on the foreign subsidiary. To alleviate the 
strategic conflict arising from these paradoxical pressures, subsidiaries will appoint 
multicultural individuals to the executive team. These types of individuals will have 
experiences that allow them to better process the existing conflict, and make balanced 
strategic decisions. 
Hypothesis 4: As the MNC faces increasing environmental uncertainty in 
its subsidiary, the MNC is more likely to appoint multicultural executives 
to the subsidiary executive team. 
2.3 DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 Data and research setting 
The sample for this study was drawn from the subsidiaries of foreign banks in 13 Central 
& Eastern European (CEE) countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the 
Ukraine). Though single-industry studies are sometimes criticized for their lack of 
generalizability, they are useful in the study of managerial attributes, which differ 
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significantly among industries (Norburn & Birley, 1988; Pegels, Song, & Yang, 2000). 
The choice of the Central & Eastern European banking industry as a setting for this 
research is particularly appropriate because 1) MNCs played a pivotal role in the sector’s 
development, 2) MNCs are the dominant players in the market, and 3) the sector is 
economically significant for the local economies. Prior to the transition from centrally-
planned economies to market economies in 1989/1990, the financial sector was 
undeveloped. CEE countries operated as cash economies and basic financial products 
such as debit cards, credit cards or mortgage loans did not exist, let alone more 
sophisticated ones like mutual funds. The fall of the Iron Curtain thus created an entirely 
new industry, requiring the inflow of industry expertise, technological infrastructure, and 
executive experience from Western countries. The CEE financial sector drew investors 
mainly from Western Europe and the United States, which over the last decade grew to 
dominate market penetration in the region, controlling approximately 80 percent of the 
assets in this market by 2008. 
Our dataset contains information on executive teams from 75 national subsidiaries 
belonging to 34 separate MNCs from 16 parent countries in the United States and 
Europe, between the years 2005 and 2010. The sample differs from extant work in a 
noteworthy way. Related previous studies of this subject matter have looked at staffing 
strategy in subsidiaries of MNCs whose headquarters are geographically proximate to 
each other, but whose subsidiaries are globally dispersed (i.e. subsidiaries of Japanese 
MNCs  (Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003)). In contrast, our sample contains a more 
dispersed set of MNC headquarters countries (United States and Europe), but a 
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geographically bounded area of possible subsidiary locations (CEE). 
The six-year unbalanced panel has 2067 observations representing 689 unique 
executives, with data on executives’ nationalities, age, educational experience, tenure, 
international experience, and functional experience from the annual reports and company 
websites of individual subsidiaries. In a second iteration of data gathering, we searched 
executives’ profiles on LinkedIn, and where we found overlap between annual report 
profiles and LinkedIn profiles, we supplemented executive experiential background data 
with information from LinkedIn. 1741 observations include full information on 
executives’ nationalities and functional roles.  
Financial data on the subsidiaries and their parents comes from their respective 
annual reports and Bureau van Dijk's Bankscope database, country level and market level 
data is from the World Bank database, cross-national distance data are from 
http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/ciber/faculty_research.asp (Berry et al., 2010). 
2.3.2 Measures 
The executive team is defined as the executives who belong to the subsidiary’s executive 
committee, as self-reported in annual reports and/or company web pages.  
2.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Local executive is the outcome variable for analysis related to Hypotheses 1A, 1B, 2, 
and 3. It is a dummy variable which is set to 1 if the executive’s nationality country 
matches the subsidiary country. We determined nationality using a three-step approach. 
We used nationality data provided in executive biographies in subsidiaries’ annual 
reports where available. It was explicitly cited more often in the case of expatriates than 
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local executives. If unavailable, the first author used her international experience and in-
depth knowledge of Slavic languages, names, and the CEE region to make an initial 
classification of nationality, and triangulated this classification against the executive’s 
first educational country and first country in which he/she gained work experience, to 
ensure consensus. This approach takes into account that CEE executives had very limited 
opportunities to study internationally before 1989. Finally, last names were compared 
against the most common nationality which appeared in a search of Skype. If these three 
classification methods aligned, we assigned a nationality to the executive. 
Multicultural executive is the outcome variable for analysis related to Hypothesis 4. 
We follow current convention and define multiculturals as individuals who have 
considerable experience in two or more cultures (Brannen & Thomas, 2010; 
Fitzsimmons, 2013; Fitzsimmons et al., 2011), and who have developed multicultural 
attributes through childhood socialization, or through cultural exposure as adults (Lücke 
et al., 2014). We measure multiculturalism in two distinct ways to capture experiential 
diversity (multicultural experience) and experiential relevance (bicultural experience). It 
is important to note that while executive nationality is naturally one of the national 
experiences we include in calculating our measures, whether the executive is a local or an 
expatriate does not explicitly factor into these measures. 
Multicultural experience is a continuous variable with zero as its minimum possible 
value. It is the sum of cultural distances between all possible pairs of countries where the 
executive has gained national, educational, or work experience. Unlike a simple count of 
unique national experiences, this measure incorporates a notion of “hardship” associated 
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with adapting to a different national culture. For example, working in the United States 
and Canada represents two unique cultural experiences, however the need for cultural 
adaptation between United States and Canada is likely less than between the United 
States and Romania. By summing cultural distances between pairs of countries where the 
executive has gained experience, we capture the individual’s experience level in 
integrating disparate national experiences. This measure captures diversity of national 
experience, but not the relevance of this acquired experience relative to the parent 
country – host country dyad. 
Bicultural experience is a binary variable, which is set equal to 1 if the executive has 
national, educational, or work experience in both the parent country and in the region of 
the subsidiary country. Because the parent and subsidiary country cultures are the salient 
cultures driving potential conflict, this measure seeks to capture executives’ social and 
cultural proficiency in identifying both as locals of the host country and as executives 
representing the parent country culture. In the dataset, each expatriate by definition has 
subsidiary country/region experience. However, we only code a positive match for 
subsidiary region work experience if the expatriate has worked in the subsidiary region 
for 3 years or longer. We reason that 3 years is a sufficient amount of time for the 
expatriate to acquire knowledge of the local environment. We place the set of CEE 
countries where executives in our sample have acquired past experience in four regional 
blocks, which share political, economic and cultural histories: Central Europe3, Balkans4, 
Baltics5, and former Soviet republics6. 
                                                 
3 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary – also referred to as the Visegrad Group. 
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2.3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
2.3.2.2.1 Functional roles 
When classifying functional roles, it is straightforward to identify the CEO. Other 
executive functions do not always have consistent titles across firms, but we were able to 
assign most executives to the 6 broad functional areas: CEO, Deputy CEO, CFO, COO, 
CMO, and CLO. Banking industry functional teams are characterized by a few 
particulars, such as the importance of a Risk Management Function. Some subsidiaries 
have separate Finance and Risk Officers, while others combine the function into the 
Chief Finance and Risk Officer. Therefore, we classified risk-related functions as akin to 
a CFO. Though most subsidiaries do not have CMO per se, there is a variety of sales-
related roles whose responsibilities include managing retail, private, and corporate client 
segments. We placed operations, human resources, and IT roles into the COO category. 
The CLO category includes legal officers, audit officers, and compliance officers. 
Executive in monitoring role is the outcome variable for analysis related to 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. It is a dummy variable which is set to 1 if the executive’s function is 
akin to that of a CEO, Deputy CEO, or CFO. It is set to 0 if it is akin to that of a COO, 
CMO, or CLO. 
2.3.2.2.2 Environmental uncertainty 
We proxy uncertainty in subsidiary settings using five types of cross-national distance. 
Of the five distance measures, administrative distance, political distance, cultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania. 
5 Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. 
6 Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan. 
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distance, and geographic distance are from Berry et al.’s (2010) cross-national distance 
data. The data have numerous positive attributes which we believe add validity and 
empirical novelty to our analysis. Other than geographic distance, which is a constant 
absolute distance measure, they are each composed of multiple dimensions of a given 
type of distance, are variable year-to-year, and because they are measured using 
Mahalanobis and not Euclidian distance, they are scale invariant. For more detail on how 
these measures were calculated, see Berry et al. (2010). 
Economic distance is measured with the difference in gross domestic product per 
capita in units of purchasing power parity (GDP PPP p.c.) between the subsidiary country 
and the parent country for subsidiary i in year t-1 (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2012; Tsang 
& Yip, 2007). GDP p.c. is commonly used by researchers and institutions, such as the 
United Nations or the World Bank, to measure a country’s level of economic 
development. The PPP denomination accounts for the difference in purchasing power 
between countries, which may be substantial when comparing developed and emerging 
economies. We believe economic distance to be a useful measure of environmental 
uncertainty, because it captures at a high level the differences in economic progress and 
prosperity between the parent and subsidiary country. Economic distance between 
countries has implications for differences in consumer incomes, differences in the quality 
of natural, financial, and human resources, and for information availability (Ghemawat, 
2001). Therefore, though it is a basic measure, the difference in GDP PPP p.c. is a 
fundamental country level indicator not only of the cross-market palatability of banking 
products in the MNC’s product offering, but also of the potential gains from successful 
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knowledge transfer from the parent to the subsidiary. 
Political distance is a multi-dimensional measure of the democratic nature and 
existence of political ties between countries. It is measured by synthesizing differences in 
democracy scores, membership in world and regional trade agreements, government size 
as percent of GDP, and political stability. It is an explicit measure of perceived political 
stability and interconnectedness between two nations. 
Administrative distance is a multi-dimensional measure of differences between 
bureaucratic patterns due to language, religion, legal systems, and colonial ties. Unlike 
political distance, administrative distance refers to both formal and informal institutional 
attributes which shape ease of interpretation of national “rules of the game” from the 
perspective of the other country in the distance dyad. 
Cultural distance is a multi-dimensional measure which integrates power distance 
(respect for authority), uncertainty avoidance (interpersonal trust), individualism 
(independence and role of government), and masculinity (importance of family and work) 
as measured in the World Values Survey. 
Geographic distance is measured as the distance between two countries’ geographic 
centers. We include absolute distance in our analysis, because it has been shown in 
previous studies to be a non-trivial predictor of firm behavior, even relative to 
institutional or cultural distance (Dastidar & Zaheer, 2010). 
2.3.2.3 Control variables 
We included several parent and subsidiary level variables which control for the effect of 
uncertainty on executive appointments. 
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Subsidiary Headcount / MNC Home Country Headcount is a proportion 
representing the number of employees working in the subsidiary country relative to the 
number of employees working in the MNC’s home country, in a given year. It is a proxy 
of the amount of human capital in the subsidiary, placed in relation to the total amount of 
human capital to which the MNC has access within organizational boundaries. The 
availability of human capital may constrain MNC staffing strategy, and therefore we 
include it as a control. 
Presence in CEE / Global Presence is the proportion of the number countries in 
Central & Eastern Europe where the MNC operates through wholly-owned subsidiaries 
relative to the number of countries globally where the MNC is present, in a given year. It 
is a proxy of the significance of the CEE region relative to the overall breadth of global 
MNC operations. An MNC with a more pronounced stake in the CEE region through on-
the-ground presence (such as Austria’s Raiffeisenbank Group, Belgium’s KBC Group, or 
GE Capital’s Consumer Finance and Banking business) may be more invested and 
involved in CEE subsidiary operations, and may therefore provide these subsidiaries with 
more expatriate oversight. On the other hand, greater CEE presence could also endow 
MNCs with access to a richer pool of qualified local human capital, which would speak 
to a greater propensity to appoint local executives. 
Years MNC is in control of subsidiary denotes the number of years since the parent 
company has acquired the subsidiary or established operations in the subsidiary country. 
Previous studies show that as the subsidiary ages, headquarters’ basis for control shifts as 
does the role of the subsidiary, resulting in a decreased reliance on expatriates and greater 
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utilization of local executives (Gong, 2003). With time, the subsidiary becomes more 
integrated with the rest of the MNC, and is no longer as dependent on the parent 
company for the supplying of basic resources, such as capital, technology, and 
knowledge (Prahalad & Doz, 1981). The subsidiaries’ talent and knowledge which had 
been built up by the MNC can be exploited through management localization to local 
human resources who know the market and the customers well (Bartlett & Yoshihara, 
1988; Lam & Yeung, 2010; Wang, Tong, & Koh, 2004).  
Subsidiary is an acquisition is a dummy variable set to 1 if the subsidiary was 
acquired by the parent company, and set to 0 if it was developed as a greenfield. We 
expect there to be a greater percentage of local executives in the executive teams of 
acquired subsidiaries, because the MNC acquired a going concern with an existing 
management team. Conversely, we expect there to be a greater percentage of expatriates 
in the executive teams of greenfield subsidiaries, because the parent company may have 
needed to draw on internal human resources to fill empty positions. Finally, in the CEE 
setting from which we drew our sample, acquired units are oftentimes former state 
monopolists in retail or corporate banking from the Communist era. These former state-
owned banks which are now large national subsidiaries of global banking MNCs, 
continue to enjoy high market share, and operate a localized strategy aimed at serving the 
needs of the country’s average retail and corporate customer.7 This would speak to a 
higher likelihood that acquired subsidiaries are managed to a greater extent by local 
                                                 
7 Examples of former state-owned monopolists include Česká spořitelna in the Czech 
Republic (now a flagship of Austria’s Erste Group), Bulbank of Bulgaria (now part of Unicredit 
Group). 
36 
 
executives than expatriates, relative to subsidiaries which were developed as greenfields.8 
Subsidiary Assets / MNC Assets represents the financial importance of the focal 
subsidiary to the MNC. A subsidiary which comprises a large proportion of total MNC 
assets may attract more of headquarters’ attention, which may manifest itself through the 
deployment of expatriate managers into the subsidiary’s executive team. 
Subsidiary return on average assets (lagged) is the profitability of subsidiary i in 
year t-1. We expect that subsidiaries which reported higher profits in the previous year 
will require less monitoring from the parent company, and will have a higher incidence of 
local executives in the subsidiary executive team. 
MNC return on average assets (lagged) is the profitability of the whole MNC in year 
t-1. We expect that more profitable MNCs are less likely to monitor the day-to-day 
operations of foreign subsidiaries, and will have a greater incidence of local executives in 
the subsidiary executive team. 
2.3.3 Methodology 
The basic modeled relationship for Hypothesis 1a and 1b between uncertainty and 
executive choice is as follows: 
 	
 =   + 
 + ∑   +  + ε   , 
where X is a vector of subsidiary-specific and MNC-specific control variables and MNC 
denotes MNC fixed effects. In the subscripts, i denotes the executive, j denotes the 
                                                 
8 Citibank and Deutsche Bank’s subsidiaries in the region were developed as greenfields, for 
example. These banks tend to operate a more unified, global strategy toward its clients 
worldwide. It must be noted, however, that this is not true for all greenfield subsidiaries. MNCs 
such as Unicredit or Raiffeisenbank have developed greenfield national subsidiaries, even though 
their self-professed strategies are multi-local and regional, respectively.  
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subsidiary, k denotes the MNC, and t denotes the year. 
To test Hypothesis 4, the modeled relationship is the same as above, however the 
dependent variable becomes Multicultural Experience or Bicultural Experience. 
For Hypothesis 2, we model the following relationship: 
 	

=   + 
 + !"# $
 + % 



+  + ε 
For Hypothesis 3, we model the interaction between uncertainty and functional role 
as follows: 
 	
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Because our dependent variables for H1–H3 are both dummies that take the value of 
zero or one, we test our hypotheses using a logistic specification. An ordinary least-
squares regression model is not appropriate because it does not account for the floor and 
ceiling effects of a bounded dependent variable, and it may not be reasonable to assume a 
linear effect of predictors on outcome probability. Also, the factors which affect 
probability alter both the mean and the variance of observations, while OLS only allows 
the predictors to affect the mean of the outcome variable but assumes that its variance is 
constant, giving rise to biased and inconsistent estimators (Wooldridge, 2002).  
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In the years after the establishment of subsidiary j by MNC k, it is reasonable to 
assume that all five measures of environmental uncertainty (economic, administrative, 
political, cultural, and geographic distance) are exogenous to the choice of appointing a 
local executive or an expatriate to the subsidiary’s executive team. However, because this 
observable is not randomly assigned among parent-subsidiary pairs, we still have 
concerns about omitted variable bias. To alleviate this worry, we include the control 
variables described above, as well as MNC fixed effects, which control for within-entity 
unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with the explanatory variable, 
environmental uncertainty. In particular, we include these fixed effects because we are 
concerned that MNC-wide staffing strategies, policies, or tendencies could drive 
subsidiary executive appointments independently of environmental uncertainty. Because 
we are using a panel dataset where some executives remain on the executive team in 
multiple consecutive years, we also cluster the standard errors by subsidiary. 
2.4 RESULTS 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The full sample consists of 2067 executive-year observations, of which 60 percent are 
subsidiary country nationals (local executives), and 37 percent are expatriates. We could 
not identify nationality for the remaining 3 percent. Using information from subsidiary 
annual reports, we were able to assign functional roles to 1741 executive-year 
observations. Table 1.1 presents summary statistics on executive-specific variables. 
In our sample, expatriates occupy monitoring roles in 60 percent of observations and 
local executives fill the remaining 40 percent. The opposite is the case for 
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implementation roles, which are filled by expatriates in 40 percent of the cases and by 
local executives 60 percent of the time. This serves as a baseline for our results, and 
shows that on average, MNCs are more likely to appoint expatriates to monitoring roles 
and local executives to implementation roles across the entire range of cross-national 
differences between parent and subsidiary countries available in our sample of 
multinational banks. 
Multicultural and bicultural experience is computed using executives’ cultural 
immersion due to nationality and educational and career experiences, country by country. 
There is no difference in the number of higher educational degrees attained by local 
executives and expatriates. Also, when examining the national diversity of educational 
experiences, the two types of executives perform nearly identically. Giving a value of 1 
to a manager whose higher educational degrees all come from a single country, a value of 
2 for educational degrees coming from two countries, and a value of 3 for educational 
degrees coming from three separate countries, local executives and expatriates both 
average a diversity value of 1.3. Differences among executive types arise when 
comparing the number of countries in which an executive has worked. Subsidiary country 
nationals average 1.3 countries, while expatriates average 3.1 countries. 
As a result, when measuring executives’ multicultural experience as the sum of 
cultural distances between all possible pairs of countries where they have acquired 
professional credentials, plus relative to their country of origin, expatriates have 
multicultural experience scores which are on average 4.5 times higher than the average 
local executive. 49 percent of expatriates are bicultural according to our methodology, 
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compared to 28 percent of local executives. 
Additionally, Table 1.1 presents subsidiary executives’ demographic and experiential 
characteristics, which have rarely been reported in the literature. In our sample, only 14 
percent of the observed executives are female, but there is a much higher proportion of 
females among local executives than among expatriates (20% versus 5%, respectively). 
Expatriates have been with the MNC on average 13.3 years, compared to 8.5 years for 
subsidiary country nationals. On the other hand, expatriates have only been with the 
subsidiary an average of 4.9 years compared to subsidiary country nationals’ 10.7 years. 
For descriptive statistics of the subsidiaries and the parent companies, please see Table 
1.2. Table 1.3 reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients between the five measures of 
cross-national distance. The pair-wise correlations are quite low, with the greatest being 
0.49 between economic distance and geographic distance. Therefore we can be confident 
that they are measuring different types of environmental uncertainty. 
2.4.2 Uncertainty management through executive appointments 
To explore MNCs’ selection strategies for appointing human capital to the subsidiary 
executive team, we start in Model 1 by examining the relationships between our control 
variables and executive type (local executives versus expatriates). Of our control 
variables, regional presence is negatively associated with appointing local executives (at 
the 10% significance level), which seems to signify that when the CEE region occupies 
greater significance in the overall MNC portfolio, the MNC is more likely to deploy 
expatriates with a capacity for oversight on behalf of headquarters. In contrast, the longer 
the subsidiary has been under MNC control is positively associated with MNCs’ 
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propensity to appoint local executives (at the 1% significance level), supporting the 
findings of Gong (2003) for Japanese MNCs. MNCs were also found to have a 
statistically significant tendency to appoint local executives when the subsidiary is an 
acquisition instead of a greenfield (at the 1% significance level), which is in line with the 
arguments set forth in the Methods section. These results and the following are shown in 
Table 1.4. 
Looking now to the main variables of interest, we argued that rising uncertainty due 
to increased cross-national distance between the parent and subsidiary country heightens 
the dual pressures of adaptation and intraorganizational alignment. Therefore, MNCs are 
unlikely to form a subsidiary executive team with a uniform preference for expatriates or 
locals throughout the executive team. In Model 2, we see the differential impacts of 
cross-national distance measures on the likelihood of appointing local executives to the 
subsidiary executive team. We find that an increase in economic, administrative, or 
cultural distance statistically increases the likelihood an MNC will appoint a local 
executive. This effect is significant at the 5 percent level for economic distance, at the 1 
percent level for administrative distance, and at the 1 percent level for cultural distance. 
In contrast, political distance and geographic distance have a slightly negative effect on 
the likelihood of appointing local executives. However, those coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. These results provide support for Hypothesis 1b when uncertainty rises due 
to economic, administrative and cultural distance, controlling for political and geographic 
distance. 
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2.4.3 Functional role appointments in the subsidiary executive team 
Next, we explored the effect of functional roles. In Model 3, we only included control 
variables and whether the executive’s functional role was monitoring or implementation. 
Initially, we did not include measures of cross-national distance. The results illustrate a 
strong, negative association between monitoring roles and local executives, even when 
controlling for our full set of control variables. We note that the magnitudes, signs, and 
significance levels of our control variables remain very consistent between the model 
specifications. 
In Model 4, the functional role indicator remains and we now include environmental 
uncertainty, as measured by the five types of cross-national distance. Controlling for the 
fact that MNCs are significantly less likely to appoint local executives to monitoring 
roles (at the 5% level), heightened economic distance, administrative distance, and 
cultural distance increases MNCs’ propensity for appointing local executives to the 
subsidiary executive team. Hypothesis 2 is supported. Also, our findings regarding the 
relationship between different types of environmental uncertainty and executive 
appointments in Model 2 remain consistent after including functional role into the 
regression in Model 4.  
In Models 5–9, we examine the interaction between functional role and measures of 
uncertainty to determine which types of cross-national distance are associated with the 
strong finding that monitoring roles are filled more often by expatriates than local 
executives, and implementation roles are filled more often by local executives than 
expatriates. We find that out of the five measures which proxy environmental uncertainty 
43 
 
in our analysis, administrative distance is the only measure with a statistically significant 
negative effect on local executives occupying monitoring roles. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 
is supported only when uncertainty rises due to increased administrative distance. 
Naturally, the above results are the exact opposite for appointments to 
implementation roles. Heightened uncertainty arising from economic, administrative, and 
cultural distance is associated with a greater likelihood of local executive appointments to 
the subsidiary executive team, even when controlling for the fact that implementation 
roles are likely to be filled by local executives at the 5 percent significance level. With 
rising administrative distance, implementation roles are more likely to be filled by local 
executives. 
2.4.4 Uncertainty management through multicultural executive experience 
We explore Hypothesis 4 in Models 16 and 17. Here, we examine how MNCs utilize the 
multinational experience of their subsidiary executives to address environmental 
uncertainty. We find that contrary to our hypothesis, heightened uncertainty arising from 
economic, political distance (1% significance level), cultural distance (5% significance 
level), and geographic distance (1% significance level) is associated with less 
multicultural experience in the average executive appointment. When we consider 
bicultural experience, greater uncertainty arising from administrative distance (10% 
significance level), cultural distance (10% significance level), and geographic distance 
(1% significance level) is associated with a decreased likelihood of appointing a 
bicultural executive. Economic distance, in contrast, is associated with a higher 
likelihood of a bicultural executive at the 1 percent significance level. 
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2.5 DISCUSSION 
The preceding results illustrate the tension faced by MNCs between being able to 
effectively monitor their subsidiaries and leverage local knowledge. These organizations 
have developed specific staffing solutions to strike the appropriate balance – namely, in 
the form of the strategic allocation of human capital to particular functional roles in the 
subsidiary executive team. 
In previous work, scholars found evidence that environmental uncertainty (as 
measured by cultural and institutional distance) prompts MNCs to appoint more 
expatriates to the CEO/General Manager role in the subsidiary executive team in order to 
strengthen monitoring on behalf of headquarters (Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003). By 
examining the composition of the entire executive team, however, we offer a more 
nuanced story. 
In our analysis, we find that as environmental uncertainty rises in the form of 
economic, administrative, and cultural distance (while controlling for political and 
geographic distance), MNCs are on average more likely to appoint local executives to the 
subsidiary executive team. Building on previous research which characterizes local 
executives as being able to provide insight into the local environment versus expatriates 
acting as agents of coordination and control, this finding provides support to the 
contingency view first set forth by Lawrence & Lorsch (1967), which states that greater 
uncertainty requires greater environmental adaptation. 
Looking deeper at MNCs’ appointment strategies, we find that MNCs do not deploy a 
one-size-fits-all appointment strategy across all members of the subsidiary executive 
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team. Instead, we see that the contingency view is actually complemented by the agency 
perspective when the subsidiary executive team is split by type of functional role. 
Specifically, our results suggest that MNCs match the unique human capital of local 
executives and expatriates to the two general types of functional roles in the subsidiary 
executive team: implementation roles and monitoring roles. Implementation roles, which 
require a greater degree of local market adaptation, are occupied by local executives, 
while monitoring roles are filled by expatriates, who act as agents of coordination and 
control on behalf of headquarters. These results are strong and consistent across model 
specifications which include or exclude measures of environmental uncertainty. Overall, 
we note that there is a consistent, visible disinclination to placing local executives in 
CEO, Deputy CEO, and CFO roles, and accompanying preference for local executives in 
implementer roles. 
In the models which include the effects of environmental uncertainty, the regression 
results reveal an interesting finding. After controlling for the strong effect of functional 
role which suppresses the presence of locals in monitoring roles, the average executive 
appointment is more likely to be filled by a local executive – again highlighting the 
strength of the contingency view.  
The differential effects of proxies for environmental uncertainty become apparent 
when exploring the interactions between the various kinds of cross-national distance and 
functional roles. Of the five measures of cross-national distance, only administrative 
distance is associated with a statistically significant disinclination to appoint local 
executives to monitoring roles, and an accompanying preference to appoint them to 
46 
 
implementation roles. Recalling the dimensions which comprise administrative distance, 
it appears that as the formal and informal institutions of the subsidiary country become 
less transparent from the point of view of parent country headquarters due to difference in 
language, religion, and legal system, expatriate executives are called upon to act as 
boundary spanners and monitor the activities of the subsidiary. 
Our interpretation of this finding is that there is a distinction between administrative 
distance on the one hand, and economic, political, cultural, and geographic distance on 
the other. We venture to suggest that while economic, political, geographic, and to a 
lesser extent cultural differences can be measured and analyzed, great differences in 
language, religion, and legal systems make cross-border interactions opaque and 
nontransparent, and introduce a different kind of uncertainty. Differences between two 
countries with different languages, religions and legal systems are highly intangible, 
difficult to define, and may dampen trust. Though this is a possible explanation of the 
mechanism underlying our findings, more research is required which would explore the 
microfoundations of differences among various types of uncertainty. 
Our unique dataset allowed us to not only analyze executive team composition by 
executive type, but to delve deeper into how MNCs leverage the portfolios of experiences 
that executives possess. We pursued this analysis based on the observation that today’s 
executives increasingly possess diverse international experience, which may make them 
better able to manage uncertainty arising from cross-national distance. However, we 
found that heightened uncertainty actually attenuates MNC preference for executives 
with multicultural and bicultural experience, which is counter to the ambidexterity 
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literature (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005; Tushman & O'Reilly, 
1996) and to the theoretical literature on multicultural executives (Fitzsimmons, 2013; 
Hong, 2010; Lakshman, 2013; Lücke et al., 2014). The only exception is uncertainty 
arising from economic distance, which shows a positive association with bicultural 
executives. In effect, these results mirror the first part of our analysis, which found that 
across most dimensions of cross-national distance, MNCs are more likely to appoint local 
executives – i.e., executives who are less likely to possess multicultural or bicultural 
experience. 
In order to understand these results better, we performed additional analysis and 
reanalyzed Model 17 on two subsamples: local executives and expatriates. The results 
can be found in Table 1.5 in Models 18 and 19, respectively. Splitting the sample shows 
that with increasing uncertainty arising from economic distance, MNCs’ propensity to 
appoint bicultural executives is driven by the appointment of local executives with 
bicultural experience (significant at the 1% level). In contrast, increased geographic 
distance is negatively associated with the appointment of bicultural local executives 
(significant at the 1% level), which is quite reasonable given that it is likely more difficult 
to find local executives with relevant parent country/subsidiary region bicultural 
experience the further away the two countries are from one another. This effect holds for 
expatriates as well, but is statistically insignificant. 
When examining the subsample of expatriates (Model 19), greater uncertainty arising 
from administrative, political, and cultural distance is negatively associated with the 
appointment of bicultural expatriates. This may indicate one of two things. Either MNCs 
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consciously appoint expatriates without previous regional experience when faced with 
administrative, political, and cultural uncertainty, because these executives’ mental maps 
are fully aligned with the needs of the parent company and they can be trusted to enact 
the headquarters’ strategy. Or expatriates with bicultural experience are simply 
unavailable and therefore cannot be appointed even if the MNC would prefer them, 
because the pool of candidates has an insufficient amount of these types of people. This 
provides impetus for future empirical research to determine how strong the labor market 
effect is. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
We began this study with an interest in understanding how MNCs manage uncertainty in 
the subsidiary market environment through the appointment of strategic human capital to 
subsidiary executive teams. Looking at the formation of the executive team, our first 
conclusion was that the dual pressures of local market adaptation and intra-organizational 
coordination are indeed strong, because MNCs do not show a clear preference for the 
human capital of local executives or expatriates across the entire team. Instead, we 
demonstrated that MNCs segment functional roles and are disinclined to appoint local 
executives to roles that have substantial monitoring responsibilities and instead fill these 
roles with expatriates. Local executives in turn occupy implementation roles, thereby 
providing the organization with resources for local market adaptation. These findings 
offer support for the view that one of the ways that MNCs manage the dual pressures of 
adaptation and intra-organizational coordination is through a balanced and deliberate 
configuration of the subsidiary executive team.  
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There are certainly several limitations to our study which give rise to future research 
questions that will enhance our understanding of strategic human capital allocation. First, 
although the reporting requirements in the banking industry in Central & Eastern Europe 
facilitated access to subsidiary-level information on executives and performance, 
focusing on a single industry limits the generalizability of our findings. A meaningful 
extension of this research would be to explore whether the appointment patterns for 
implementation and monitoring roles hold more generally across industries and other 
parts of the world. Second, our results suggest that not all types of uncertainty have the 
same effect on executive staffing. An intriguing question that our results raise is how 
administrative distance differs from economic, political, cultural, and geographic distance 
in directing human capital allocation in the subsidiary executive team. Finally, our foray 
into examining how MNCs use multicultural executives indicates an empirical 
opportunity to study to what extent the availability of human capital in the labor market 
impacts MNC staffing strategy. 
Overall, our results contribute to a deeper understanding of MNC human capital 
allocation strategies. Most prior research has focused on executives in the parent 
company or on the CEO role in the subsidiary executive team. We contribute to the 
literature on subsidiary staffing by highlighting the division of labor among the full set of 
functional roles, and illustrating how agency pressures and contingency pressures 
complement each other to achieve balance in team. Finally, we contribute to the 
burgeoning literature on multicultural executives and provide empirical evidence of how 
multicultural individuals are being utilized in the subsidiary executive team. 
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Table 1.1 – Summary statistics for subsidiary executives 
 
 
All
Local 
Executives
Expatriates
Executives
Number 2067 1247 763
Percentage of total 100% 60% 37%
Role
Monitoring role (CEO, Deputy CEO, CFO) 47% 40% 60%
Implementation role (COO, IT, HR, Sales, Legal) 53% 60% 40%
No. of observations 1741 1093 615
Data available for % of sample 84% 88% 81%
Multiculturalism
Multicultural experience (sum of cultural distances 
between all possible country pairs of national 
experience acquired)
63 27 123
Bicultural experience (binary) 35% 28% 49%
Education
No. of higher educational degrees 1.6 1.6 1.6
At least one higher educational degree is from the 
subsidiary country
58% 96% 1%
At least one higher educational degree is from 
region of the subsidiary country
64% 97% 14%
At least one higher educational degree is from the 
parent country
24% 4% 54%
Diversity of educational degrees (1 = all in same 
country, 2 = in two different countries, 3 = in 3 
different countries)
1.3 1.3 1.3
Previous Work Experience
No. of countries 2 1.3 3.1
No. of companies 1.6 1.6 1.6
Percentage who have worked in different industry 30% 34% 24%
Gender
Female (No.) 299 253 41
Male (No.) 1768 994 722
Female (% of executive category) 14% 20% 5%
Male (% of executive category) 86% 80% 95%
Age 45.2 44 46.9
Female 41.3 41.4 41
Male 45.5 44.2 47.2
Tenure
Years in parent company 10.4 8.5 13.3
Years in subsidiary 8.4 10.7 4.9
Years in subsidiary BOD 5.4 6.1 4.2
Years in subsidiary in current executive role 4.8 5.4 3.9
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Table 1.2 – Summary statistics for subsidiaries and parent companies 
 
 
  
Subsidiaries Average
Standard 
Deviation
Mininum Maximum
Subsidiary headcount / MNC home country headcount 91% 204% 0.4% 15000%
Years since owner is in control 10 4.03 1 24
Percentage of subsidiaries which are acquisitions 72% 45% 0 1
Years since acquired 8 2.65 1 16
Year acquired 2000 2.24 1995 2007
Percentage of subsidiaries which are greenfield 28% 45% 0 1
Subsidiary assets / MNC assets 6% 9% 0.07% 79%
Total subsidiary assets (in million USD) 9,702 10,030 93 51,200
Total MNC assets (in million USD) 420,000 515,000 2,000 3,070,000
Return on average assets 1.3 1.5 -7.4 4.5
Parent Companies Average
Standard 
Deviation
Mininum Maximum
Presence in CEE / Global presence 64% 32% 9% 100%
Return on average assets 0.7 0.9 -3.6 4.0
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Table 1.3 – Correlation matrix of cross-national distance measures 
 
 
  
Economic 
distance
Geographic 
distance
Cultural 
distance
Administrative 
distance
Political 
distance
Economic distance 1.00
Geographic distance 0.49 1.00
Cultural distance 0.13 0.23 1.00
Administrative distance 0.33 -0.24 0.01 1.00
Political distance 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.33 1.00
53 
 
Table 1.4 – Environmental uncertainty and staffing of local executives in monitoring 
roles (logistic regression) 
 
 
  
Dependent variable
Local 
executive
Local 
executive
Local 
executive
Local 
executive
Local 
executive
Local 
executive
Local 
executive
Local 
executive
Local 
executive
H1a,b
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Econ dist * monitoring role 0.208
[0.364]
Admin dist * monitoring role -0.041*
[0.022]
Polit dist * monitoring role 0.028
[0.048]
Cult dist * monitoring role 0.067
[0.093]
Geog dist * monitoring role -0.027
[0.517]
Economic distance 1.205** 1.067** -0.535
[0.472] [0.469] [0.346]
Administrative distance 0.066*** 0.084*** 0.016
[0.020] [0.023] [0.019]
Political distance -0.01 -0.033 -0.003
[0.054] [0.057] [0.032]
Cultural distance 0.094*** 0.127** 0.039
[0.034] [0.059] [0.086]
Geographic distance -0.014 0.332 -0.909*
[0.489] [0.581] [0.477]
Monitoring role -1.046*** -1.057** -1.446* -0.199 -1.382* -1.893 -0.886
[0.327] [0.502] [0.784] [0.541] [0.740] [1.228] [3.419]
Subsidiary Headcount / MNC Home 
Country Headcount
-0.138 0.147 -0.084 0.250** -0.078 -0.09 -0.085 0.148 -0.051
[0.152] [0.133] [0.132] [0.126] [0.128] [0.131] [0.129] [0.095] [0.109]
Presence in CEE / Global Presence -3.046* -2.39 -2.731 -1.329 -1.906 -2.685 -2.786 -1.116 -2.036
[1.830] [1.727] [2.240] [2.239] [2.134] [2.440] [2.257] [1.825] [2.257]
Years MNC is in Control 0.169*** 0.015 0.187*** -0.053 0.173*** 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.048 0.152**
[0.065] [0.068] [0.067] [0.078] [0.067] [0.065] [0.067] [0.069] [0.068]
Subsidiary Assets / MNC Assets -0.692 1.399 -0.845 1.52 -1.533 -1.106 -0.606 -2.470*** -1.018
[1.716] [1.075] [1.686] [1.020] [1.453] [1.660] [1.697] [0.740] [0.975]
Subsidiary is an Acquisition 2.871*** 20.105*** 2.965*** 21.056*** 3.041*** 2.924*** 2.951*** 19.387*** 2.591***
[0.900] [1.515] [0.884] [1.801] [0.913] [0.940] [0.897] [1.190] [0.876]
Subsidiary ROAA 0.121 0.001 0.167** -0.036 0.182** 0.162** 0.167** 0.005 0.208**
[0.081] [0.093] [0.082] [0.108] [0.078] [0.080] [0.081] [0.103] [0.085]
MNC ROAA 0.126 -0.106 0.136 -0.184 0.131 0.115 0.158 -0.014 0.068
[0.137] [0.121] [0.144] [0.144] [0.153] [0.133] [0.147] [0.153] [0.134]
Constant -2.842** -23.004*** -2.969** -25.786*** -1.799 -3.223** -2.877** -18.524*** 4.409
[1.247] [3.996] [1.243] [5.221] [1.287] [1.275] [1.228] [2.135] [3.577]
MNC-level F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 992 604 864 507 864 864 864 507 864
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
H3H2
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Table 1.5 – Environmental uncertainty and staffing of multicultural executives 
 
 
Regression type: OLS Logit Logit Logit
Dependent variable: Multicultural Bicultural Bicultural Bicultural
Hypothesis:
Local execs 
only
Expats only
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Economic distance 2.607 2.759*** 10.989*** 0.411
[11.584] [0.935] [3.184] [1.245]
Administrative distance -1.032 -0.065* -0.195 -0.133*
[0.632] [0.035] [0.131] [0.071]
Political distance -3.550*** -0.164 0.018 -0.166*
[0.842] [0.100] [0.143] [0.093]
Cultural distance -3.064** -0.069* 0.222** -0.307**
[1.307] [0.042] [0.095] [0.123]
Geographic distance -47.676*** -2.965*** -6.368*** -0.743
[11.908] [0.819] [1.888] [1.700]
Subsidiary Headcount / MNC Home Country Headcount-5.716* 0.07 0.524*** 0.133
[3.355] [0.068] [0.100] [0.277]
Presence in CEE / Global Presence -57.943 -3.252 -14.174*** -1.629
[36.611] [2.076] [3.093] [4.246]
Years MNC is in Control 0.799 -0.058 -0.211 -0.099
[1.902] [0.097] [0.200] [0.152]
Subsidiary Assets / MNC Assets -76.331* -0.677 -6.867*** -0.867
[37.908] [1.410] [2.256] [2.493]
Subsidiary is an Acquisition -109.495*** -2.526** -0.345 9.962***
[24.396] [1.168] [2.013] [3.267]
Subsidiary ROAA -0.319 -0.17 -0.255 -0.163
[2.798] [0.150] [0.281] [0.272]
MNC ROAA -2.161 -0.539* -1.563*** -0.887**
[3.891] [0.318] [0.523] [0.409]
Constant 586.926*** 20.044*** 43.051*** 2.335
[112.704] [5.293] [13.105] [14.207]
MNC-level F.E. YES YES YES YES
Observations 472 612 248 254
R-squared 0.319
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
H4
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CHAPTER 3:  PRINCIPAL—AGENT RELATIONSHIPS IN MULTINATIONAL 
BANKS – EVIDENCE FROM EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twenty years, emerging markets have experienced a significant increase in 
foreign ownership of banks (Claessens & Van Horen, 2012). Banks with foreign owners 
from advanced economies tend to be more profitable and efficient than other emerging 
market banks (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001; Cull & Martínez Pería, 
2010; Micco, Panizza, & Yanez, 2007). However, foreign-owned banks may be reluctant 
to engage in soft-information lending (Detragiache, Tressel, & Gupta, 2008; Mian, 2006). 
Explanations for the behavior of these banks are grounded in assumptions about the 
ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge (Guillén & 
Tschoegl, 2000; Sengupta, 2007) and to manage agency problems in the parent-
subsidiary relationship (Stein, 2002). However, while there is evidence on the internal 
capital market in multinational banks (De Haas & Van Lelyveld, 2010) and on agency 
relations within foreign-owned banks (Beck, Ioannidou, & Shchäfer, 2012; Canales & 
Nanda, 2012), evidence on governance relationships between parent banks and their 
subsidiaries is almost non-existent (Majnoni, Shankar, & Varhegyi, 2003 is an 
exception). 
In this paper, we investigate how foreign owners use the power to appoint executives 
at their subsidiaries to manage the parent-subsidiary relationship.1 Subsidiary executives 
                                                 
1 We refer to the headquarters of a multinational bank as the parent bank, which is located in 
the parent or home country. Subsidiaries, are foreign-owned banks located in emerging market 
host countries. 
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have extensive delegated authority. It is therefore important that they have insight into the 
local business environment and that they can be relied upon to act in the best interest of 
the parent bank (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). We draw on the international management 
literature to argue that, at the margin, executives from the host country where a subsidiary 
operates are more apt to understand the local business environment, while executives 
with roots in the parent bank have objectives that are more congruent with those of the 
parent (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Kobrin, 1988). The choice between a parent-bank 
and a host-country executive thus involves a trade-off between congruence of objectives 
and the quality of information held by an agent. We evaluate how banks manage this 
trade-off in light of the institutional environment in the host country, parent-country 
supervision and parent-host distance. 
We hand-collect a unique new dataset on executive appointments in 74 banks in 
fourteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe over the years 2005 to 2010. We have 
2,063 executive-year observations, although most of the analysis focuses on CEOs. We 
combine these data with accounting data from Bankscope for both subsidiaries and 
foreign parents, data on the regulatory environment from (Abiad, Detragiache, & Tressel, 
2010) and (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2008) and data on strategy and internal organization 
of banks from the EBRD’s Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS). 
We first investigate the relationship between CEO type and the quality of institutions 
that facilitate monitoring by the parent (rules for bank accounting and supervision). 
Stronger “monitoring institutions” increase the likelihood that a bank has a host-country 
CEO. In the trade-off between congruence and insight, monitoring by the parent bank 
57 
 
relaxes the constraint on congruence and thus facilitates the appointment of host-country 
CEOs.  We also show that banks from home countries with strong supervision are more 
concerned about monitoring institutions in the host country than other banks. In the same 
vein, (Ongena, Popov, & Udell, 2013) find that banks are more risk-averse abroad when 
supervision at home is strong. Monitoring institutions also have a bigger effect on CEO 
type when cultural distance between home and host-countries is large. Distant parent 
banks derive more informational benefits from monitoring institutions. 
(Stein, 2002) argues that informational opacity at the loan level affects agency 
relations between loan officers and their supervisors as well as at higher levels in the 
organization. Yet, we find no relationship between creditor rights or the quality of credit 
information and CEO type. There are several explanations for the fact that these credit 
institutions do not affect CEO type. For example, banks may simply avoid soft-
information lending when credit information is poor (Beck et al., 2012; Haselmann, 
Pistor, & Vig, 2010). However, we don’t find that credit institutions matter more for CEO 
type in banks whose strategies rely on soft information. 
The empirical analysis is informed by agency theory and we show that it has 
significant explanatory power. That being said, other considerations, such as knowledge 
transfers, inform the choice of CEO type (Guillén & Tschoegl, 2000). In additional 
analysis, we find that other factors may play a larger role in the appointment of 
executives below the CEO. Overall though, parent banks appear to emphasize control 
over knowledge transfer and congruence over insight even though weaker institutions 
increase the value of both. 
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Indicators of institutional quality tend to be highly correlated and a concern is that the 
coefficients on monitoring institutions represent the impact of a wider set of institutions 
on CEO type. A standard fixed effects model eliminates (almost) all variation in 
institutions because institutions change slowly. However, our results hold in a (Mundlak, 
1978)-type approach that treats bank fixed effects as a function of the average of the 
time-varying variables in the model. 
This paper makes three important contributions to the literature. First, the literature on 
foreign ownership of banks makes important assumptions about agency problems 
between foreign owner and subsidiary. We are the first to provide direct evidence on 
banks’ efforts to manage this agency problem. Our findings also contribute to the broader 
literature on international human resource management, which has not directly studied 
the relation between the quality of host-country institutions and executive appointments. 
Second, building on (Stein, 2002), the literature has thought of agency relations in 
multinational banks in terms of a trade-off between information and control, keeping the 
objectives and capabilities of agents constant. We complement this by thinking of the 
agency problem as a trade-off between information and congruency. This is of practical 
relevance because multinational banks delegate, formally or effectively, many important 
decisions to their subsidiaries. Third, our paper suggests that there is a need for further 
research on the origins and consequences of information asymmetries within multilateral 
banks. (Stein, 2002) and (Aghion & Tirole, 1997) assume that all information 
asymmetries arise at the transaction (loan) level. We find that institutions that affect 
information asymmetries at the loan level (credit information) and at the subsidiary level 
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(monitoring institutions) have a different impact on agency relations in multinational 
banks. 
In what follows, we discuss the background and empirical predictions in section 2. 
We present the data and methodology in section 3 and the results in section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1 Agency relations in multinational banks 
Research on principal-agent problems in multinational banks has generally built on the 
model in (Stein, 2002), who studies the choice between centralization and delegation in 
hierarchies. In the model, principals may delegate the allocation of capital to agents who 
have soft information about the profitability of investment opportunities, but also seek to 
maximize their capital allocation. Centralization is likely to be optimal in large, multi-
unit organizations, especially when soft information can be hardened to some extent. 
While multinational banks centralize decisions such as the allocation of capital (De 
Haas & Naaborg, 2006), they routinely delegate important decisions to their subsidiaries, 
including loan approvals and local hiring. “Who to delegate to?” is therefore an important 
question.  
The identity of the agent is not a variable of interest in (Stein, 2002), but Aghion and 
Tirole (1997) argue that a principal is more comfortable with delegation if (i) an agent is 
good at collecting information about potential investments and if (ii) the agent’s 
objectives are congruent with the principal’s. Given a certain level of delegation parent 
banks should thus appoint CEOs with insight into the local business environment and 
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loyalty to the parent. Because candidates are heterogeneous, CEO appointments likely 
involve a tradeoff between insight and congruence. 
3.2.2 Agency relations and the origin of executives 
The international management literature suggests that such a trade-off exists in the choice 
between parent-country and host-country executives. This literature has thought of host-
country executives as inherently more attuned to the local market environment, for 
example because they speak the local language (Edström & Galbraith, 1977; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991; Kobrin, 1988). By contrast, parent-country executives are more 
attuned to the objectives and business practices of a company’s headquarters.  As such, 
they exercise control through “socialization” of the subsidiary within the multinational 
(Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994; Ouchi, 1980). Socialization supplements formal control 
mechanisms (such as resource allocation) and facilitates the development of shared 
values and congruence of objectives. 
Empirical evidence suggests that multinationals are more likely to appoint parent-
country executives positions where they exercise control (e.g. CEO, CFO) than in 
executive positions such as human resource management or marketing  that require 
awareness of local conditions (Brenner, 2009; Harzing, 2001). There is limited research 
on the role of host-country institutions in the choice between host-country and parent-
country executives. However, evidence suggests that high cultural or institutional 
distance is associated with the appointment of parent-country nationals even though 
multinationals could benefit from the insight of host-country nationals in distant locations 
(Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003; Harzing, 2001).  
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3.2.3 The subsidiary CEO as intermediary 
In addition to being an agent of the parent bank, a subsidiary CEO can be seen as an 
intermediary between the parent and loan officers in the subsidiary.2 In the models of 
(Aghion & Tirole, 1997) and (Dessein, 2002), intermediaries act as a buffer between 
principal and agent. In these models, agents are motivated to collect information about 
projects because information gives them influence and the opportunity to recommend a 
project that gives them the highest private benefits. Ex ante, agents’ effort is beneficial to 
the principal, but ex post, it may be in the interest of the principal to overrule the agent. 
The prospect of being overruled creates a disincentive to gather information for the agent 
(see also Stein, 2002). If an intermediary (the CEO) has objectives somewhere between 
those of the principal (the parent) and the agent (the loan officer), an intermediary will 
increase agents’ incentives to do research. This is attractive for the principal if the value 
of information collected by agents is very high (Dessein, 2002). 
3.2.4 Agency relations and host-country institutions 
Institutions in the host country create or attenuate informational asymmetries between 
subsidiaries and their foreign parents. Empirical evidence shows that strong institutions 
that reduce information asymmetries facilitate foreign investment in banking and, 
conditional upon entry, risk-taking (Buch & DeLong, 2004; Focarelli & Pozzolo, 2005; 
Haselmann et al., 2010; Houston, Lin, & Ma, 2012). One of the theoretical arguments 
underlying these findings is that better institutions alleviate informational and agency 
                                                 
2 In practice, there are additional hierarchical layers in the subsidiary including branch and 
regional managers. The key point is that there are agency problems both between headquarters 
and subsidiary and within the subsidiary. 
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costs for foreign banks, which enables them to compete with domestic incumbents 
(Dell'Ariccia & Marquez, 2004; Mian, 2006). 
Institutions affect information asymmetries in multinational banks at two levels: the 
parent-CEO relationship and the loan officer-CEO relationship. Existing theories focus 
(implicitly) on the latter: all information asymmetries originate at the transaction/loan 
level (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Stein, 2002). Better credit information and creditor rights 
(“credit institutions”) reduce the importance of soft information to make good lending 
decisions. Hence, better credit institutions reduce the value of loan officer effort to collect 
information. From a CEO-as-intermediary perspective, better creditor rights may 
therefore, all else being equal, favor the appointment of parent-bank CEOs, who are 
closer to the parent. 
Institutions such as strong accounting rules for banks or strict supervision in the host 
country do not necessarily improve loan-level information. However, they improve 
parents’ insight into the performance of the subsidiary as a whole and thus the 
performance of the CEO. As such, these “monitoring institutions” reduce the need for 
parent-CEO congruence and thus facilitate the appointment of host-country CEOs. 
3.2.5 Home country characteristics and distance 
Recent work by (Houston et al., 2012) and (Ongena et al., 2013) shows that home-
country regulation has an impact on the scope of bank activities abroad. Strict regulation 
of activities at home is associated with more risk-taking abroad. This relationship is 
particularly strong when banking supervision at home is weak (Ongena et al., 2013). 
Stringent home-country supervision makes parents more sensitive to risk and less likely 
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to lend to soft-information clients, which should favor parent-bank CEOs. 
Home-country characteristics also matter because they create geographical, cultural 
or regulatory distance. Distance causes information asymmetries and it may reduce 
(perceived) congruence between the parent bank and host-country nationals. Several 
studies show that distance makes banks more risk averse in their cross-country lending 
and investment (Buch & DeLong, 2004; De Haas & Van Horen, 2013; Giannetti & 
Yafeh, 2012; Mian, 2006). This is consistent with evidence that multinationals appoint 
parent-country executives when distance grows, asserting control but giving up on insight 
into the local environment (Harzing, 2001). 
3.2.6 Hypotheses 
Building on the preceding discussion, we test three hypotheses. First, we expect that 
institutions that facilitate monitoring of the subsidiary will be associated with the 
appointment of host-country CEOs. Second, the direct effect of both distance and poor 
credit institutions on CEO appointments is indeterminate. In both cases, there are benefits 
to appointing a host-country CEO who is closer to local loan officers or has more insight 
into the local business environment, but it also becomes more difficult to monitor a CEO 
who may not share the parent’s. Hence, we can think of the need for congruence as a 
constraint on the parent’s ability to appoint a host-country CEO. Monitoring institutions 
relax this constraint and we therefore expect the marginal effect of better monitoring 
institutions on CEO-type to be large when distance is high or credit institutions in the 
host country are poor. Third, stronger home-country supervision should be associated 
with parent-bank CEOs, especially when host-country monitoring institutions are weak. 
64 
 
3.3 DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 Executives 
This paper presents a unique new dataset of executive appointments in 74 foreign-owned 
banks in thirteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe (the CEE region) over the years 
2005 to 2010. Most of the countries in the region have implemented far-reaching reforms 
since the beginning of economic transition in the early 1990s. However, cross-country 
variation in the quality of institutions remains significant (Cottarelli, Dell'Ariccia, & 
Vladkova-Hollar, 2005). Foreign banks, mostly from Western Europe along with some 
from the United States, control more than 65 percent of the banking sector in the region. 
Recently, OTP, a Hungarian bank, and a few Russian banks have also made acquisitions 
in the CEE countries. The subsidiaries in our dataset tend to offer a wide range of 
commercial banking services to predominantly local clients. Below the level of the 
executive board, staff in the subsidiaries is overwhelmingly from the host country. 
Our data cover 355 bank years with a total of 2,063 executive-year entries from 695 
unique executives. In addition to the names, gender, and nationalities of executives, we 
have information on their age, tenure at their current bank, prior experience, and 
education, including foreign experience and education. Data on executives comes 
primarily from bank websites and annual reports but we also checked executive profiles 
in Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database and reputable websites like Bloomberg (but not in 
self-reported information such as LinkedIn). 
In a small number of cases (23 executives, 4 CEOs), we could not determine an 
executive’s nationality. For these individuals, we used the address book on Skype to 
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determine a “most likely” nationality for these executives. We entered an executive’s last 
name in the Skype address book and checked which country was most frequently 
associated with this name.3 We validated this approach by using the “Skype method” on 
executives with a confirmed nationality. This revealed that the method does not 
differentiate very well between, say, Belgium and France, but it does differentiate 
between Belgium and Romania, which is the important distinction. 
We divide executives into two groups based on their nationalities. “Host-country 
executives” are nationals of the country in which a subsidiary is located. We count 
Slovak nationals as host-country executives in the Czech Republic (and vice versa) and 
we count executives from any of the parts of former Yugoslavia as host-country 
executives in the other parts. Some of these executives started their careers in what were 
then Czechoslovak or Yugoslav banks and even if they didn’t, they grew up and were 
educated in Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia and they are likely to share a common 
understanding of business practices. 
Executives from the parent country of a bank or from third countries are all “parent-
bank executives”. The international management literature has sometimes argued that 
third-country nationals are a separate category that fits in between host- and parent-
country nationals (for example because they are from the region of the subsidiary 
Collings, Morley, & Gunnigle, 2008). However, the third-country executives in our data 
do not fit this description. They are often from Western Europe or have built careers in 
                                                 
3 The address book on Skype.com will list up to 200 entries for each name; from these names, 
we exclude entries where the user clearly does not have the same last name as the executive in 
our database (a search for the last name Wilson for example also returns users with the first name 
Wilson). 
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the parent bank. Hence, their career prospects depend on their success in serving the 
interests of the parent just like it does for parent-country executives. 
Table 2.1 shows that out of 2,063 observations 752 (37%) are from parent-bank 
executives. The share is 46% among new appointees. Aside from the CEO position, 
executive functions are not consistently defined across banks. However, we were able to 
assign most executives to a functional area. Like e.g. Harzing (2001), we find that 
executives responsible for sales, internal operations or human resources, are more likely 
to be host-country executives than CEOs, Deputy CEOs or executives in functions related 
to financial and risk management.4 Parent-bank executives are in roles where congruence 
is important as they exercise control on behalf of the parent in general management and 
finance functions. 
We summarize executive characteristics in Table 2.2. Individuals in our database are 
generally male and in their mid-forties, with parent-bank executives slightly older and 
more likely to be male than their host-country counterparts. Host-country nationals are 
more likely to have at least a master’s degree than parent-bank executives, but less likely 
to have foreign work experience or a foreign education.5 Finally, parent-bank executives 
have a shorter tenure at the subsidiary and in the board than host-country nationals but a 
longer tenure at the parent bank. 
3.3.2 Institutions, distance and other data 
We combine the hand-collected data on executives with bank level and parent-bank level 
accounting data from Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope database. Information on country-
                                                 
4 “Other” indicates that no specific function could be determined. 
5 Foreign experience does not include experience in the executive’s current position. 
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level institutions comes from a variety of sources. As a measure of monitoring 
institutions, we use the score for the quality of banking supervision from (Abiad et al., 
2010), which rates countries on a scale of 0 to 3 as of 2005; a higher score indicates that 
regulators apply stricter rules and have the legal authority and capacity to exercise 
effective supervision. In addition, we use the score for bank accounting rules from (Barth, 
Caprio, & Levine, 2013).6 The score has a scale from 0 to 4 and measures to what extent 
banks recognize interest on nonperforming loans as income and if they produce 
consolidated statement. A higher score is associated with more stringent accounting 
practices. 
As a proxy for the importance of soft information in lending decisions, we use the 
score for the quality of credit information from the Doing Business Database, which 
measures the scope and accessibility of credit information on a scale from 0 to 6.7 As an 
alternative measure, we also use the Doing Business score for creditor rights, which 
measures the quality of collateral laws and legal protection for secured creditors in case 
of bankruptcy. 
Our measure for geographical distance between countries comes from the French 
center for research on the international economy, CEPII.8 Cultural distance is calculated 
on the basis of the four dimensions of national culture that were conceived by Hofstede 
(Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Masculinity versus Femininity, 
                                                 
6 See http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Regulation.htm 
7 www.doingbusiness.org 
8 www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6 
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Uncertainty Avoidance).9 On all dimensions, countries receive a score from 0 to 100 and 
cultural distance is calculated as the Euclidian distance between the scores of the parent 
and host-countries. 
In some of the additional analysis of our results, we use information from the 
Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS), which was held by the EBRD in 
2004. To measure banks’ focus on retail clients, we use the percentage of loans going to 
households. We also use information from the BEPS to measure the hierarchical nature of 
the internal organization of subsidiaries. Banks were asked about the maximum size of a 
loan that could be approved by a branch manager. We create a dummy that is 1 if the loan 
approval authority of branch managers is smaller than the median for the host country in 
which the subsidiary is located. Hence, the dummy is 1 for subsidiaries that have a 
relatively hierarchical organization that promotes the use of hard information (Liberti & 
Mian, 2009; Stein, 2002). 
3.3.3 Empirical model 
The hypotheses predict a link between the likelihood that a parent-bank executive is 
appointed and host-country and home-country institutions. The baseline model has the 
following specification (with subscripts i for bank, j for parent bank, c for country and t 
for time): 
 (1) 
In equation (1), Parent CEO is a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO is from the parent bank, 
                                                 
9 www.geerthofstede.nl/dimension-data-matrix; a fifth dimension (long-term orientation) and 
a sixth (Indulgence vs. restraint) have been added to the set of cultural dimensions, but the 
country coverage does not fully coincide between the first four and the additional dimensions. 
ijct ct ijct jct ct t ijctInstitutions Bank Parent Country YearParent CEO β γ δ θ ε= + + + + +
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Institutions is a measure of the institutional environment such as the quality of banking 
supervision. Bank, Parent Bank and Country are vectors of control variables and Year is a 
set of dummies for each of the years in the panel. 
The main challenge in estimating equation (1) is that there may be unobserved bank 
and country characteristics that affect CEO appointments even after we control for 
relevant observables. We are particularly concerned that characteristics of the business 
climate in host countries are correlated with the institutions of interest. In principle, bank 
or country fixed effects would control for this but fixed effects wipe out (almost) all 
variation in the institutional variables. In some cases, institutional variables are time-
invariant but even when there is variation over time this is limited. Over the course of the 
sample period, the score for creditor rights does not change in eight out of thirteen 
countries. In three of the other countries, it changes once, by one point. Even if fixed 
effects estimates were statistically significant one could wonder if estimates that are 
identified by observations from a handful of countries are meaningful. 
Instead of estimating a standard fixed effects model, we follow (Mundlak, 1978) and 
explicitly model unobserved heterogeneity across banks. If we simplify equation (1) and 
split the independent variables into a vector X of time-varying variables and a vector Z of 
variables that remain constant over time, we can write the model as follows: 
 (2) 
In equation (2), εijct is decomposed into ci, a bank-level fixed effect and ηijct, a mean-
zero error that is assumed to be uncorrelated with X and Z. Mundlak models ci as a 
function of the bank-level averages of X,  and we estimate: 
ijct ijct ijc i ijctX ZParent CEO cβ λ η= + + +
i ijc ijcc X pi ν= +
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 (3) 
As shown by (Mundlak, 1978), this estimator produces the fixed effects estimate for β 
(see also Wooldridge, 2010). Each of the coefficients λa in the vector λ is unbiased under 
the assumption that a variable za that is associated with λa is uncorrelated with vijc, i.e. 
that za is uncorrelated with ci  conditional on X, X̅ and all variables zb≠a in Z. To justify 
this assumption for the institutions of interest, we include in our model GDP per capita, 
which is strongly correlated with measures of the general business climate (Commander 
& Svejnar, 2011) and the ICRG score for economic risk.10 Also, because the presence of 
νijc in the error term causes correlation of errors within banks we cluster errors at the level 
of subsidiaries or their parents. 
3.3.4 Control variables 
At the bank level, we control for size (log of assets), capitalization (the equity-to-assets 
ratio) and profitability (ROA). Both size and capitalization of a subsidiary indicate how 
much is at stake for the parent bank. A lack of profitability might induce owners to 
appoint a parent-bank CEO in an effort to realign strategy and restore profits. We include 
a dummy for banks established through greenfield investment and the log of the number 
of years a bank has been under foreign ownership. At greenfield banks, owners start with 
a clean slate and can appoint executives to their liking, but at acquired banks they may be 
reluctant to replace incumbents, at least initially. Alternatively, it may become easier to 
delegate to host-country nationals over time as they become more attuned to the 
objectives and practices of the parent bank. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable 
                                                 
10 www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx 
( )ijct ijct ijc ijc ijc ijctParent C X XZEO β λ pi ν η= + + + +
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that is equal to 1 if a subsidiary is listed in its host country. At listed companies, it may be 
more difficult to control executive appointments. 
Because cultural attributes of the home country or the parent bank could have an 
impact on executive appointments, we control for the tendency of parents to appoint 
parent-bank CEOs. For parents with multiple subsidiaries in the dataset we calculate, for 
each subsidiary and each year, the unconditional probability that the other banks in the 
parent network have a parent-bank CEO (we set the variable to zero for subsidiaries that 
have no siblings in a given year). At the level of parent banks, we further control for size, 
capitalization and profitability. Large and well-capitalized parents might be willing to 
take some risk and leave subsidiaries in the hands of local executives. Alternatively, large 
banks may have well-established policies that promote expatriate appointments as a part 
of management development (Harzing, 2001). Profitable parent banks may seek to 
“export” surplus managerial resources to subsidiaries (Tschoegl, 2005). 
In addition to the log of GDP per capita and the ICRG score for economic risk, we 
include GDP growth to control for demand conditions and the ratio of bank credit to GDP 
to control for the development of the banking sector in the host country. Furthermore, we 
include enrolment in tertiary education as a proxy for the availability of highly qualified 
individuals in the host country. Table 2.3 reports summary statistics. 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Monitoring institutions 
The first set of regressions is reported in Table 2.4, with OLS estimates in the first 
column. There is a strong negative correlation between the quality of supervision in the 
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host-country and the likelihood that a bank has a parent-bank CEO. This is consistent 
with the notion that supervision facilitates monitoring by parents. Coefficients on the 
control variables suggest that large subsidiaries are less likely, while listed banks are 
more likely to have parent-bank CEOs. Large and well-capitalized parent banks are more 
likely to choose parent-bank CEOs. 
We move to the fixed effects estimates in column 2 and also cluster the standard 
errors by bank. This produces a larger standard error on supervision, but it is almost 
significant at the 1 percent level.11 Adding the ICRG score for economic risk to the model 
in column 3 does not change much. In columns 2 and 3 we cluster standard errors at the 
subsidiary level, but one might argue that we should really cluster the errors at the level 
of parent banks. This produces a slight increase in standard errors on some variables and 
a decline in others, but there is no large change in the significance of supervision (column 
4). 
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the estimates in columns 3 and 4 with bank accounting rules. 
This gives us access to a slightly larger sample (supervision is missing for Croatia, 
Slovakia and Macedonia; accounting rules are missing for Kazakhstan). The results 
confirm that banks are more likely to have a parent-bank CEO if monitoring institutions 
are weak. The size of the coefficients is meaningful. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
the score for supervision reduces the likelihood that a subsidiary has a parent-bank CEO 
by about 30 percent of a standard deviation. In the case of accounting rules, a one-
                                                 
11 The “significance stars” in the tables are based on a t-distribution with N – 1 degrees of 
freedom, where N is the number of clusters. In column 2, the t-statistic on supervision is 2.64 and 
the p-value is 0.0105. 
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standard deviation increase leads to a reduction in the likelihood of a parent-bank CEO 
by a little less than 15 percent of a standard deviation. 
In the Mundlak fixed effects estimates most control variables lose significance as 
their bank-level averages are included in the model. However, the coefficient on log 
assets remains significant if errors are clustered by bank. Moreover, in columns 5 and 6, 
the economic risk score enters with a negative coefficient, indicating that lower economic 
risk makes it less likely that foreign owners choose parent-bank CEOs. 
The results in Table 2.4 are robust in a variety of alternative specifications. For 
example, they hold up in a probit model (with Mundlak-type fixed effects) and, with the 
exception of column 4, the results also hold when we restrict the sample to observations 
for which we have both the supervision score and the score for accounting rules. 
Although the results do not hold if we use the scores for supervisory powers from (Barth 
et al., 2013)12, the results are robust to using a dummy that is equal to 1 if both 
accounting rules and supervision are above the median in the sample. The results also 
hold when we replace the dependent variable with a dummy that is equal to 1 only when 
the CEO is from the parent country (i.e. excluding third-country nationals) or with a 
variable that allows for “hybrid nationalities”. This variable operationalizes the idea that 
host-country nationals can be “socialized” into the multinational environment: it is equal 
to 3 for parent-bank executives, equal to 2 for host-country executives with foreign work 
                                                 
12 The score for supervisory power from Barth et al. puts a lot of weight on enforcement 
powers. Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. 2008. Bank regulations are changing: for better or 
worse? Comparative Economic Studies, 50, No. 4: 537-563. find the score to be associated with 
corruption in lending, which would increase rather than decrease the need for parental oversight 
of foreign subsidiaries. 
74 
 
experience and equal to 1 for host-country executives with a foreign education. Overall, 
the results confirm that subsidiaries are more likely to have parent-bank CEOs when 
institutional weakness compromises monitoring by parents. 
3.4.2 Credit information and creditor rights 
We anticipate that the marginal effect of monitoring institutions is stronger in countries 
with weak creditor rights. We investigate this in Table 2.5 (going forward, the sample is 
restricted to observations for which we have the supervision and bank accounting scores). 
In the first column, we enter credit information along with supervision and find that 
supervision remains significant while credit information is insignificant. In column 2, we 
assess whether the quality of credit information affects the marginal impact of monitoring 
institutions on CEO type. We divide the data into four quadrants based on whether credit 
information and supervision are above or below the median. Each quadrant is identified 
with a dummy and we enter three of them (weak monitoring / weak credit information is 
omitted).13 The results indicated that, when credit information is weak, the impact of an 
improvement in supervision on CEO type remains negative and significant (coefficient 
(1)). When credit information is strong, the marginal effect of supervision on CEO type is 
somewhat smaller (Difference: (3) – (2) at the bottom of the table) and insignificant. 
However, the marginal effects of supervision are not significantly different with strong or 
with weak credit information (Test: (3) – (2) = (1)). 
We repeat the analysis with creditor rights in columns 3 and 4 with accounting rules 
                                                 
13 We also estimated a model with a supervision × credit information interaction. However, 
these estimates were very unstable as the main variables and interactions are highly correlated 
(with correlation coefficients up to 0.99). 
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in columns 5 to 8 of Table 2.5. The results confirm that an improvement in monitoring 
institutions reduces the likelihood that subsidiaries have parent-bank CEOs. As expected, 
the marginal effect of monitoring institutions on CEO-type tends to be smaller when 
creditor institutions are strong. However, this effect is never significantly different from 
the effect with weak institutions and, except in column 8, it is always significant. 
The effect of credit institutions on CEO appointments is theoretically indeterminate 
and empirically never significant. However, given the importance in the literature of the 
notion that foreign-owned banks struggle with soft information it is worth further 
analysis. First, we investigate whether credit institutions matter more for banks that focus 
on soft information (retail) clients. In columns 1 to 4 of Table 2.6, we use the percentage 
of loans that went to households in 2004 as a proxy for retail focus. The results show a 
positive relationship between retail focus and the likelihood that a subsidiary has a 
parent-bank CEO (in different, unreported, specifications, we find that the direction of 
the effect is unclear). In columns 5 to 8, we use the ratio of customer deposits to loans to 
measure retail focus. This ratio tends to be higher for banks that have access to retail 
deposits (Altunbas, Manganelli, & Marques-Ibanez, 2011). We find that subsidiaries with 
a high deposit-to-loan ratio are less likely to have a parent-bank CEO. This is more in 
line with expectations: greater retail focus raises the importance of local knowledge. 
Again, however, there is no clear relationship between credit institutions and CEO type. 
In addition to client focus, the internal organization of a bank affects the importance 
of soft information in decision making. We use data from the BEPS survey to construct a 
dummy that is equal to 1 if branch managers have limited discretion over loan approvals, 
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which favors the use of hard information over soft information (Liberti & Mian, 2009; 
Stein, 2002). When we enter the dummy into our equation in Table 2.7, it has a strongly 
positive coefficient. The appointment of parent-bank CEOs, who have less insight into 
the local business environment, is thus associated with hierarchical decision making 
rules. Whether the impact of creditor institutions on CEO type depends on the internal 
organization is unclear. In column 2, the marginal effect of better credit information is 
positive when loan approval limits are low (coefficient (3) – coefficient (1)), but not 
when approval limits are high. For creditor rights in column 4, the situation is reversed. 
In all other cases, creditor institutions are insignificant. While the results in Table 2.7 are 
interesting in their own right, they do not clarify the relationship between creditor 
institutions and CEO type. 
3.4.3 Home country characteristics and distance 
Bank supervision at home does not have a direct impact on information asymmetries 
between banks and their subsidiaries, but they may affect parent banks’ concern about 
such asymmetries. Table 2.8 reports a set of regressions that investigate the relationship 
between monitoring institutions at home and the likelihood that a subsidiary has a parent-
bank CEO. The estimates reveal that supervision at home has a positive linear effect on 
CEO type. Moreover, when supervision at home is weak, the impact of host-country 
monitoring institutions on CEO type is insignificant (coefficient (1) in columns 2 and 6). 
By contrast, when supervision at home is strong, monitoring institutions in the host 
country have a strong significant impact on CEO type (coefficient (3) – (2)), which is 
significantly different from the effect when parent-country supervision is weak (test: (3) – 
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(2) = (1)). When home-country supervisors keep a close eye on parents, the parents are 
much more likely to keep a close eye on their subsidiaries in host countries with weak 
monitoring institutions. This is consistent with the result in (Ongena et al., 2013) that 
tight home-country supervision makes foreign-owned banks more risk averse. They also 
find that the enforcement of rules at home (supervision) has a more important effect on 
bank behavior than the restrictiveness of the rules themselves (accounting rules in our 
case). 
In Table 2.9, we investigate the role of distance – differences between countries that 
are due to distance don’t necessarily reflect strengths or weaknesses but they reduce the 
level of familiarity between home and host country. The results suggest that cultural, but 
not physical, distance matters for CEO appointments. Cultural distance itself has a 
(weakly) positive impact on the likelihood that a subsidiary has a parent-bank CEO. This 
is consistent with e.g. Harzing (2001). However, the effect of cultural distance is small 
and insignificant when monitoring institutions are strong (coefficient (3) – (1) in columns 
4 and 8). When cultural distance increases the value of a CEO’s insight into the local 
business environment grows. As anticipated, monitoring institutions provide 
informational benefits to parent-banks that have to manage large cultural differences in 
particular, which facilitates delegation to host-country nationals. 
3.4.4 Other executives 
In addition to providing oversight, parent-bank executives also engage in knowledge 
transfer (Kobrin, 1988; Tschoegl, 2005). This might be especially relevant at levels 
below the CEO where executives are responsible for e.g. the implementation of modern 
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risk management, IT, HR policies and sales. The regressions in Table 2.10 aim to get a 
better insight into the extent to which the appointment of other executives is driven by 
different considerations than the appointment of CEOs. To begin with panel A, we run 
Poisson regressions with the number of parent-bank executives (excluding the CEO) as 
dependent variable. The regressions show that strong accounting rules tend to reduce the 
number of parent-bank executives, but the coefficient on supervision is insignificant. 
Hence, after we control for CEO type, which is strongly correlated with supervision, 
supervision has no further impact on the origin of other executives. 
Unsurprisingly, the number of executives is positively related to the number of 
parent-bank executives but after we control for the parent-bank CEO dummy and the 
number of executives, the percentage of parent-bank executives in a bank’s network is 
insignificant. 
In Panel B of Table 2.10 we look at the likelihood that a newly appointed executive 
has roots in the parent bank given the share of parent-bank executives among incumbents. 
The results show that there is a negative relationship between the share of parent-bank 
incumbents and the likelihood that a new appointee is from the parent bank. Considering 
that the regression includes the bank-level average of the share of parent-bank incumbent, 
the coefficient implies that, when there are more (or fewer) parent-bank executives than 
some equilibrium level, banks choose a new appointee to restore equilibrium. The impact 
of better monitoring institutions on new appointments is negative insignificant. 
Taken together, the results in Table 2.10 show that, after we control for CEO type or 
the origin of incumbent executives, monitoring institutions have some impact on the type 
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of executives below the CEO, but this impact is weaker than that of institutions on CEO 
type. At the margin, parent banks, or subsidiary CEOs are concerned about maintaining 
the balance between parent-bank and host-country executives. They rarely appoint boards 
that have only host-country executives (15 percent of bank-year observations) or only 
parent-bank executives (2 percent). Moreover, whenever the share of parent-bank 
executives among incumbents deviates from its average, new appointments are used to 
restore the balance. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
We investigate the agency relationship between parent banks and their subsidiaries and 
evaluate how the institutional environment affects the choice between host-country and 
parent-bank executives. We find that parent banks are more likely to choose host-country 
CEOs when monitoring institutions in the host country are strong. Moreover, the effect of 
monitoring institutions on CEO type is stronger when supervision in the parent country is 
stringent and when cultural distance between home and host-country is large. The results 
are in line with a set of hypotheses that are based on the assumptions that the appointment 
of CEOs involves a trade-off between insight into the local business environment and 
congruence of objectives and that, on the margin, host-country CEOs have better insight, 
while the objectives of parent-bank CEOs are better aligned with those of the parent. 
The results and the theoretical framework underlying the hypotheses suggest three 
areas for further research – some of which we are currently working on. First and most 
immediately, the identification of the relationship between CEO appointments and the 
institutional environment is complicated by the fact that both institutions and CEOs 
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change slowly and one needs longer panels to be able to see whether and how banks 
respond to institutional change. Second, in developing our hypotheses, we leaned on 
empirical findings with regard the relationship between institutions and bank strategies to 
explain how institutions are likely to affect the trade-off between insight and congruence. 
Ideally however, we would integrate the analysis of executive appointments and banks’ 
strategic choices. 
Third, one of our “findings” stands out for its absence. The banking literature has 
investigated extensively whether foreign-owned banks are well-placed to engaged in soft-
information and many authors have found that they are not (Berger, Miller, Petersen, 
Rajan, & Stein, 2005; Detragiache et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010; Mian, 2006). The 
theoretical argument underpinning these results is that the information asymmetries 
between the parent bank and, ultimately, loan officers in large hierarchies in the 
subsidiary prevent foreign-owned banks from engaging in soft information lending 
(Stein, 2002). However, while we find that monitoring institutions that affect the 
hardness of information at the portfolio level have an impact on CEO type, we find no 
such impact of credit institutions that affect the hardness of information at the loan level. 
This is true even for banks that engage in soft-information lending. This suggests that 
agency problems between parent and foreign subsidiaries do not depend on the hardness 
of loan-level information but only on the hardness of subsidiary- or portfolio-level 
information such as data on economic prospects. Given their span of control, it is not 
feasible for managers at the parent bank (or indeed for subsidiary executives) to exercise 
effective control over loan-level decisions (Aghion & Tirole, 1997) and as long as they 
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can appoint subsidiary CEOs or branch managers as delegated monitors, they do not need 
to (Diamond, 1984). Taken together, this points to an agenda for both theoretical and 
empirical research into the way in which information is aggregated within hierarchies and 
how this facilitates or inhibits the use of soft information in decisions about loans or 
projects that are part of a larger portfolio. 
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Table 2.1 – Parent-bank executives by function 
 
Table 2.2 – Executive characteristics of host-country executives vs. parent-bank 
executives 
 
N Parent bank N Parent bank
Chief Executive Officer 355 41% 57 56%
Deputy CEO 92 49% 14 64%
Finance/Risk Function 388 48% 82 57%
Legal Officer 35 20% 7 43%
Operations/IT/HR 278 33% 60 40%
Sales Function 633 25% 123 31%
Other 282 42% 30 60%
Total 2,063 36% 373 46%
All Executives New appointments
Notes Parent-bank executives are all executives that do not come from the
country where a bank is located, except if the executive is from Slovakia
and the bank is in the Czech Republic and vice versa or if both the
executive and the bank are from one of the former Yugoslav Republics.
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D.
Age 541 43.6 7.6 312 46.3 7.6
Female 1,311 0.2 0.4 752 0.1 0.2
Master's degree 1,041 0.7 0.5 585 0.6 0.5
Foreign work experience 1,311 0.2 0.4 751 0.6 0.5
Foreign education 1,041 0.3 0.5 585 0.4 0.5
Years in executive position 1,149 3.8 4.0 654 2.2 2.3
Years on board of directors 1,129 4.5 4.5 659 2.5 2.4
Years in subsidiary 1,085 8.8 6.9 649 3.2 2.9
Years with parent bank 1,113 6.8 4.2 628 11.5 9.3
Host-country executives Parent-bank executives
Notes Parent-bank executives are all executives that do not come from the country where a
subsidiary is located, except if the executive is from Slovakia and the subsidiary is in the
Czech Republic and vice versa or if both the executive and the subsidiary are from one of
the former Yugoslav Republics.
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Table 2.3 – Summary statistics 
 
  
N Mean S.D. Min Max Source
Host-country institutions
Banking Supervision 289 2.5 0.5 2.0 3.0 Abiad et al., 2010
Bank Accounting 345 3.6 0.5 3.0 4.0 Barth et al., 2008
Credit information 355 4.3 1.5 0.0 6.0 Doing Business
Creditor rights 355 7.7 1.4 3.0 0.0 Doing Business
Distance and home-country institutions
log of Parent-subsidiary distance (km) 355 6.7 1.0 4.1 8.9 CEPII
Cultural Distance 250 26.4 11.0 9.2 50.3 Hofstede
Bank accounting in home country 349 3.6 0.6 2.0 4.0 Barth et al., 2008
Banking supervision in home country 289 2.7 0.5 1.0 3.0 Abiad et al., 2010
CEO & executive characteristics
Parent-bank CEO 355 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 Own research
% Parent-bank CEOs in parent 
network
355 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 Own research
% Parent-bank Executives in parent 
network
352 0.3 0.2 0.0 1.0 Own research
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Table 2.3 – Summary statistics, continued 
  
Subsidiary characteristics
log Assets 350 8.6 1.2 5.0 10.8 Bankscope
Equity / Assets 350 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 Bankscope
Return on assets 350 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 Bankscope
log of Years under foreign ownership 355 2.3 0.5 0.0 3.2 Own research
Foreign greenfield 355 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 Own research
Bank is listed 350 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 Bankscope
% of Loans to consumers 220 32.1 19.5 0.0 81.4 BEPS
Deposits / Loans 348 8.2 66.3 0.1 622.0 Bankscope
1 if Branch manager approval limit is
low
195 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 BEPS
Parent bank characteristics
log of Assets parent bank 355 12.4 1.6 6.1 15.0 Bankscope
Equity to assets ratio parent bank 355 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 Bankscope
ROA parent bank 355 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 Bankscope
Country characteristics
Economic Risk Rating 352 34.0 4.4 20.0 40.5 ICRG
log of GDP per capita 355 9.7 0.3 8.7 10.2 WDI
GDP growth (annual %) 355 2.7 5.7 -18.0 12.2 WDI
Domestic credit provided by banking
sector (% of GDP)
347 60.7 17.3 20.8 106.0 WDI
Tertiary enrollment 355 59.8 10.2 38.5 80.6 WDI
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Table 2.3 – Summary statistics, continued 
 
 
Notes Banking supervision is a three-point indicator of the strength of the regulatory framework and legal
authority of the regulator in the host country. Bank accounting is a four-point measure of disclosure in
accounts. Creditor rights measures the quality of collateral laws and legal protection for secured creditors
in case of bankruptcy on a ten-point scale and Contract-viability measures the sanctity of contracts on a six-
point one. Cultural distance is the Euclidean distance between parent and host country on Hofstede's 4 item
scale of cultural dimensions. Parent-bank CEO is a dummy that is 1 if a CEO has roots in the parent bank.
CEO hybrid nationality is a categorical variable that is equal to 3 if an executive has roots in the parent
bank, 2 for host-country executives with foreign work experience, 1 for host-country with a foreign
education and 0 otherwise. % Parent-bank CEOs (executives) in parent network is the unconditional
probability that a CEO (executive) in another subsidiary with the same owner as the observed bank is a
parent-bank CEO (executive). The variable is set to zero for banks without siblings in the data set. log of
Years under foreign ownership is the log of the number of years since foreign acquisition or foreign
greenfield investment by the owner (or previous foreign owner) of a bank. Foreign greenfield is a dummy
that is equal to 1 if a bank was established through a greenfield investment by a foreign owner. Branch 
manager loan approval limit low is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the branch managers of a subsidiary have
a loan approval limit that is below the median for their country. The International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) is published by the PRS Group and the Doing Business indicators and World Development
Indicators (WDI) by the World Bank. Bankscope is published by Bureau van Dijk and CEPII is the French
research center in international economics. The Business Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) was
held by the EBRD in 2004.The table contains one observation per bank / CEO / year.
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Table 2.4 – Host country institutions and CEO appointments 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE FE FE FE FE
Banking Supervision -0.440*** -0.435** -0.422** -0.422** 0 0
[0.087] [0.165] [0.167] [0.171] 0 0
Bank Accounting 0 0 0 0 -0.185** -0.185**
0 0 0 0 [0.077] [0.073]
Economic Risk Rating 0 0 -0.012 -0.012 -0.021* -0.021*
0 0 [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.011]
log Assets -0.231*** -0.224** -0.216** -0.216 -0.174* -0.174
[0.034] [0.094] [0.098] [0.150] [0.099] [0.133]
Equity / Assets -1.938** -1.149 -1.011 -1.011 0.313 0.313
[0.890] [1.278] [1.288] [1.212] [0.975] [0.983]
Return on assets 1.191 -1.94 -1.817 -1.817 -1.268 -1.268
[2.128] [1.791] [1.785] [1.777] [1.577] [1.642]
log of Years under 
foreign ownership
0.067 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.151 0.151
[0.091] [0.382] [0.390] [0.353] [0.347] [0.340]
Foreign greenfield -0.123 -0.159 -0.159 -0.159 -0.222 -0.222*
[0.085] [0.164] [0.162] [0.138] [0.150] [0.131]
Bank is listed 0.375*** 0.404*** 0.405*** 0.405** 0.08 0.08
[0.086] [0.151] [0.150] [0.189] [0.125] [0.131]
0.005 -0.072 -0.075 -0.075 -0.092* -0.092
[0.069] [0.052] [0.055] [0.082] [0.047] [0.101]
0.072*** 0.037 0.04 0.04 0.094 0.094
[0.021] [0.084] [0.083] [0.093] [0.083] [0.095]
1.529* 0.686 0.787 0.787 1.768 1.768
[0.907] [1.341] [1.345] [1.435] [1.235] [1.313]
ROA parent bank -2.8 -2.692 -3.299 -3.299 -3.948 -3.948
[3.566] [2.725] [2.789] [3.462] [2.637] [3.567]
log of GDP per capita -0.046 -0.1 -0.324 -0.324 -0.793 -0.793*
[0.123] [0.433] [0.568] [0.656] [0.487] [0.463]
% Parent-bank CEOs in 
parent network
log of Assets parent 
bank
Equity to assets ratio 
parent bank
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Table 2.4 – Host country institutions and CEO appointments, continued 
GDP growth (annual %) -0.008 0 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008
[0.008] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005]
Domestic credit 
provided by banking 
sector (% of GDP)
0 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Tertiary enrollment -0.006 0 0 0 0.003 0.003
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Constant 3.138*** 2.373 2.098 2.098 5.241* 5.241*
[1.035] [2.714] [2.718] [3.040] [2.679] [2.921]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No Implied Implied Implied Implied Implied
Bank fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered? No By bank By bank By parent By bank By parent
Observations 284 284 284 284 331 331
Number of clusters 0 64 64 33 73 34
R-squared 0.351 0.442 0.444 0.444 0.376 0.376
Notes The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a CEO is from the
parent bank. See Table 2.3 for a definition of all other variables. OLS refers to
ordinary least squares regression. FE refers to Mundlak (1978) fixed effects
regression. According to this approach, bank-level fixed effects are modeled as a
function of the average values of the time-varying independent variables in the model
and these averages are included in the regression model (the coefficients are not
reported). Monitoring institutions (banking supervision, accounting rules), the bank-
is-listed dummy and the economic risk rating are treated as time invariant; their
average values were not included. All models include year fixed effects. Standard
errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at
1%
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Table 2.5 – Monitoring institutions, creditor information and CEO appointments 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.428** 0 -0.463** 0
[0.172] 0 [0.187] 0
-0.222*** 0 -0.222** 0
[0.079] 0 [0.090] 0
-0.04 0 0 0 0.008 0 0 0
[0.059] 0 0 0 [0.064] 0 0 0
0 0 0.026 0 0 0 -0.045 0
0 0 [0.048] 0 0 0 [0.044] 0
0 -0.483** 0 -0.436** 0 -0.344** 0 -0.225**
0 [0.216] 0 [0.169] 0 [0.132] 0 [0.087]
0 0.01 0 0.195 0 -0.073 0 -0.013
0 [0.103] 0 [0.186] 0 [0.129] 0 [0.124]
0 -0.365* 0 -0.336 0 -0.252* 0 -0.203
0 [0.198] 0 [0.218] 0 [0.134] 0 [0.215]
276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
0.443 0.443 0.442 0.447 0.421 0.425 0.428 0.421
62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62Number of clusters
R-squared
Observations
(3) Monitoring institutions 
strong / credit institutions 
strong
(2) Monitoring institutions 
weak / credit institutions 
strong
(1) Monitoring institutions 
strong / credit institutions 
weak
0
Creditor rights
0
Credit information
Bank Accounting
0
Banking Supervision
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Table 2.5 – Monitoring institutions, creditor information and CEO appointments, continued 
 
  
0 -0.375 0 -0.531 0 -0.179 0 -0.19
0 0.039 0 0.051 0 0.098 0 0.311
0 0.499 0 0.637 0 0.342 0 0.862
Notes The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a CEO is from the parent bank. Monitoring
institutions (supervision and accounting rules) and credit institutions (credit information and creditor rights) are
strong if the indicator is above the median. Difference (3) - (2) measures the marginal effect of a change from
weak to strong monitoring institutions on CEO type when credit institutions are strong. Test (3) - (2) = (1)
evaluates whether the impact of an improvement in monitoring institutions is different when credit institutions are
strong or when they are weak. See Table 2.3 for a definition of all other variables. All estimates are from a
Mundlak (1978) fixed effects regression (see Table 2.4). Monitoring institutions and credit institutions, the bank-
is-listed dummy and the economic risk rating are treated as time invariant; their average values were not included. 
All models include year fixed effects and the control variables listed in Table 2.4. Standard errors, clustered by
bank, in brackets * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Test: (3) - (2) = (1) (p-
Test: (3) - (2) = 0 (p-value)
Difference: (3) - (2)
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Table 2.6 – Credit institutions, strategy and CEO appointments 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Credit information 0.024 0 0 0 -0.04 0 0 0
[0.078] 0 0 0 [0.061] 0 0 0
Creditor rights 0 0 -0.07 0 0 0 -0.024 0
0 0 [0.072] 0 0 0 [0.045] 0
% of Loans to consumers 0.008* 0 0.006 0 0 0 0 0
[0.005] 0 [0.006] 0 0 0 0 0
Deposits / Loans 0 0 0 0 -0.002*** 0 -0.002*** 0
0 0 0 0 [0.001] 0 [0.001] 0
(1) Retail focus strong / 0 0.325** 0 0.500*** 0 -0.420** 0 -0.114
Creditor institutions weak 0 [0.148] 0 [0.148] 0 [0.184] 0 [0.118]
(2) Retail focus weak / 0 0.034 0 0.197 0 -0.084 0 0.167
Creditor institutions strong 0 [0.145] 0 [0.166] 0 [0.191] 0 [0.151]
(3) Retail focus strong / 0 0.457** 0 0.440** 0 -0.2 0 -0.219
Creditor institutions strong 0 [0.189] 0 [0.197] 0 [0.177] 0 [0.173]
Observations 165 165 165 165 274 274 274 274
Number of clusters 35 35 35 35 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.635 0.679 0.645 0.686 0.442 0.432 0.442 0.433
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Table 2.6 – Credit institutions, strategy and CEO appointments, continued 
 
Difference: (3) - (2) 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.242 0.000 -0.116 0.000 -0.386
Test: (3) - (2) = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.013
Difference: (3) - (1) 0.000 0.132 0.000 -0.060 0.000 0.220 0.000 -0.105
Test: (3) - (1) = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.765 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.521
Test: (3) - (2) = (1) (p-value) 0.000 0.482 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.116
Test: (3) - (1) = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.765 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.521
Test: (3) - (2) = (1) (p-value) 0.000 0.482 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.116
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Table 2.7 – Institutions, internal hierarchy and CEO appointments 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit information 0.013 0 0 0
[0.080] 0 0 0
Creditor rights 0 0 -0.026 0
0 0 [0.063] 0
1 if Branch manager approval limit is low 0.406** 0 0.400** 0
[0.199] 0 [0.193] 0
0 0.11 0 0.535***
0 [0.235] 0 [0.156]
0 -0.036 0 0.488***
0 [0.156] 0 [0.168]
0 0.474** 0 0.253
0 [0.228] 0 [0.198]
Observations 149 149 149 149
Number of clusters 33 33 33 33
R-squared 0.662 0.685 0.663 0.730
Difference: (3) - (2) 0.000 0.509 0.000 -0.236
Test: (3) - (2) = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.301
Difference: (3) - (1) 0.000 0.364 0.000 -0.282
Test: (3) - (1) = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.219
Test: (3) - (2) = (1) (p-value) 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.003
Notes The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a CEO is from the parent
bank. The number of observations is limited because information on loan approval limits
is available for only a limited number of banks. Difference (3) - (2) measures the marginal
effect of a change from low to high approval limits on CEO type when credit institutions
are strong. Difference (3) - (1) measures the marginal effect of a change from weak to
strong credit institutions on CEO type when approval limits are low. Test (3) - (2) = (1)
evaluates whether the impact of a change in approval limits is different when credit
institutions are strong or when they are weak. All estimates are from a Mundlak (1978)
fixed effects regression (see Table 2.4). Credit institutions, approval limits, the bank-is-
listed dummy and economic risk are treated as time invariant; their average values were
not included. All models include the control variables listed in Table 4 and year fixed
effects. Standard errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
(1)Approval limit low / Creditor institutions 
weak
(2) Approval limit high / Creditor institutions 
strong
(3) Approval limit low / Creditor institutions 
strong
  
93 
Table 2.8 – Monitoring institutions in the parent and host country and CEO appointments 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Banking Supervision -0.490*** 0 -0.394** 0 0 0 0 0
[0.169] 0 [0.173] 0 0 0 0 0
Bank Accounting 0 0 0 0 -0.252*** 0 -0.211** 0
0 0 0 0 [0.086] 0 [0.097] 0
Banking supervision in home country 0.267** 0 0.218* 0
[0.118] 0 [0.126] 0
Bank accounting in home country 0.153** 0 0.159** 0
[0.073] 0 [0.073] 0
0 0.02 0 -0.416** 0 -0.012 0 -0.222**
0 [0.232] 0 [0.187] 0 [0.096] 0 [0.097]
0 0.522*** 0 0.156 0 0.346** 0 0.15
0 [0.170] 0 [0.150] 0 [0.139] 0 [0.121]
0 -0.108 0 -0.231 0 -0.039 0 -0.043
0 [0.187] 0 [0.206] 0 [0.110] 0 [0.130]
Observations 276 276 270 270 276 276 270 270
Number of clusters 62 62 61 61 62 62 61 61
R-squared 0.470 0.513 0.454 0.453 0.442 0.454 0.434 0.430
Difference: (3) - (2) 0.000 -0.630 0.000 -0.386 0.000 -0.386 0.000 -0.193
Test: (3) - (2) = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.151
Difference: (3) - (1) 0.000 -0.128 0.000 0.185 0.000 -0.027 0.000 0.178
Test: (3) - (1) = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.807 0.000 0.070
Test: (3) - (2) = (1) (p-value) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.882 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.812
(1) Monitoring institutions strong / 
Monitoring institutions at home weak
(2) Monitoring institutions weak / 
Monitoring institutions at home strong
(3) Monitoring institutions strong / 
Monitoring institutions at home strong
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Table 2.9 – Monitoring, distance and CEO appointments 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Banking Supervision -0.408** 0 -0.607 0 0 0 0 0
[0.164] 0 [0.502] 0 0 0 0 0
Bank Accounting 0 0 0 0 -0.211** 0 -0.207** 0
0 0 0 0 [0.081] 0 [0.083] 0
log of Parent-subsidiary distance (km)0.103 0 0.092 0
[0.092] 0 [0.090] 0
Cultural Distance 0.016 0 0.016* 0
[0.009] 0 [0.009] 0
0 -0.467** 0 -0.767 0 -0.204* 0 -0.063
0 [0.225] 0 [0.492] 0 [0.108] 0 [0.089]
0 -0.124 0 0.373 0 -0.092 0 0.481***
0 [0.193] 0 [0.241] 0 [0.180] 0 [0.168]
0 -0.468** 0 -0.821 0 -0.321* 0 -0.147
0 [0.180] 0 [0.547] 0 [0.171] 0 [0.151]
Observations 276 276 218 218 276 276 218 218
Number of clusters 62 62 48 48 62 62 48 48
R-squared 0.452 0.446 0.533 0.534 0.431 0.426 0.54 0.575
Difference: (3) - (2) 0 -0.345 0 -1.194 0 -0.229 0 -0.627
Test: (3) - (2) = 0 (p-value) 0 0.156 0 0.031 0 0.034 0 0.000
Difference: (3) - (1) 0 -0.001 0 -0.055 0 -0.116 0 -0.083
Test: (3) - (1) = 0 (p-value) 0 0.995 0 0.754 0 0.444 0 0.591
Test: (3) - (2) = (1) (p-value) 0 0.64 0 0.128 0 0.859 0 0.000
(1) Monitoring strong / 
Distance low
(2) Monitoring weak / 
Distance high
(3) Monitoring strong / 
Distance high
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Table 2.10 – Host country institutions and executive appointments 
  
Panel A Poisson regression (1) (2)
Banking Supervision -0.155 0
[0.365] 0
Bank Accounting 0 -0.477**
0 [0.190]
Parent-bank CEO 0.324** 0.314*
[0.165] [0.164]
Number of executives 0.192*** 0.178***
[0.022] [0.022]
-0.121 -0.156
[0.185] [0.190]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Implied Implied
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered? By bank By bank
Observations 276 276
Number of clusters 62 62
% Parent-bank Executives in 
parent network
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Panel B New executives (1) (2)
Banking Supervision -0.122 0
[0.094] 0
Bank Accounting 0 -0.087
0 [0.072]
% Incumbent parent bank executives -1.201*** -1.211***
[0.243] [0.246]
Chief Executive Officer -0.028 -0.035
[0.081] [0.079]
Finance/Risk Function 0.061 0.05
[0.093] [0.090]
Operations/IT/HR -0.031 -0.047
[0.107] [0.109]
Sales Function -0.149** -0.161**
[0.071] [0.069]
% Parent-bank Executives in parent network -0.229 -0.221
[0.217] [0.226]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Implied Implied
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered? By bank By bank
Observations 306 306
Number of clusters 57 57
R-squared 0.384 0.384
Notes In Panel A, the dependent variable is the number of parent-
bank executives in a bank. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a
dummy that is 1 if a newly appointed executive is from the parent
bank. All estimates are from a Mundlak (1978) fixed effects
regression (see Table 2.4). Monitoring institutions, the bank-is-
listed dummy as well as the economic risk rating are treated as
time invariant. In panel A, the estimation method is Poisson
regression. In Panel B the method is linear regression. All models
include the control variables listed in Table 2.4 as well as year
fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by bank, in parentheses. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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CHAPTER 4:  CEO SUCCESSION IN SUBSIDIARIES FOLLOWING 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Executive selection is an essential aspect of corporate governance and has been explored 
from many angles, including examinations of its firm-level antecedents (Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993; Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Guthrie & Datta, 1998; Ocasio, 1999; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2003) as well as post-succession performance outcomes (Miller, 1991; Shen 
& Cannella, 2002; Zajac, 1990). Although ongoing research continues to emphasize the 
contexts and conditions under which executive succession is most likely to be successful, 
the attention of researchers has recently shifted toward a more granular examination of 
the characteristics and attributes of executive incumbents and successors (Chen & 
Hambrick, 2012; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Karaevli, 2007; Shen & Cannella, 2002; 
Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). Importantly, this shift has expanded the typology of 
successors beyond the dichotomous distinction of insiders versus outsiders, and furthered 
our understanding of the nuances of human capital. 
Despite the plethora of research on this topic, the phenomenon of executive selection 
and succession has rarely been studied below the uppermost layer of the organizational 
hierarchy. In particular, there is a gap in the literature on executive succession in the 
context of foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies (MNCs). Yet this is a context 
where executives exercise significant power over the direction of a business unit (Vora et 
al., 2007), and their human capital attributes, i.e., demographic characteristics as well as 
the knowledge and skills derived from educational and career experiences, affect firm 
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outcomes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). To our knowledge, the only work in this 
context is that of McNiel, Niehaus, & Powers (2004), who find that poor performance 
induces turnover for subsidiary CEOs more often than for the CEOs of stand-alone firms. 
After matching subsidiaries to stand-alone firms based on size, industry, and calendar 
time, and uncovering the above results, they conclude that conglomerate structures have 
stricter disciplining mechanisms than stand-alone firms. Although McNeil, Niehaus & 
Powers’ study provides valuable insights into the relationship between organizational 
performance and subsidiary executive turnover, an important limitation of this research is 
that it does not examine how conglomerates address CEO succession at the level of the 
subsidiary in response to turnover prompted by poor performance. Our research aims to 
fill this gap in the literature. 
The foreign subsidiary context is particularly suited for the study of executive 
selection and succession, because the varieties of relevant human capital attributes are 
more nuanced and complex than those under consideration in stand-alone firms. 
Recently, the literature on executive succession proposed an insider/outsider continuum, 
as opposed to a dichotomy, where status is defined based on whether the successor 
possesses (i) intra-firm experience, (ii) intra-industry but no intra-firm experience, or (iii) 
only outside-industry experience (Karaevli, 2007; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). These 
distinctions are appropriate for stand-alone firms, but when we consider the background 
that a potential successor in a subsidiary executive post can have, we realize that both the 
insider/outsider dichotomy and the continuum measures are insufficient to describe the 
options available in the foreign subsidiary layer of MNCs. Within MNCs, the challenge 
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of succession involves not only appointing executives with relevant experience, which 
fits the needs of the subsidiary market, but also with an understanding of the hierarchical 
relationship of the subsidiary relative to headquarters and the overall strategy of the 
MNC. In essence, subsidiary executives act on the boundary between the subsidiary, 
headquarters, and other units of the MNC. As a consequence, their position is crucial to 
the functioning of the MNC, and it is also quite complex (Vora et al., 2007). Executive 
selection and succession in the foreign subsidiary context allows us to tease apart 
components of firm-specific human capital and general human capital, and enhance our 
understanding of the complexities and nuances of insider and outsider status. 
In particular, the headquarters-subsidiary agency relationship has implications for (i) 
the relevance of different types of firm-specific knowledge (MNC-level, subsidiary-level) 
and (ii) the relevance of outside, general knowledge (intra-industry, out-of-industry, 
geographic). To test the relationship between antecedent firm performance and more 
nuanced measures of related versus unrelated human capital, we analyze succession 
events which occurred in the foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks during the period 
2005–2012. We examine subsidiary CEO departures and appointments following 
negative shocks. We make a distinction between the impact of broad environmental 
shocks and poor subsidiary performance results of the firm, and examine their differential 
impact on turnover and on preference for particular successor human capital 
characteristics. In order to make this distinction, we exploit the effects of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, which created a discontinuity that reduced the pressures and rewards of 
organizational inertia (Gresov, Haveman, & Oliva, 1993; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), 
100 
 
and prompted shifts in executive leadership (Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001; Tushman 
& Romanelli, 1985). 
The paper finds that while broad environmental shocks and subsidiary performance 
shocks both incite turnover in the top subsidiary leadership post, they prompt different 
preferences with respect to successors’ human capital attributes. Specifically, economic 
crisis promotes a preference for subsidiary-specific human capital, while performance 
shocks limited to the subsidiary are associated with a preference for MNC-specific 
human capital and for successors with broad international experience. 
The paper begins with a brief literature review, followed by a section which describes 
relevant theory and hypotheses. We then describe the data and the research setting of 
multinational banks’ foreign subsidiaries. We end with a discussion of the results, and 
their implications for future research and practice. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Executive succession is a universal event in the lives of organizations (Grusky, 1960). 
Consequently, it has been a central topic of corporate governance since it was first 
addressed in the literature over 50 years ago (Carlson, 1961; Grusky, 1963). Executive 
turnover and the resulting need for succession may arise naturally with the passing of 
time. It may also be prompted by a need for organizational change. In particular, dramatic 
exogenous shocks like economic crises, regulatory shifts, or radical technological 
changes have been shown to precipitate organizational change by alleviating the 
pressures of organizational inertia and reducing its rewards (Gresov et al., 1993; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Through their impact on organizational performance, 
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environmental discontinuities have been shown to drive turnover in leadership (Haveman 
et al., 2001; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). 
Within the strategic choice and upper echelons perspectives (Child, 1972; Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984), the human capital of executives is an important determinant of firm 
outcomes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Demographic 
characteristics as well as the knowledge and skills derived from educational and career 
experiences affect executives’ perceptions of the surrounding environment, and influence 
their decision making (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In the context of executive 
succession, the literature thus makes a major distinction between organizational 
“insiders” and “outsiders”22. Because of their different backgrounds, the insiders and 
outsiders differ in their propensity to uphold the status quo versus initiate organizational 
change (Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993). 
4.2.1 Performance as an antecedent to successor origin 
Periods of stability and upheaval call for different leadership styles, and in light of this, a 
sizeable body of empirical literature analyzes the relationship between antecedent 
organizational performance and executive origin (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Dalton & 
Kesner, 1985; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). Many scholars have found that positive 
antecedent firm size and performance is associated with insider succession (Dalton & 
Kesner, 1985; Guthrie & Datta, 1997, 1998), while negative firm performance is 
associated with outsider succession (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie & Datta, 1998). 
Much of the analysis focuses on the origin of the CEO, who is viewed as the agent 
                                                 
22 Insiders are promoted from within the firm and outsiders come from other organizations. 
102 
 
ultimately responsible and accountable for formulating and executing organizational 
strategy and design, in response to ongoing firm performance and the demands of the 
surrounding environment (Dalton & Kesner, 1985). 
4.2.2 The role of insiders 
During periods of stability, structures and routines facilitate information processing and 
tighten linkages between interdependent organizational components (Tushman & Nadler, 
1978), allowing organizations to become more efficient in their activities (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984). With increased tenure in the firm, individuals develop deeper 
understanding of these firm-specific routines through on-the-job experience and face-to-
face interaction. Experience and on-the-job learning creates context-specific tacit 
understanding of important interdependencies, which is difficult to verbalize or translate 
to other contexts (Grant, 1996). Firm-specific experience also builds social capital which 
does not have equivalent value in other firms (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Somaya, 
Williamson, & Lorinkova, 2008). As a result, individuals acquire knowledge and hone 
context-specific problem-solving skills, which are uniquely suited to the focal 
organizational environment (Becker, 1976), and contribute to firm efficiency and 
performance. 
Over time, however, the power of organizational culture and inertia muddy the 
linkages between organizational design and its business purpose. Existing structures and 
routines once calibrated to meet the needs of a particular environment become taken-for-
granted, and evolve into symbols of organizational identity and legitimacy. Routines may 
even become institutionalized out of deference to powerful elites within the organization, 
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and can become entirely decoupled from the needs of a shifting environment. Thus, as the 
task environment evolves, individuals’ acquired knowledge and skills may become 
irrelevant, or even serve as a source of strategic inertia (Miller, 1991; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992). 
With prolonged exposure to a particular organizational setting, socialization processes  
develop – but also entrench – individuals’ task-relevant knowledge (Fondas & Wiersema, 
1997; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979), creating cognitive perspectives which are deep but 
narrow (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Hambrick et al., 1993). With longer tenure, the 
quality and effort devoted to information processing declines (Tushman & Romanelli, 
1985), and individuals are prone to selective perception and attention (Miller, 1993a). 
Therefore, particularly when firm performance is lagging, the attributes of insiders which 
would otherwise be assets become liabilities. 
Indeed, the empirical literature on executive succession supports this notion. Relative 
to shorter-tenured CEOs, CEOs with longer tenures accumulate power to resist external 
pressures for change, and fail to adequately align the firm’s structure and strategy to the 
demands of the environment (Miller, 1991). Due to lower receptivity to change and a 
decreased willingness to take risks, insider executives are less likely than outsiders to 
initiate strategic change (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). The broad conclusion in the 
literature is that insider executive succession furthers the continuation of existing 
organizational strategies (Helmich & Brown, 1972), and is thus better suited for well-
performing firms than for poor performers (Dalton & Kesner, 1985).  
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4.2.3 The role of outsiders 
Outsiders, in contrast, are characterized in the literature as agents of change (Dalton & 
Kesner, 1985; Helmich & Brown, 1972). By definition, outsiders lack firm-specific 
knowledge, and are, for better and for worse, unfamiliar with daily operations. 
Undoubtedly, outsiders’ lack of knowledge of organizational resources and procedures 
slows down both routine and strategic decision-making, but it also frees the organization 
from blind repetition of ingrained responses to external stimuli. 
Instead of being limited by inertial forces or selective perception, outsiders are likely 
to scan their environment more broadly, and collect and utilize information from both 
external and internal sources before making key decisions (Fredrickson, 1986; Hambrick 
& Fukutomi, 1991). Since outsiders lack strong network connections within the firm, 
they are more likely to go outside of the traditional “inner circle” to gather needed 
information. They will tend to reach out to a wider group of knowledgeable experts and 
subordinates, rather than the usual set of executive advisors (Miller, 1993a). Depending 
on the outsider executive’s background, potential sources of external knowledge may 
even enable the focal firm to learn from the behavior of competitors. Specifically, 
outsider executives who come from within the same industry have industry-specific 
knowledge and skills, which may be applicable in the new organizational context 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Outside-industry knowledge is less likely to be transferrable 
across industry and firm boundaries, however. 
Decisions reached in an egalitarian manner, which promotes the gathering of 
heterogeneous sources of information, have been shown to improve decision outcomes 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989) and be more closely aligned with current organizational needs (Miller, 
1993b). They are also more likely to be free of political interests, which often dominate 
organizational strategy-making led by insiders and limit organizational responsiveness. 
Finally, outsider succession carries symbolic value as a signal of organizational change 
and strategic reorientation (Friedman & Singh, 1989) to both internal and external 
stakeholders (Chung, Lubatkin, Rogers, & Owers, 1987; Worrell, Davidson III, & 
Glascock, 1993). The signal itself may thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy, allowing 
change to occur. 
4.2.4 Beyond the insider/outsider dichotomy 
Despite the studies which show that well-performing firms favor insider succession and 
poor performers tend toward outsider succession, the link between negative antecedent 
firm performance and outsider succession does not have consistent empirical support. In 
fact, multiple studies, including those of Dalton & Kesner (1985), Friedman & Singh 
(1989), and Furtado & Karan (1990) show that poorly performing firms are equally likely 
to select an outsider successor as an insider successor. 
In seeking to reconcile these conflicting results, researchers have tried to find relevant 
contingency factors and contextual influences which mediate the relationship between 
antecedent performance and successor origin (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Guthrie & 
Datta, 1997). Still others view the insider/outsider dichotomy as insufficient and lacking 
in being able to realistically describe relevant human capital attributes of successors 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). They hypothesize and test relationships between firm 
performance and successor origin using a non-dichotomous characterization of insiders 
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and outsiders (Karaevli, 2007; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). 
Ascribing to the view that firm outsiders who come from the same industry may 
possess industry-specific knowledge and skills applicable in the new organizational 
context, Zhang & Rajagopalan (2003) classify CEO origin into three categories, 
depending on whether the executive succession is intra-firm, intra-industry, or outside-
industry. They relate CEO origin to the presence of an heir apparent within the firm, 
strategic continuity within the firm, and industry structure. Along similar lines, Karaevli 
(2007) constructs a continuous measure of degree of “outsiderness” based on years of 
tenure within the firm, and within the industry. She finds that new CEO “outsiderness” is 
more positively associated with post-succession firm performance when pre-succession 
firm performance is low. In contrast, Shen & Cannella (2002) distinguish between 
insiders who are promoted following a CEO dismissal (“contenders”), versus insiders 
who are promoted following an ordinary CEO exit (“followers”), and firm outsiders. 
They find that outsider succession is negatively related to post-succession performance, 
but it becomes positively related to post-succession performance when accompanied by 
turnover in the rest of the executive team. 
Overall, the insider/outsider distinction has contributed important theory and 
empirical results to the field, but it remains an imprecise and potentially misleading 
characterization of executive succession. It is markedly inadequate in describing the 
succession options available within a subsidiary environment. Our research thus builds on 
the works cited above, and follows Zhang & Rajagopalan (2003) and Karaevli (2007) in 
seeking to model successors’ firm-specific human capital as a multidimensional 
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construct. 
Moreover, despite the attention being paid to understanding executive succession, as 
well as the effort being put toward modeling the phenomenon realistically, there has been 
a conspicuous lack of attention to how executive succession happens at the subsidiary 
level of MNCs. Most studies have taken place in stand-alone firm settings and within the 
domestic context of U.S. firms. We are aware of only one exception, which is the work of 
McNeil, Niehaus, & Powers (2004). However, the focus of their study is limited to the 
relationship between performance and subsidiary CEO turnover, not succession. 
Therefore, in the next section, we will develop a succession theory for subsidiary 
executives by introducing a more nuanced conception of firm-specific of human capital, 
which takes into account both (i) what it means to be an insider versus an outsider in the 
subsidiary context, and (ii) issues of agency arising from the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship. 
4.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Relative to stand-alone firms, the agency relationship between headquarters and its 
subsidiaries adds an additional layer of complexity to corporate governance. In part, 
strategy formulation and responsibility for subsidiary operations lies within the 
competence of the subsidiary. But because the subsidiary is part of a broader network, its 
strategy must also be coordinated with the overall strategic direction set forth for by 
headquarters for the organization as a whole, and to a greater or lesser extent with 
specific activities of other network subsidiaries. In practice, strategy making and the 
structural design process are the outcome of a dialogue between MNC headquarters and 
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subsidiary leadership. At times, the demands of the local external environment and the 
needs of the organization may conflict, and it is the role of subsidiary executives to act in 
the subsidiary’s best interest, but also in the best interest of the MNC (Vora et al., 2007). 
The role of the subsidiary CEO is therefore quite complex, and demands a dual affiliation 
to both the local and the corporate entities.   
Executive succession strategy is one of the main levers that headquarters can use to 
manage the agency relationship with its subsidiaries, and both turnover and succession 
are manifestations of headquarters’ control over subsidiary direction. Though the need for 
succession may arise naturally, it may also be a response to deterioration in fit between 
the executive’s qualities and the changing local environment. Alternatively it can be a 
disciplining mechanism for poor subsidiary performance (McNeil et al., 2004). 
4.3.1 Subsidiary CEO turnover 
4.3.1.1 Negative performance shock 
A downturn in performance is likely to trigger turnover as a form of discipline. Research 
shows that this is the case in stand-alone firms, where poor performance is associated 
with a higher rate of CEO turnover than good performance. McNeil, Niehaus & Powers 
(2004) theorize that subsidiary executives are likely to be subject to even stricter 
discipline. They argue that stand-alone firms’ CEOs are monitored by the board of 
directors, who do not participate in daily operations, and may not be able to link specific 
leadership actions with performance outcomes. Also, board remuneration is unlikely to 
be tied to firm performance, and therefore a performance shock may not motivate the 
board to commence disciplinary action against the stand-alone firm CEO. In contrast, 
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subsidiary CEOs are evaluated by headquarters executives who are well informed about 
subsidiary activity, and their compensation is directly tied to the profitability of business 
units. This implies that headquarters executives are likely to be more sensitive to 
subsidiary CEO performance than board members are to CEO performance in stand-
alone firms. McNeil et al. also argue that the replacement costs for subsidiary CEOs are 
lower than for stand-alone firm CEOs, because the subsidiary CEO skill set is not as 
specialized, and therefore an adequate replacement is relatively easier to find. 
In sum, the strength of the agency relationship between headquarters and the 
subsidiary amplifies the disciplining response to poor subsidiary performance. Our first 
hypothesis serves to replicate the results previous research has found in both the stand-
alone and subsidiary setting, and compare our data against the existing literature on the 
topic. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Poor subsidiary performance will be positively related to 
the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
Because a subsidiary is part of a broader organizational network, we must also 
consider the spillover effects of network subsidiaries’ performance on CEO departure. 
Since headquarters’ attention is finite, we expect to see a reduction in the amount of 
attention an average subsidiary receives when other subsidiaries in the network are 
performing poorly. Because of trouble in other areas of the network, the average 
subsidiary commands a smaller amount of headquarters’ attention. We expect this to 
result in reduced incidence of turnover, even when the subsidiary in question is itself 
performing poorly. 
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In addition to the attention argument, resource constraints may also come into play. 
Given that there is likely to be a limited supply of qualified talent which would be able to 
replace any given subsidiary CEO, poor performance within the network is likely to 
reduce the probability of CEO succession in the focal subsidiary, even if the focal 
subsidiary is struggling. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: Poor performance by other subsidiaries in the MNC 
network will reduce the MNC’s sensitivity to the focal subsidiary’s 
performance, and therefore poor focal subsidiary performance will be 
negatively related to the likelihood of CEO turnover in the presence of 
poor performance by other subsidiaries in the MNC network. 
4.3.1.2 Economic crisis 
Whereas a decline in subsidiary performance may trigger disciplinary action by 
headquarters, the impact of an unexpected, dramatic environmental shift is likely to 
create a need for strategic realignment of the subsidiary to the new normal. The transition 
involves substantial uncertainty, and likely requires a fresh perspective, untainted by 
existing organizational routines and taken-for-granted assumptions. For this reason, the 
incumbent CEO may not be effective in leading the subsidiary through a strategic 
reorientation. Because of the mechanisms at play which we outlined in the review of the 
literature, the incumbent CEO may be unable to pursue an exploratory strategy in the face 
of a new, unfamiliar environment, because subsidiary-specific knowledge and skills may 
actually limit what pursuits he or she views as relevant or feasible. Having been laser-
focused on enhancing organizational efficiency, and perhaps becoming personally 
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invested in certain aspects of the organization’s structure and design, the incumbent CEO 
may be unwilling to deviate from a maintenance strategy to a turnaround strategy. As a 
result, dramatic shifts in the organization’s task environment are likely to require fresh 
blood, and will culminate in CEO turnover. 
Specifically, an economic crisis may trigger shifts in consumer behavior, competitive 
behavior within the industry, or lead to regulatory changes, all of which bring significant 
changes to the effectiveness of daily operations. Therefore, we expect: 
Hypothesis 3: Economic crisis in the subsidiary country will be positively 
related to the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
4.3.2 Subsidiary CEO succession 
Whereas our hypotheses regarding executive turnover in the subsidiary context are 
largely in line with the extant literature on stand-alone firms, the layered hierarchy that 
exists within the MNC presents unique challenges and opportunities for subsidiary 
executive succession. Following the turnover event, we argue that the ensuing selection 
process allows the MNC to control the direction of the subsidiary. But in contrast to 
stand-alone firms, successor characteristics are not just manifestations of the MNC’s 
preference for maintaining the status quo versus initiating strategic change in the 
subsidiary. The choice of successor also has implications for the extent of leeway the 
MNC is willing to give the subsidiary in (i) adapting to the local market environment 
versus (ii) aligning its structures to the rest of the organization. It is therefore insufficient 
to consider successors as organizational insiders versus outsiders. The nature of being an 
insider is important in the subsidiary context. Specifically, we distinguish between 
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whether the successor CEO is (i) a subsidiary insider, (ii) a subsidiary outsider but an 
MNC insider, or (iii) an organizational outsider. 
4.3.2.1 Economic crisis 
An environmental discontinuity, such as an economic crisis, upsets the status quo; 
however its implications for organizational behavior are ambiguous – especially in the 
early stages. Although the old way of doing business is obsolete, the new rules of the 
game are not yet defined and it is not clear how the organization should position itself 
within the new competitive landscape. This paper is the first foray into examining how 
MNCs allocate human capital to subsidiaries following an environmental shock, so we 
have looked to research on institutional transitions (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Peng, 
2003) which appears to be quite relevant here, to guide our theorizing. 
An economic crisis, especially in the early stages, is likely to cause a substantial 
amount of confusion among market participants. During institutional upheaval, 
uncertainty has been shown to lead to a greater reliance by managers on informal, 
interpersonal ties to other individuals within the firm, and also to competitors, and market 
regulators (Makhija, 2003; Peng & Heath, 1996; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000). 
Network embeddedness and relationships with other important actors in the field allow 
managers to have access to up-to-date information about others’ behavior, as well as keep 
abreast of the evolution of formal and informal rules as they develop. Insider access is 
thus an important asset in dealing with environmental upheaval. 
With this in mind, we posit that subsidiaries located in countries facing an economic 
crisis are likely to reach out to insider candidates for CEO succession. In the MNC 
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context, insiders come from within the subsidiary, and possess relevant subsidiary-
specific, but also MNC-specific, and subsidiary-country-specific knowledge. Subsidiary 
experience not only creates subsidiary-specific knowledge of routines, awareness of 
interdependencies, and linkages among complementary assets, it also breeds familiarity 
with local demand preferences and the local institutional environment. Prolonged tenure 
within subsidiary boundaries also creates local network ties both within the subsidiary, 
and to other local stakeholders. Subsidiary-specific knowledge thus allows individuals to 
comprehend the nature of the economic crisis, and also to understand how subsidiary 
assets can best be leveraged and aligned to meet the changing needs of the local 
environment. Therefore, we expect an economic crisis to increase the need for subsidiary-
specific knowledge in the top subsidiary post.  
Hypothesis 4: Economic crisis in the subsidiary country will be positively 
related to the new CEO having greater subsidiary-specific experience. 
4.3.2.2 Negative performance shock 
However, when the subsidiary itself is performing poorly, subsidiary insiders are likely to 
exhibit the same kinds of negative attributes as insiders of stand-alone firms. Therefore, 
in the case of poor subsidiary performance, the MNC will likely reach out to outsiders, 
who are untainted by the entrenched routines and taken-for-granted assumptions which 
are shown to inhibit organizational change.  
In the subsidiary context, we separate outsiders into two main categories: (i) 
subsidiary outsiders/MNC insiders and (ii) MNC outsiders. Subsidiary outsiders/MNC 
insiders do not have subsidiary-specific experience, and are unlikely to have subsidiary-
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country experience. However, they are insiders to the broader multinational organization, 
and as such possess an understanding of the organization’s overall goals and strategy. 
They also have access to important organizational resources. 
Subsidiary outsiders/MNC insiders are likely to exhibit a higher level of 
understanding of the organization, and have a deep understanding of the parent corporate 
culture (Ando et al., 2008; Isobe et al., 2000; Kobrin, 1988).  They can therefore be 
trusted to enact the dominant logic and strategy of corporate leaders in a predictable 
manner (Boyacigiller, 1990; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Subsidiary outsiders/MNC 
insiders are also likely to be useful for knowledge transfer (Bonache & Brewer, 2001; 
Franko, 1973; Tsang, 2001), which is likely to be an important resource for turning 
around a struggling subsidiary.  Finally, subsidiary outsiders/MNC insiders are likely to 
be more firmly embedded in the MNC’s informal communication network (Edström & 
Galbraith, 1977) than subsidiary insiders, and these network ties may also serve as an 
important resource during subsidiary turnaround. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5a: Poor subsidiary performance will be positively related to 
the new CEO having greater MNC-specific experience. 
Subsidiaries facing financial pressure may also prefer to exploit the experience, 
knowledge transfer capabilities, and coordinative power of executives who have a broad 
portfolio of know-how collected from multiple heterogeneous competitive environments. 
Exposure to multiple national and cultural environments breeds both adaptive and 
integrative skills which allow executives to be comfortable and competent in a range of 
settings (Endicott, Bock, & Narvaez, 2003). Breadth of national experience also creates 
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linkages across distinct knowledge categories. In effect, a broad portfolio of knowledge 
and experience supports the development of dynamic capabilities, which facilitate 
executive response to a changing environment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Specifically, the experience gained in the headquarters country, 
or in other countries where the executive has worked, may be useful in addressing 
subsidiary needs following a decline in performance. Even if the executive himself does 
not possess relevant past experience, he or she may have a vast network of informal 
relations, and thus have access to solutions developed for the resolution of performance 
problems, which can be transferred and applied to the focal subsidiary. In summary, we 
hypothesize that MNCs will call upon CEOs with a diverse knowledge background to 
guide a subsidiary through a negative performance shock: 
Hypothesis 5b: Poor subsidiary performance will be positively related to 
the new CEO having more diverse international experience. 
4.4 DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Sample 
To investigate the above-described relationships between economic crises and subsidiary 
performance, and subsidiary CEO departures and successor characteristics, we have data 
from 78 subsidiaries in 13 CEE countries, belonging to 38 separate MNCs from 17 parent 
countries. The dataset contains information on the composition of subsidiary executive 
teams in the banking industry in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), in the years 2005 to 
2012. The entire dataset contains 2749 observations and 806 unique executives. 
This setting allows us to exploit the discontinuity created by the 2008 global 
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financial crisis, which created economic disturbances in many countries across the globe 
and affected the financial stability of the banking industry worldwide. In our sample, 
cross-country and cross-subsidiary variation in the extent of the impact of the economic 
crisis remains substantial. This allows us to examine the relationship between economic 
shocks and subsidiary performance, and subsidiary CEO departures and subsequent 
successor characteristics. Country-wide banking crisis data comes from the database of 
Laeven & Valencia (2012). Financial data on the subsidiaries and their parents comes 
from Bureau van Dijk's Bankscope database, and country level and industry level data is 
from the World Bank database. 
We hand-collected data on executives’ demographics and background from annual 
reports and company websites of individual subsidiaries. Our database thus includes 
information on executives’ nationalities, age, educational experience, tenure, functional 
experience, previous work experience, and international experience. As a result, we can 
distinguish between subsidiary insiders, subsidiary outsiders/MNC insiders, and MNC 
outsiders. 
We have chosen to focus our analysis on CEOs, because the event of succession is 
quite clear. It is generally straightforward to identify the CEO of a banking subsidiary, 
and therefore it is easy to identify whether the CEO was promoted into the role from 
within the subsidiary or the MNC, or whether he or she is an organizational outsider. In 
the case of the other functional roles, the titles are not consistently defined. Therefore, the 
distinction between promotions and lateral moves is more opaque in the remainder of the 
executive team. By focusing just on CEO succession, we reduce our sample to 477 
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observations and 140 unique CEOs. Our unit of observation is the subsidiary CEO in a 
given year. In the 2005–2012 time range, we observe 71 instances of turnover and 82 
successions. The difference between departures and appointments is attributable to left-
censoring in our dataset. While we observe CEO appointments for the first year of our 
sample, our dataset does not contain information about the predecessor. 
4.4.2 Definition and measurement of variables 
4.4.2.1 Dependent variables 
In hypotheses 1–3, we examine the relationship between subsidiary performance, 
network bank performance, and economic crisis in the subsidiary country – and the 
occurrence of turnover. Turnover is a binary variable set equal to 1 if the subsidiary 
replaced its CEO in a given year, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
In Hypothesis 4, we look at the relationship between banking crisis in the subsidiary 
country and subsidiary-specific experience of the successor. We measure subsidiary-
specific experience as the logarithm of the number of years of subsidiary tenure. We also 
examine an alternate specification, which is a binary variable indicating whether the 
successor is a subsidiary-country national. In our dataset, we see that being a subsidiary-
country national is closely correlated with having educational experience and previous 
professional experience from the subsidiary country. Therefore, an individual who is a 
subsidiary-country national is more likely to be an effective successor if the subsidiary is 
located in a country experiencing an economic crisis, as we propose in Hypothesis 4. 
In Hypothesis 5a, we explore the relationship between subsidiary performance and 
MNC-specific experience. We measure MNC-specific experience as the logarithm of the 
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number of years of tenure with the MNC. Again, we also examine an alternate 
specification, which is a binary variable indicating whether the successor is a parent-bank 
executive. In our dataset, we see that parent-bank executives are expatriates sent from 
headquarters. As such, their background makes them effective agents of coordination and 
control on behalf of headquarters, as well as vessels for knowledge transfer. Therefore, an 
individual who is a parent-bank executive is more likely to be an effective successor if 
the subsidiary is experiencing poor performance, as we propose in Hypothesis 5a. 
To test Hypothesis 5b, we measure country diversity as the logarithm of the number 
of countries where the successor has gained educational or professional experience, 
excluding the subsidiary country and the headquarters country of the MNC. 
4.4.2.2 Independent variables 
ROA shock is a binary variable. It is set equal to 1 if the year-on-year change in 
return on assets of the subsidiary is negative and in the lowest quartile among all the 
subsidiaries in the sample in year t-1. It is set to 0 otherwise. 
ROA shock in owner network is a binary variable set equal to 1 if at least one other 
subsidiary in the MNC’s banking network suffered an ROA shock in t-1. Again, ROA 
shock is defined as occurring if a network subsidiary’s year-on-year change in return on 
assets is negative and in the lowest quartile among all the subsidiaries in the sample in a 
given year. Although we only observe the performance of network subsidiaries within the 
CEE setting, and not the entire banking network of the MNC, we believe this constraint 
does not adversely affect our results. Many of the MNCs in our sample have a strategic 
orientation toward the CEE market, and therefore we expect ROA shocks within the 
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region to be material to the behavior of the MNC with respect to subsidiary succession. 
Among the truly global players in our dataset, most if not all have a dedicated geographic 
headquarters for the CEE region. Therefore, we expect decisions regarding succession to 
be made in light of events occurring within the region.  
Crisis in subsidiary country is a binary variable, which is set equal to 1 if the 
subsidiary country experienced a banking crisis in the previous year, that is, in year t-1. 
Otherwise, it is set to 0. The underlying data come from the database of Laeven & 
Valencia (2012), who define a banking crisis as occurring in a given year if there are 1) 
“significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant 
bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations)”, and 2) “significant 
banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking 
system” (pg. 4). For further details, see Laeven & Valencia (2012). 
4.4.2.3 Control variables 
Our analysis includes a number of control variables, which may also affect CEO 
departures and successor characteristics. All of our specifications include the following: 
We control for the education level of departing as well as successor CEOs with the 
binary variable master’s degree or higher. This variable indicates whether or not the 
individual has earned a master’s degree. We expect this variable to be negatively 
associated with the probability of CEO turnover, and positively associated with other 
successor attributes which are of primary interest in this analysis. 
The variable log assets controls for the effect of subsidiary size. The variable 
represents the logarithm of subsidiary assets in t-1. Subsidiary size can impact turnover 
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and successor characteristics in multiple ways. On the one hand, larger subsidiaries may 
find it more difficult to overcome the pressures of organizational inertia, and take the 
necessary steps toward initiating organizational change. It may also be more difficult to 
find a qualified replacement to lead a large and presumably important subsidiary, 
reducing the probability of CEO turnover. Conversely, larger subsidiaries may attract a 
greater proportion of MNC attention, which could increase the incidence of CEO 
turnover. 
We also control for the size of the MNC as a whole with the variable log assets 
(owner). The variable represents the logarithm of MNC assets in t-1. Here, again, the 
predicted relationship between size and turnover or successor attributes is unclear. Larger 
MNCs may have a broader network of potential candidates which they can appoint to top 
subsidiary posts. At the same time, larger MNCs may be able to devote only a sliver of 
attention to each individual subsidiary, reducing the probability of succession. 
We include the number of years the subsidiary has been under MNC control with the 
variable log of years under foreign ownership. We also include the binary variable 
foreign greenfield, which indicates whether the subsidiary was started as a greenfield, or 
whether it was an acquisition. At greenfield subsidiaries, owners start with a clean slate 
and can appoint executives to their liking, but at acquired subsidiaries they may be 
reluctant to replace incumbents, at least initially. Finally, we include GDP growth to 
control for demand conditions in the subsidiary country. 
In the specifications which explore hypotheses 1–3, we also control for the tenure of 
the incumbent CEO. The literature is unequivocal in showing that longer tenure increases 
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probability of departure. Lastly, we include the variable parent CEO which indicates 
whether the incumbent CEO is a parent-bank executive. Executives from the country 
where the MNC is headquartered or from third countries are all “parent-bank executives”. 
We count third-country executives as parent-bank executives because they tend to be part 
of the international staff of the MNC. Their career prospects depend on their success in 
serving the interests of the parent just like for parent-country executives. The inclusion of 
this variable controls for MNCs’ treatment of subsidiary CEOs based on the incumbent’s 
national affiliation.  
In the specifications which explore hypotheses 4 and 5, we include the variable % 
parent-bank executives in parent network to control for the tendency of MNCs to 
appoint parent-bank CEOs. For MNCs with multiple subsidiaries in the dataset we 
calculate, for each subsidiary, the unconditional probability that the other subsidiaries in 
the parent network have a parent-bank CEO. We set the variable to zero for subsidiaries 
that have no siblings in the dataset. To account for the composition of the remainder of 
the subsidiary executive team, we include the variable % incumbent parent-bank 
executives, indicating the percentage of the team (excluding the CEO) which is 
composed of parent-bank executives. Lastly, we include the ratio of bank credit to GDP 
to control for the development of the banking sector in the subsidiary country. 
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4.4.3 Methodology 
To test hypotheses 1–3, which predict the occurrence of CEO turnover, we model the 
following relationship: 
(#)
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where X is a vector of variables controlling for the observable characteristics of the 
departing CEO, Y is a vector of subsidiary-specific and MNC-specific control variables, Z 
is a vector subsidiary-country control variables, Year denotes year fixed effects and SC 
denotes subsidiary country fixed effects. In the subscripts, s denotes the subsidiary, m 
denotes the MNC, c denotes the subsidiary country, and t denotes the year. In Hypothesis 
1, the independent variable Shock is operationalized with ROA shocksm,t-1. In Hypothesis 
2, it is operationalized with ROA shock in owner networkm,t-1. In Hypothesis 3, it is 
operationalized with crisis in subsidiary countryc,t-1. All of the dependent variables are 
binary, and therefore we choose a “logit” specification for the regression model. 
We lagged subsidiary performance (ROA shocksm,t-1) and network bank performance 
(ROA shock in owner networkm,t-1) by one year in order to eliminate concerns regarding 
reverse causality in the relationship between performance and the incidence of 
succession. Although many scholars have linked poor performance to CEO succession 
(Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie & Datta, 1997, 1998; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2003), we stop short of making a causal claim. Our dataset is comprised of 
archival data, and not experimental data, which implies that subsidiary performance is not 
randomly assigned among individual subsidiaries and may be correlated with variables 
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we have failed to include in our model. To alleviate this worry, we include subsidiary 
country and time fixed effects, which control for unobserved heterogeneity that may be 
correlated with the dependent variable, turnover. Despite these efforts, our identification 
strategy may still suffer from omitted variable bias, and therefore we cannot make the 
case for a causal relationship between performance and turnover.  
It is reasonable to assume that crisis in subsidiary country at time t-1 is an exogenous 
shock, which induces variation in subsidiary behavior regarding CEO turnover, but is 
uncorrelated with the error term. We have no reason to believe than any of the 
subsidiaries caused a banking crisis in their country, and therefore reverse causality in our 
model is not an empirical concern, and neither is selection bias. But again, because this 
observable is not randomly assigned among countries, we may still have concerns about 
omitted variable bias driving both banking crises and turnover. Again, we attempt to limit 
omitted variable bias by including subsidiary country and time fixed effects in the model. 
To test hypotheses 4–5, which predict successor characteristics, we model the 
following relationship: 
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Shock, X, Y, Z, Year, and SC denote the same constructs as in the first model, as do the 
subscripts. We measure Experience in a variety of ways, as described in the section on 
Definition and Measurement of Variables. For each of these specifications, we model the 
relationships using ordinary least squares regression. 
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Predicting successor characteristics clearly involves selection bias, because we limit 
our sample to those subsidiaries which chose to undergo a leadership transition, and 
exclude those subsidiaries which retained the incumbent CEO. Therefore, the results for 
hypotheses 4–5 should be interpreted keeping in mind that they are conditional on a 
succession taking place. 
4.5 RESULTS 
Table 3.1 provides the means, standard deviations and correlations for the variables used 
in models predicting CEO turnover (hypotheses 1–3). The means provide an interesting 
picture of turnover and crisis in the sample of Central & Eastern European banking 
subsidiaries. Over the course of our observation period in the years 2005–2012, a 
succession event occurred in 15% of our observations. 22% of subsidiaries experienced a 
banking crisis in their country. 16% of subsidiaries experienced a performance decline 
which can be qualified as an ROA shock. The average length of time that a subsidiary has 
been under MNC control is 10.7 years, but only 38% of subsidiaries are greenfield 
investments. The average subsidiary tenure of a CEO is 4.4 years, with 58% having 
earned a master’s degree or higher. 59% of CEOs are subsidiary-country nationals, and 
the remaining 41% are parent-bank executives. 
Correlation Table 3.1 indicates that the occurrence of a banking crisis in the 
subsidiary country is essentially uncorrelated with a shock in subsidiary performance 
(correlation coefficient = 0.09). The correlation between subsidiary ROA shocks and 
ROA shocks in the owner network is quite low as well (correlation coefficient = 0.14). 
This provides support for testing the separate effects of banking crises and subsidiary 
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performance. 
Table 3.2 provides the means, standard deviations and correlations for the reduced 
sample, which only includes successors. Successors have an average of 0.96 years of 
tenure within the subsidiary, and 2.13 years of tenure within the MNC. 41% are 
subsidiary-country nationals and 59% are parent-bank executives. The average country 
diversity is 0.8, which does not include experience in the subsidiary country or the 
headquarters country of the parent bank. In this sample, the correlation between the 
occurrence of a banking crisis in the subsidiary country and subsidiary performance 
shock is also very low (correlation coefficient = 0.02). 
4.5.1 CEO departures 
To test hypotheses 1–3, we begin with an exploration of the relationship between a crisis 
in the subsidiary country and the likelihood of CEO turnover. Because CEO turnover is a 
binary variable, we used “logit” analyses. Among the control variables which we include 
in our models, the only one that displays a significant association with subsidiary CEO 
turnover is CEO tenure. However, this relationship is statistically significant only when 
the CEO is a parent-bank executive. Already, this suggests that CEO background is an 
important contextual variable. 
In Model 1 of Table 3.3, we consider the relationship between subsidiary 
performance and CEO turnover. We find that an ROA shock in the focal subsidiary 
increases the likelihood of a turnover event in the CEO role. The results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, providing strong support for Hypothesis 1. ROA shocks in the 
MNC’s subsidiary network also increase the likelihood of a turnover event in the focal 
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subsidiary. However, consistent with Hypothesis 2, when both types of shocks occur 
simultaneously, the likelihood of turnover in the focal subsidiary declines. Empirically, 
the estimated coefficient is an average across subsidiaries, and therefore the interpretation 
of the result is that when there are simultaneous performance shocks in the bank network, 
the likelihood of turnover decreases in all poorly performing subsidiaries. This effect is 
significant at the 1% level. 
Model 3 in Table 3.3 includes all the control variables as well as the direct effect of a 
crisis in the subsidiary country on the likelihood of executive turnover. The direct 
relationship between crisis and subsidiary CEO turnover is not significant. However, 
when we also consider whether other countries in the MNC subsidiary network are 
experiencing crises in Model 2, we find that a crisis in the subsidiary country increases 
the likelihood of CEO turnover at the 10% significance level, providing marginal support 
for Hypothesis 3 at traditional significance levels. We also find that a crisis in the 
subsidiary country occurring simultaneously with crises in countries within the MNC 
network reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
Overall, the pattern of results is consistent with our study’s theoretical premise that 
environmental discontinuities will have an impact on the incidence of executive turnover. 
4.5.2 Successor characteristics 
To test the relationship between performance and successor characteristics, we first 
consider the impact of crisis in the subsidiary country on preference for the successor 
having subsidiary-specific experience. When experience is measured as the logarithm of 
the number of years of subsidiary tenure, the relationship is not significant. However, 
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when experience is measured using successor CEO national background, we find that a 
crisis in the subsidiary country is associated with the successor being a subsidiary-
country national. This result is significant at the 5% level, providing support for 
Hypothesis 4. 
In contrast to the above results, we hypothesized that an ROA shock in the subsidiary 
will be associated with a preference for MNC-specific experience. When we measure 
MNC-specific experience as the logarithm of the number of years of tenure within the 
boundaries of the MNC, the relationship is not statistically significant. But using 
successor CEO nationality, the relationship is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Specifically, an ROA shock in the subsidiary country is associated with a greater 
preference for successor CEOs who are parent-bank executives. 
Continuing in this line of inquiry, another interesting set of results involves looking at 
the relative magnitude of subsidiary experience and MNC experience, as measured by the 
ratio of tenures within each of these organizational boundaries. Here, we find that a crisis 
in the subsidiary country is associated with a decrease in the successor’s MNC 
experience relative to his or her subsidiary experience. In other words, subsidiaries 
located in countries experiencing a banking crisis are more likely to choose successors 
with an increasing amount of subsidiary-specific experience relative to MNC-specific 
experience. On ROA shock in the subsidiary, on the other hand, induces the opposite 
tendency. Subsidiaries which have experienced an ROA shock are more likely to choose 
a successor with a decreasing amount of subsidiary-specific experience relative to MNC-
specific experience. Moreover, these results hold when the crisis indicator and the ROA 
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shock indicator are entered into the regression at the same time. Taken together, the 
above results provide further support for Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5a. 
Hypothesis 5b proposes a relationship between an ROA shock in the subsidiary 
country and preference for CEO successors with broad international experience. Our 
findings provide support for this hypothesis at the 10% significance level. Overall, the 
above set of results suggests that country-level banking crises increase MNCs’ preference 
for successors with subsidiary-specific experience, while subsidiary-level shocks to 
profitability lead to the appointment of successors with MNC-experience and greater 
breadth of national experience. 
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study set out to explore CEO succession in the subsidiary context, which is a setting 
that has not received adequate attention in the literature. By exploiting the 2008 global 
financial crisis, we were able to distinguish between the effects of environmental shocks 
and subsidiary performance effects on turnover and successor selection. The theoretical 
contribution of this study is a more refined conceptualization and a more granular 
measurement of organizational insiders and outsiders in the MNC setting. From an 
empirical standpoint, our results provide useful insight into the nuances of human capital 
within a subsidiary context, and highlight that the distinction between being a subsidiary 
insider versus a subsidiary outsider/MNC insider is important. 
Overall, our findings suggest that both environmental discontinuities and negative 
performance shocks are associated with turnover in the top subsidiary leadership post. 
These results are in line with much of the literature on turnover in both stand-alone firms 
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as well as the McNeil et al. study on subsidiaries. But because by their nature subsidiaries 
are part of a broader organizational network, we also explore the impact of network 
banks’ performance on focal subsidiary turnover. We find that when there are 
simultaneous shocks within the bank network, the likelihood of turnover decreases in all 
poorly performing subsidiaries. In effect, when multiple parts of the MNC network are 
struggling financially, the attention of the MNC does not appear to shift to the poorly 
performing subsidiaries, manifesting itself in the form of CEO turnover. Instead, it seems 
that the MNC freezes, as the results show that the likelihood of turnover decreases 
everywhere. 
While broad environmental shocks and subsidiary performance shocks both incite 
subsidiary CEO turnover, they prompt different preferences with respect to successors’ 
human capital attributes. Specifically, economic crisis promotes a preference for 
subsidiary-specific human capital, while performance shocks limited to the subsidiary are 
associated with a preference for MNC-specific human capital and for successors with 
broad international experience. This suggests that instead of responding to an 
environmental discontinuity by deploying human resources from other parts of the 
organization, MNCs appoint new subsidiary CEOs who possess deep familiarity with the 
local subsidiary and environment. Interestingly, our findings also highlight that MNCs do 
not necessarily prefer to appoint individuals with longer subsidiary tenures; they prefer to 
appoint subsidiary-country nationals. This seems to suggest that in order for local market 
experience to be a relevant asset, it must be accompanied by deep immersion in national 
culture and an innate understanding of the institutional environment. It would seem that 
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knowledge and embeddedness in the local network is something that is developed during 
the individual’s formative years through education and throughout one’s professional 
career. It is not something that can be acquired year to year, and thus attained through 
tenure. 
In contrast to our findings for economic crisis, a performance decline in the 
subsidiary alerts the MNC to the need for increased monitoring in the form of expatriate 
human capital and increased knowledge flows from successors who have a broad range 
of applicable experience. This result provides support for the agency theory view of the 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship, and furthers our understanding of how the 
disciplining mechanism operates within a layered hierarchy. Our results highlight that 
poor performance indeed prompts CEO turnover, but our study also contributes to our 
understanding of how MNCs utilize subsequent successor selection to reclaim control 
over subsidiary activity. 
Focusing on the banking industry was effective in that it allowed us to exploit the 
exogenous shock of the 2008 global financial crisis. However, as a result, the study does 
suffer from single-industry bias, and therefore it would be interesting to explore the 
phenomena of subsidiary succession in other industries as well.  
A natural progression along this line of research is to examine succession in other 
functional roles in the subsidiary executive team. In particular, it would be interesting to 
explore whether the same results hold for the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and whether 
they differ for the Chief Operating Officer (COO), for example. Specifically, whereas 
responsibility for financial performance is likely to affect the duties of the CEO and CFO 
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similarly, the COO position may require different human capital attributes in the face of 
environmental and subsidiary performance shock. 
Although our database includes post-succession performance statistics of the 
subsidiaries in our sample, our empirical design does not allow us to ascertain in a causal 
manner whether appointing CEOs with subsidiary-specific experience is an effective 
response to an economic crisis, and whether CEOs with MNC-specific experience 
successfully turn around a struggling subsidiary. This is an important aspect of 
succession, however, and an avenue for future research.  
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Table 3.1 – Summary statistics for full sample of CEOs 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Turnover 0.15 0.36 0 1 1.00
2 ROA shock 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.08 1.00
-0.12
3 ROA shock in network bank 0.36 0.48 0 1 -0.10 0.14 1.00
-0.02 -0.01
4 ROA shock x ROA shock in owner network 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.03 0.58 0.45 1.00
-0.56 0.00 0.00
5 Crisis in subsidiary country 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 1.00
-0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06
6 Crisis in network country 0.38 0.49 0 1 -0.10 -0.04 0.15 0.08 -0.15 1.00
-0.03 -0.47 0.00 -0.10 0.00
7 Crisis x crisis in owner network 0.06 0.23 0 1 -0.02 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.45 0.30 1.00
-0.62 -0.23 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
8 Tenure 4.36 4.69 0 23 -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 -0.13 -0.19 -0.01 -0.05 1.00
-0.11 -0.09 -0.48 -0.01 0.00 -0.81 -0.29
9 Tenure x parent CEO 0.93 1.89 0 10 0.14 -0.08 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 0.05 0.16 0.04 1.00
0.00 -0.12 -0.62 -0.28 -0.02 -0.26 0.00 -0.35
10 Parent CEO 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.15 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.23 0.01 0.10 -0.36 0.60 1.00
0.00 -0.58 -0.93 -0.90 0.00 -0.91 -0.03 0.00 0.00
11 1 if Master's degree or higher 0.58 0.49 0 1 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.20 0.11 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.14 1.00
-0.19 -0.39 -0.69 -0.99 0.00 -0.02 -0.23 -0.96 -0.67 0.00
12 log Assets 8.60 1.20 5.02 10.84 0.00 -0.10 0.04 -0.05 -0.17 0.07 -0.08 0.24 -0.08 -0.26 0.08 1.00
-1.00 -0.04 -0.38 -0.34 0.00 -0.16 -0.10 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.10
13 log of Years under foreign ownership 2.37 0.44 0.00 3.18 -0.08 -0.06 0.14 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 1.00
-0.10 -0.20 0.00 -0.90 -0.38 -0.12 -0.23 -0.67 -0.16 -0.63 -0.46 -0.25
14 Foreign greenfield 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.06 0.10 0.14 -0.49 0.50 1.00
-0.96 -0.51 -0.93 -0.53 -0.04 -0.57 -0.36 -0.02 -0.19 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 log Assets (owner) 12.46 1.58 6.09 14.94 -0.02 0.01 0.15 0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.11 0.48 0.09 -0.26 1.00
-0.62 -0.85 0.00 -0.52 0.00 -0.50 -0.06 -0.37 -0.07 -0.49 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.00
16 GDP growth (annual %) 2.74 5.37 -17.96 12.23 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.19 0.00 0.06 1.00
-0.77 -0.60 -0.71 -0.57 -0.47 -0.08 -0.87 -0.45 -0.46 -0.41 -0.12 -0.65 0.00 -0.95 -0.24
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Table 3.2 – Summary statistics for successor sample of CEOs 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Subsidiary tenure 0.96 1.13 0 3.56 1.00
2 Subsidiary country national 0.42 0.50 0 1 0.54 1.00
0.00
3 MNC tenure 2.13 1.05 0 3.66 0.12 -0.32 1.00
-0.31 0.00
4 Parent national 0.59 0.50 0 1 -0.54 -1.00 0.32 1.00
0.00 -1.00 0.00
5 MNC tenure / subsidiary tenure 1.45 1.17 0 3.61 -0.55 -0.62 0.75 0.62 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 Country diversity 0.84 0.62 0 1.95 -0.48 -0.41 0.09 0.41 0.38 1.00
0.00 0.00 -0.43 0.00 0.00
7 1 if Master's degree or higher 0.59 0.50 0 1 0.09 0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 0.06 1.00
-0.44 -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.10 -0.57
8 Crisis in subsidiary country 0.34 0.48 0 1 -0.19 -0.19 -0.16 0.19 0.01 0.05 -0.07 1.00
-0.10 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09 -0.94 -0.66 -0.52
9 ROA shock 0.26 0.44 0 1 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.21 -0.10 0.02 1.00
-0.61 -0.64 -0.81 -0.64 -0.43 -0.09 -0.43 -0.86
10 log Assets 8.57 1.33 5.68 10.76 0.00 0.21 0.10 -0.21 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.26 -0.17 1.00
-0.97 -0.09 -0.43 -0.09 -0.70 -0.90 -0.92 -0.04 -0.16
11 log of Years under foreign ownership 2.36 0.47 0.69 3.14 -0.01 0.03 0.19 -0.03 0.12 0.11 0.00 -0.18 0.11 -0.03 1.00
-0.93 -0.76 -0.08 -0.76 -0.27 -0.34 -0.97 -0.11 -0.40 -0.81
12 Foreign greenfield 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.04 -0.17 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.57 0.43 1.00
-0.72 -0.14 -0.25 -0.14 -0.53 -0.15 -0.74 -0.97 -0.68 0.00 0.00
13 log Assets (owner) 12.55 1.74 8.32 14.80 -0.22 -0.11 0.24 0.11 0.32 0.23 -0.26 -0.18 0.01 0.56 0.21 -0.30 1.00
-0.07 -0.37 -0.05 -0.37 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.15 -0.94 0.00 -0.08 -0.01
14 % Parent-bank Executives in parent network 0.27 0.20 0 0.75 0.03 0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.14 -0.01 -0.22 0.28 1.00
-0.82 -0.73 -0.38 -0.73 -0.73 -0.77 -0.79 -0.91 -0.63 -0.27 -0.96 -0.06 -0.02
15 % Incumbent parent bank executives 0.36 0.27 0 1 -0.09 -0.26 -0.18 0.26 -0.09 0.00 -0.27 0.34 -0.03 -0.15 -0.14 -0.05 0.25 0.08 1.00
-0.40 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -0.44 -1.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.84 -0.24 -0.20 -0.66 -0.04 -0.51
16 GDP growth (annual %) 2.87 5.88 -17.96 10.60 -0.09 -0.08 -0.15 0.08 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.13 -0.16 -0.27 -0.03 -0.10 0.02 0.15 1.00
-0.48 -0.49 -0.23 -0.49 -0.71 -0.79 -0.62 -0.79 -0.30 -0.21 -0.02 -0.81 -0.43 -0.84 -0.20
17 log of GDP per capita 9.74 0.31 8.81 10.18 -0.18 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.14 -0.51 -0.22 0.55 0.41 -0.19 0.39 0.06 -0.16 -0.08 1.00
-0.13 -0.97 -0.47 -0.97 -0.29 -0.44 -0.23 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.65 -0.19 -0.50
18 Bank credit / GDP 61.71 17.20 24.05 106.00 0.20 0.27 0.08 -0.27 -0.08 -0.09 0.21 -0.29 0.23 0.11 0.28 -0.15 0.10 0.08 -0.13 -0.37 0.10 1.00
-0.11 -0.03 -0.50 -0.03 -0.54 -0.46 -0.09 -0.01 -0.07 -0.39 -0.02 -0.21 -0.41 -0.51 -0.29 0.00 -0.39
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Table 3.3 – Performance and CEO turnover 
H1 H2
ROA shock 1.566*** 2.247***
[0.391] [0.501]
ROA shock in owner network 1.208***
[0.437]
-1.990**
[0.814]
Crisis in subsidiary country 0.765 1.381*
[0.741] [0.819]
Crisis in owner network 0.026
[0.418]
Crisis x crisis in owner network -1.627**
[0.816]
Tenure -0.062 -0.075 -0.059 -0.075
[0.053] [0.054] [0.054] [0.056]
Tenure x parent CEO 0.316*** 0.374*** 0.306*** 0.360***
[0.112] [0.117] [0.113] [0.117]
Parent CEO -0.106 -0.33 0.089 0.002
[0.497] [0.519] [0.487] [0.491]
1 if Master's degree or higher -0.117 -0.153 -0.127 0.076
[0.379] [0.387] [0.367] [0.382]
log Assets 0.039 0.084 0.06 0.05
[0.228] [0.231] [0.221] [0.230]
log of Years under foreign ownership -0.417 -0.515 -0.476 -0.666
[0.604] [0.615] [0.590] [0.600]
Foreign greenfield -0.025 0.011 0.051 0.146
[0.571] [0.577] [0.564] [0.572]
log Assets (owner) -0.075 -0.115 -0.062 -0.081
[0.139] [0.143] [0.135] [0.136]
GDP growth (annual %) 0.083 0.088 0.025 0.015
[0.053] [0.055] [0.049] [0.049]
Constant -2.221 -2.243 -1.804 -1.377
[2.566] [2.550] [2.510] [2.554]
Observations 360 360 360 360
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Dependent variable: incidence of turnover
H3
ROA shock x ROA shock in owner 
network
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Table 3.4 – Performance and CEO successor attributes 
Dependent variable:
Crisis in subsidiary country -1.234** -3.004** -2.653** -0.491
[0.536] [1.130] [1.102] [0.755]
ROA shock 0.345* 0.283 0.868** 0.715* 0.491* 0.466*
[0.192] [0.183] [0.401] [0.378] [0.252] [0.257]
1 if Master's degree or higher 0.127 0.055 0.111 0.618 0.399 0.285 0.257
[0.186] [0.178] [0.370] [0.404] [0.387] [0.245] [0.251]
log Assets -0.179 -0.201* -0.319 -0.097 -0.166 -0.197 -0.205
[0.113] [0.106] [0.217] [0.239] [0.224] [0.148] [0.150]
-0.715** -0.890*** -1.760** -1.238* -1.662** -0.867** -0.937**
[0.318] [0.309] [0.658] [0.655] [0.634] [0.417] [0.435]
Foreign greenfield 0.461* 0.506** 1.844*** 1.957*** 1.997*** 0.538 0.555
[0.262] [0.248] [0.548] [0.573] [0.533] [0.345] [0.349]
log Assets (owner) 0.125* 0.137** 0.586*** 0.542*** 0.556*** 0.176** 0.181**
[0.065] [0.062] [0.131] [0.137] [0.127] [0.086] [0.087]
-0.337 -0.478 -1.023 -0.575 -0.963 -0.587 -0.643
[0.389] [0.370] [0.804] [0.812] [0.773] [0.510] [0.522]
-0.153 -0.191 -1.355 -0.836 -0.976 -0.649 -0.664
[0.453] [0.426] [0.877] [0.929] [0.866] [0.594] [0.600]
GDP growth (annual %) -0.059* -0.042 0.02 -0.052 -0.016 -0.001 0.006
[0.031] [0.030] [0.061] [0.064] [0.061] [0.041] [0.043]
log of GDP per capita 3.122* 2.66 4.116 7.869** 6.771* 4.392* 4.208*
[1.800] [1.705] [3.271] [3.667] [3.443] [2.363] [2.400]
Bank credit / GDP 0.016 -0.014 -0.069 0.013 -0.052 -0.005 -0.017
[0.022] [0.024] [0.050] [0.044] [0.049] [0.028] [0.034]
Constant -27.916* -22.237 -36.152 -75.952** -62.284* -39.519* -37.260*
[16.334] [15.559] [29.538] [33.380] [31.578] [21.443] [21.909]
Observations 61 61 60 59 59 61 61
R-squared 0.521 0.589 0.655 0.622 0.683 0.506 0.512
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
% Parent-bank executives in 
parent network
log of Years under foreign 
ownership
% Incumbent parent-bank 
executives
H5b
MNC tenure / subsidiary 
tenure
Country diversityParent national
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CHAPTER 5:  ESTIMATING THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE-
SUBSIDIARY MATCHES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
An important question for managers and management scholars alike is how firms select 
the right workers. As a production input, human capital has an unrivaled impact on firm 
performance. However, finding the right fit between workers and firms is non-trivial. Not 
only do human capital attributes differ between individuals, but the value of human 
capital can differ dramatically between firms (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; 
Lazear & Oyer, 2012). In other words, the value of a worker to a firm depends not only 
on his or her abilities but also on the quality of the match between the firm and the 
worker’s human capital attributes. 
Despite the importance of job matching and despite its ubiquity in organizational life, 
the personnel economics literature and the literature on strategic human capital continue 
to debate how the matching process takes place. What are the determinants of a job 
match? Which mechanisms underlie the matching process? In particular, it is unclear 
whether an efficient job match arises from aligning firm attributes to idiosyncratic 
combinations of general human capital, to on-the-job firm-specific experience, or 
whether it arises from a mix of both (Lazear, 2009). Finally, how do matching patterns 
change between economic upswings and downturns and are they consistent between 
appointment roles? 
To inform research on selection and matching, I examine the international labor 
market and executive appointment processes in multinational corporations’ (MNCs) 
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foreign subsidiaries. The international context is comprised of heterogeneous firms with 
varied human capital needs, and provides a rich research setting for studying the 
determinants of executive—firm matches. Using a competitive assignment matching 
model, I estimate the drivers of efficient job matching by modeling how executives with 
different skillsets partner with MNC subsidiaries, and examine how the joint preferences 
of executives and firms change depending on economic conditions. 
By applying the logic of a two-sided competitive assignment game (Shapley & 
Shubik, 1971) to the process of executive selection, my study addresses a limitation of 
previous research. The assignment of executives to firms is endogenously determined, 
meaning that both executives and firms choose their partners strategically and 
interdependently given rival options in the labor market. Since executive selection by 
firms is 1) nonrandom and 2) is likely to be influenced by unobservable variables, using 
classical regression frameworks is problematic and can lead to biased results. One such 
unobservable variable which is arguably a key component of the executive appointment 
process is the availability of human capital in the labor market, and its exclusion can bias 
the results obtained using regression models. 
The two-sided matching approach compares observed executive—firm matches 
relative to all other counterfactual matches which could have occurred in the labor 
market, but did not, thereby explicitly accounting for the availability of human capital in 
the labor market. These counterfactual partnerships between executives and firms 
represent the set of relevant potential candidates available to firms in the labor market 
and, conversely, the set of employers seeking to fill executive positions. The empirical 
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estimation strategy uses the assumption that the labor market is in a pairwise stable 
equilibrium where neither executives nor firms would gain from forming a counterfactual 
match. Exploiting the constraint that observed matches produce higher productivity for 
both sets of agents than any possible counterfactual executive—firm pairing, I estimate 
the parameters of interest. Solving a matching model with many agents is not trivial 
because the observed solution must hold compared against all possible counterfactual 
partnerships, otherwise an agent would have incentive to deviate from his or her 
equilibrium match. Following Fox (2010b), I use a maximum score estimation strategy to 
estimate a local production maximization condition, and optimize the multinomial model 
using the differential evolution method. 
I apply this method to a self-collected database of 2063 matches between MNC 
subsidiaries and top management team executives, of which 1068 have complete 
information on all firm and executive attributes of interest. The study sample includes 75 
subsidiaries of 34 U.S. and European banks located in 13 Central & Eastern European 
countries during 2005–2010. 
In addition to highlighting the determinants of an executive-subsidiary job match, I 
study the relative weights that various types of MNCs place on firm-specific human 
capital versus different kinds of general human capital. Human capital theory (Becker, 
1964) asserts that firm-specific human capital only raises productivity in the focal firm, 
while general human capital acts as a rising tide that lifts all boats. Yet recent work in 
labor economics shows that firms appear to extract super-normal returns from general 
human capital as well (Dobbie, MacMillan, & Watson, 2014; Gathmann & Schonberg, 
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2010; Nawakitphaitoon, 2014). These results lend empirical support to the strategic 
human capital view, which argues that firms benefit from both firm-specific and general 
human capital, however the use value of general human capital varies with the goodness 
of fit between firm resources and workers’ idiosyncratic endowment of widely-applicable 
skills (Campbell et al., 2012). 
I contribute by estimating the relative value which MNCs place on firm-specific 
human capital relative to general human capital during executive selection. Because 
general human capital can itself differ in its “generality”, I study how MNCs weigh firm-
specific human capital relative to the following types of general human capital: 
education, multicultural experience, relevant regional experience and relevant country-
specific experience, listed here from most broadly applicable for a given subsidiary to 
least. Finally, I examine how the determinants of a job match change between periods of 
economic growth and economic decline.  
The main findings indicate that among CEOs, Deputy CEOs, and CFOs, an 
executive—subsidiary job match is driven by complementarities between (i) MNC size 
and executive education, (ii) scope of international operations and executive international 
experience, and (iii) subsidiary acquisition status and executive tenure with the MNC. 
However, firm-specific knowledge in the form of executive tenure is more important 
during an economic upswing than an economic downturn, while general human capital in 
the form of education is more important during an economic downturn than upswing. 
Among COOs, legal executives, and sales executives, the selection process is driven by 
complementarities between (i) subsidiary age and executive national experience, and (ii) 
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subsidiary acquisition status and executive tenure with the MNC, pointing to a difference 
in appointment strategies between the two types of functional roles. Among the different 
varieties of general human capital, greater consideration is being given to national 
experience over regional and international experience and educational attainment for both 
types of functional roles. 
5.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The intuitive notion of “fit” is a central premise for understanding strategic decision 
making within organizations (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Venkatraman, 1989). Since the 
seminal works of Chandler (1962) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), who first articulated 
that organizational efficiency arises from alignment between firm strategy, structure, and 
managerial processes, management researchers have explored “fit” from many angles. 
Defining and testing for fit within complex, interrelated systems however can be an 
empirical challenge (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; Schoonhoven, 1981). 
An approach which has been lauded by scholars for correspondence between the 
theoretical concept and its formal, mathematical formulation is to define fit through 
matching between related variables (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Venkatraman, 1989). The 
mathematical concepts which underlie a matching approach are complementarity and 
substitutability. Formally, two variables are complements in production if the cross-
partial derivative of the objective function with respect to the two inputs is positive, and 
substitutes if the cross-partial derivate is negative. An advantage of this optimization 
approach is that fit can be determined without referencing an outcome variable, such as 
system performance. Instead, total productivity is measured as the weighted sum of 
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estimated complementarities among a system of relationships.  
The matching approach has been used to study two-sided markets where the strategic 
aspects of partner choice drive the match. Unlike random utility models, which rely on 
random assignment and independence, matching models explicitly account for voluntary, 
intentional, joint selection by partners under conditions of rivalry which are based on 
strategic considerations, such as an expectation of mutual gain (Mortensen, 1988). The 
assumption of complementarity and assortative matching on quality underlies much of 
the literature on matching in two-sided markets and has been used to model the formation 
of marriage partnerships (Becker, 1973), investor-firm partnerships (Sorensen, 2007), 
university-firm alliances (Mindruta, 2013), brand alliances (Yang, Shi, & Goldfarb, 
2009), as well as job matching in labor markets (Jovanovic, 1979). 
The literature on matching in the executive labor market has largely focused on 
explaining the distribution of executive pay. Observed empirical outcomes in studies of 
executive—firm  matches show sorting based on executive pay relative to firm size 
(Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Rosen, 1982) which is interpreted as evidence of a strong 
positive relationship between firm resources and managerial talent (Tervio, 2008). 
Edmans et al. (2009) expanded the matching model of firm size and executive pay to add 
executive risk aversion. However, few scholars have exploited the methodology to 
explore the multidimensional nature of match formation and address executive—firm fit. 
Exceptions include the recent work of Pan (Forthcoming), who observes 
complementarities on multiple attributes between executives and firms, and finds 
evidence of assortative matching on (i) firm size and executive talent, (ii) firm 
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diversification and executive experience in conglomerates, and (iii) firm R&D intensity 
and executive technical experience. 
My study matches executives and MNC subsidiaries along multiple dimensions to 
estimate which firm characteristics and human capital attributes jointly determine 
executive appointments. Specifically, I explore whether the same mechanisms – 
complementarity or substitutability – underlie executive—firm matching for both firm-
specific attributes and general attributes. My study responds to a recent call for scholars 
to specify if human capital is a complementary resource, whether it acts a substitute to 
other firm resources, or whether it is neither (Mackey, Molloy, & Morris, 2014). The 
model has precise implications for the importance of firm-specific versus general human 
capital relative to firm characteristics and contributes to human capital theory by 
informing our understanding of executive—firm fit. 
My research builds on current themes in the literature on strategic human capital, 
namely the recent reconceptualization of general human capital as having firm-specific 
value. Traditional human capital theory (Becker, 1964) asserts that firms cannot enjoy 
competitive advantage from general human capital, because general skills are widely 
deployable. However, Campbell et al. (2012) argue that general human capital has the 
potential to be a source of competitive advantage for a firm if its use value at the focal 
firm is greater than at other firms in the market. In other words, they propose that the 
value of general human capital isn’t constant across firms. Instead its value varies 
depending on how it fits with a firm’s resources and strategic positioning. 
Lazear (2009) offers a related observation and employs formal mathematical 
143 
 
modeling to show that  because firms’ needs are unique, firms weigh general skills 
differently. Although on its own each general skill is not firm-specific, unique 
combinations of general human capital are – the implication being that idiosyncratic 
combinations of general human capital can be a source of value for both firms (as 
measured by firm performance) and workers (in terms of wage growth).  Numerous 
empirical studies find support for this view and report greater returns to general human 
capital than to firm-specific human capital, when general human capital is proxied by 
occupational tenure (Dobbie et al., 2014; Gathmann & Schonberg, 2010; Lazear & Oyer, 
2004; Nawakitphaitoon, 2014; Sullivan, 2010) or industry tenure (Neal, 1995; Parent, 
2000). My study builds on this work, but instead of focusing on general and firm-specific 
human capital as determinants of earnings, I estimate multidimensional fit between firm 
and executive human capital attributes during the appointment process. 
My theory also incorporates work on the role of industry conditions on firms’ 
preferences for executive human capital. How firm-performance impacts turnover has 
been studied extensively (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Guthrie & 
Datta, 1998; Ocasio, 1999; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003), but recently scholars have 
turned their attention to examining how changes in environmental conditions alter 
demand for human capital attributes (Eisfeldt & Kuhnen, 2013; Jenter & Kanaan, 
Forthcoming). I contribute to this growing literature by studying how complementarities 
between firm and executive attributes differ during an economic upturn (2005–2007) 
versus an economic downswing (2008–2010). 
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5.3 HYPOTHESES 
Doing business in multiple foreign environments exposes MNCs to a broad range of 
markets, information, and technologies, which the firm can then deploy in the 
management of its subsidiaries and use to compete against domestic rivals (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 2004; Kogut, 1989). Much of the acquired knowledge is tacit and requires 
human capital to successfully transfer it within firm boundaries (Buckley & Casson, 
1976; Caves, 1996; Hymer, 1976; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Teece, 1981). As a result, 
executive human capital is fundamental to effectively manage multinational operations, 
yet executive—firm fit has been underexplored in the international context.  
MNCs with numerous, globally dispersed subsidiaries use executives to manage 
knowledge flows within firm boundaries. Top-down knowledge transfer from the parent 
company to its subsidiaries is essential, because headquarters are sources of both 
managerial and technical know-how. However, subsidiary management must be able to 
address frictions arising from cross-country differences in cultures, systems and 
institutions, and satisfy the needs of local customers. Therefore, the human capital needs 
of multinational corporations are quite complex, which is why the foreign subsidiary 
setting is useful for the study of joint, multidimensional preferences of executives and 
firms. 
Value creation from matching between partners arises out of alignment. Alignment 
can be driven by (i) complementarity and positive sorting on attributes, or (ii) it can 
emerge out of a substitution effect where one partner contributes where the other lacks 
and partnerships are created according to negative sorting on attributes. 
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In my work, I focus on the several fundamental relationships between firm and 
executive characteristics, some of which have already been examined in the literature, 
while others are breaking new ground. The seven hypothesized relationships are as 
follows: 
1. A subsidiary executive’s educational attainment is complementary to the size of 
the MNC. 
2. A subsidiary executive’s international experience is complementary to the scope 
of the MNC’s international operations. 
3. A subsidiary executive’s relevant regional experience is complementary to the 
MNC’s regional presence in Central & Eastern Europe. 
4. A local subsidiary executive (a subsidiary-country national) is complementary to 
subsidiary age. 
5. A subsidiary executive’s tenure with the MNC is complementary to the subsidiary 
being an acquisition. 
6. The joint preferences of MNCs and executives along the above-mentioned 
attributes will shift in response to an economic discontinuity. 
7. The joint preferences of MNCs and executives along the above-mentioned 
attributes will differ for monitoring-oriented and implementation-oriented 
functional roles. 
To the best of my knowledge, Hypotheses 5–7 are novel and have never been tested 
in the presented context. In the following paragraphs, I provide a description of the 
above-listed relationships in more detail. 
5.3.1 MNC size and executive educational attainment (general human capital) 
Previous studies of executive—firm fit show a complementary relationship between firm 
size and managerial talent, arguing that resource-rich firms can attract better-qualified 
managers and in turn, qualified managers want to work for firms where there is more to 
manage. I begin my examination of mutual relationships between subsidiary—executive 
pairings by considering MNC size and general human capital in its most basic form – 
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executive’s education. It follows from the resource argument that larger MNCs can 
attract more qualified candidates, and a common signal of an executive’s qualification is 
his or her education level. More highly educated executives are attracted to larger MNCs, 
because they arguably offer a more prestigious position. The executive has the potential 
to influence bigger operations, for which he or she is well compensated. Therefore, I 
propose to test a relationship between economies of scale and general human capital. 
Specifically: 
Hypothesis 1: A subsidiary executive’s educational attainment is 
complementary to the size of the MNC. 
5.3.2 Scope of international operations and executive international experience 
(general human capital) 
Next, I consider the relationship between general human capital and economies of scope. 
In MNCs, it is reasonable to measure diversification in terms of the scope of international 
operations. Forms of general human capital which are particularly salient for MNCs are 
international experience, regional experience, and national experience. MNCs with a 
more global footprint have access to executives with more international experience and 
also have demand for their skills (Greve et al., 2009). Multicultural individuals possess a 
unique competence to interact across cultures, and are effective boundary spanners (Yagi 
& Kleinberg, 2011) with a heightened capacity for solving complex problems 
(Fitzsimmons et al., 2011), making them attractive candidates for internationally 
diversified corporations. Similarly, multicultural individuals are attracted to global 
companies. Therefore, I expect that executive—firm pairings will form based on 
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complementarity between executives’ international experience and international scope of 
operations. 
Hypothesis 2:  A subsidiary executive’s international experience is 
complementary to the scope of the MNC’s international operations. 
5.3.3 MNC regional presence and executive regional experience (general human 
capital) 
Similarly, I expect to find complementarity between executives’ relevant regional 
experience and the extent to which MNC operations are concentrated in the region. 
Executives who possess relevant regional experience are likely to be attractive for 
regionally-oriented MNCs. The Central & Eastern European (CEE) region which serves 
as the research context is specific, but within the region, countries are characterized by 
comparable levels of economic development, parallel political histories and challenges, 
similar cultural backgrounds and demographics. Therefore, regional expertise can be 
expected to add value for MNCs with a CEE orientation. 
Hypothesis 3: A subsidiary executive’s relevant regional experience is 
complementary to the MNC’s regional presence in Central & Eastern 
Europe. 
5.3.4 Subsidiary age and executive nationality (general human capital) 
The final type of general human capital I explore is national experience in the subsidiary 
country relative to subsidiary age. Previous regression-based studies show that as the 
subsidiary ages, headquarters’ basis for control shifts as does the role of the subsidiary, 
resulting in decreased reliance on expatriates and greater utilization of local executives 
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(Gong, 2003). With time, the subsidiary becomes more integrated with the rest of the 
MNC, and is no longer as dependent on the parent company for supplying basic 
resources, such as capital, technology, and knowledge (Prahalad & Doz, 1981). 
Subsidiaries’ talent and knowledge which had been built up by the MNC can be exploited 
through management localization to local human resources who know the market and the 
customers well (Bartlett & Yoshihara, 1988; Lam & Yeung, 2010; Wang et al., 2004). I 
expect the following relationship: 
Hypothesis 4: A local subsidiary executive (a subsidiary-country 
national) is complementary to subsidiary age. 
5.3.5 Subsidiary acquisition status and executive MNC tenure (firm-specific 
human capital) 
I then examine the mutual relationship between subsidiary acquisition status and MNC 
preference for firm-specific human capital. The knowledge base of acquired subsidiaries 
can be weak, particularly in transition economies and developing countries (Lyles & 
Salk, 1996). Firm-specific human capital is likely to be important during the integration 
of a foreign acquisition into the MNC, as firms transfer technological and management 
know-how (Franko, 1973; Tung, 1982, 1987). A novel hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 5: A subsidiary executive’s tenure with the MNC is 
complementary to the subsidiary being an acquisition. 
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5.3.6 Estimating the impact of economic discontinuity on executive—firm 
preferences 
In a multidimensional competitive assignment model, parameters of the above described 
hypothesized relationships are determined simultaneously. Therefore, it is possible to 
compare the weights that MNCs place on executives’ firm-specific knowledge relative to 
the four types of general knowledge (education, international experience, regional 
experience, and national experience) during the appointment process. 
I model the above-listed relationships in two states of the world: during an economic 
upswing (2005–2007) and during an economic downturn (2008–2010). A shift in 
economic conditions changes firms’ skill demands, and the quality of existing 
executive—firm matches deteriorates (Eisfeldt & Kuhnen, 2013). Therefore, I expect to 
observe a difference in magnitudes and/or signs on the relative weights that firms place 
on general knowledge relative to firm-specific knowledge during good economic times 
versus bad, which leads to the following novel hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The joint preferences of MNCs and executives along the 
above-mentioned attributes will shift in response to an economic 
discontinuity. 
The above-written hypothesis is verifiable; however it is purposely formulated in 
broad terms. Not only have economic conditions been unexplored by scholars as 
impacting firms’ relative preferences for firm-specific versus general human capital, but 
there also remains a lack of consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature on a 
more basic issue – which is, whether the formation of the job match is driven by firm 
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preference for firm-specific human capital or general human capital in the first place. By 
testing Hypothesis 6, 1) I inform our understanding of firm behavior in attracting firm-
specific versus general human capital to executive positions, and 2) by comparing the 
joint preferences of executives and firms in two distinct economic environments, I 
provide evidence of how these preferences can shift relative to economic conditions. 
5.3.7 Estimating executive—firm preferences for two types of functional roles 
Finally, I expect to observe a difference in firms’ skill-weights for different functional 
roles, which leads to another general and novel hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: The joint preferences of MNCs and executives along the 
above-mentioned attributes will differ for monitoring-oriented23 and 
implementation-oriented24 functional roles. 
5.4 EMPIRICAL SETTING 
5.4.1 Industry setting 
I analyze complementarities between firm-specific and general executive human capital 
and MNC and subsidiary characteristics in the context of national subsidiaries of U.S. 
and Western European multinational banks, located in Central & Eastern Europe. The 
context is characterized by heterogeneous firms with varied human capital needs, and the 
timeframe allows for an examination of how MNCs’ human capital preferences shift 
during the business cycle, and differ among functional roles. 
Prior to the transition from centrally-planned economies to market economies in 
                                                 
23 Monitoring-oriented functional roles include Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Deputy CEO, 
and Chief Financial Officer (CFO). 
24 Implementation-oriented functional roles include Chief Operating Officer (COO), legal 
executives, and sales executives. 
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1989/1990, the financial sector in Central & Eastern Europe was undeveloped. CEE 
countries operated largely as cash economies. The fall of the Iron Curtain changed the 
industry, requiring the inflow of financial expertise, technological infrastructure, and 
managerial experience from western countries. The CEE financial sector drew investors 
mainly from Western Europe and to a lesser extent from the United States, and today 
these “western” MNCs control the majority of the financial institutions in this market. 
This is not to say that banking institutions did not exist in Central & Eastern Europe 
prior to 1990. On the contrary, each CEE country had firmly established state-owned 
banks that were monopolists in a sub-industry, such as retail banking, corporate banking, 
or import/export financing. These state-owned monopolists enjoyed nearly 100% market 
share in their segment. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Central & Eastern European 
state-owned banks became attractive acquisition targets for western multinationals - such 
as France’s Société Générale, Austria’s Erste Group and Raiffeisenbank, or Italy’s 
Unicredit – and from a financial standpoint these acquisitions were exceptionally 
lucrative. However, integrating national subsidiaries into the international network was 
not without its challenges. New owners needed to transfer know-how and make 
substantial technological investments in order to bring the CEE subsidiaries up to western 
standards. 
But the acquiring firms also inherited dense branch networks and a loyal clientele, 
who demanded a localized strategy and financial products in local currencies which were 
calibrated to local economic and institutional conditions. Not all MNCs entered the CEE 
market via acquisition, however. Banking groups such as Citibank, BNP Paribas, or 
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HSBC developed greenfield operations and established a market presence by generating 
new business or attracting retail and corporate customers from the former monopolists. 
Following years of healthy growth and development, the global financial industry 
experienced a crisis in 2008, which created economic disturbances in many countries 
including the CEE region. A shift in economic conditions reduced the quality of 
executive—firm  fit, and changed firms’ demand preferences for executive 
characteristics, prompting executive turnover (Eisfeldt & Kuhnen, 2013). In my model, I 
use the global financial crisis to determine how fit differs during economic upswings 
versus downturns. Specifically, I explore whether different economic conditions shift 
how firms value firm-specific and general human capital relative to MNC and subsidiary 
attributes. 
5.4.2 Data sample 
To study executive—firm fit, I use panel data on executive appointments to wholly-
owned subsidiaries of multinational banks during the six-year period from 2005–2010. 
The unit of analysis is the executive—subsidiary pair and the analysis is based on 1737 
observed job matches. I include both new hires and continuing appointments in the 
analysis, because I consider the choice to reappoint an executive in the following year as 
affirmation of executive—subsidiary fit by both partners. Subsidiary executives are 
defined as individuals who belong to the executive committee, as self-reported by the 
subsidiaries in their annual reports and/or company web pages. The study sample 
includes 75 subsidiaries of 34 U.S. and European banks25 from 15 different countries26, 
                                                 
25 Allied Irish Banks Group, Alpha Bank, BNP Paribas, Banco Comercial Portugues, Bayern 
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located in 13 Central & Eastern European countries27. Of the 1068 matching records with 
complete information on executive and firm attributes, 473 matching records were 
observed in the 2005–2007 period and 595 were observed in 2008–2010. 433 records 
were of executives in monitoring roles, while 486 records represented executives in 
implementation roles, and the remaining 149 records did not clearly fit either functional 
role category. 
The data were collected from subsidiaries providing retail, private and/or commercial 
banking services, and come from subsidiary annual reports, MNC annual reports, 
LinkedIn, and the Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope Database. Information on appointed 
subsidiary executives and their human capital attributes are obtained from top 
management team biographies as presented in subsidiary-level annual reports. The 
information provided in these biographies is supplemented by educational and 
experiential histories available through LinkedIn. Subsidiary-level characteristics of 
subsidiary age and acquisition status come from the Bankscope database, as does the 
information on MNC size. The international scope of MNC operations and the extent of 
its regional focus are sourced from MNCs’ annual reports. 
                                                                                                                                                 
LB, Citigroup, Commerzbank, DNB Nord, DZ Bank, Danske Bankas, Deutsche Bank, Emporiki 
Bank of Greece, Erste Group, Eurobank EFG, Fortis, GE, HSBC, HVB, Hypo Group Alpe Adria, 
Intesa Sanpaolo, KBC Group, MDM Bank Group, National Bank of Greece, OTP, Piraeus Bank, 
Procredit Group, Raiffeisen International, SEB, Societe Generale, Swedbank, Unicredit, 
Volksbank, WestLB. 
26 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Russia, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. 
27 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine. 
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5.4.3 Definitions of variables 
5.4.3.1 Executive information 
For each executive, I have five types of information: 
1. Educational attainment 
2. International experience 
3. Regional experience 
4. Nationality 
5. MNC tenure 
Educational attainment is a categorical variable, where 
 Educational attainment  = 0 for no college degree 
     = 1 for bachelor’s degree 
     = 2 for master’s degree 
     = 3 for Ph.D. degree. 
International experience is a continuous variable with zero as its minimum possible 
value. It is the sum of cultural distances28 between all possible pairs of countries 
where the executive has gained national, educational, or work experience, and 
captures diversity of national experiences. Unlike a simple count of unique 
national experiences, this measure incorporates a notion of “hardship” associated 
with adapting to a different national culture. For example, working in the United 
States and Canada represents two unique cultural experiences, but the need for 
cultural adaptation between United States and Canada is considered less than, for 
                                                 
28 Cultural distance is a multi-dimensional measure which integrates power distance (respect 
for authority), uncertainty avoidance (interpersonal trust), individualism (independence and role 
of government), and masculinity (importance of family and work) as measured in the World 
Values Survey. 
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example, between the United States and Romania. By summing cultural distances 
between pairs of countries where the executive has gained experience, I capture 
the individual’s experience level in integrating disparate national experiences. 
More formally, 
 International experience = ∑ (## 89
,;),; ∈>,?;  , 
where k,l reference pairs of countries within the country set C of the executive’s past 
national, educational, or professional experiences. 
Regional experience is a binary variable, where 
 Regional experience = 1 if the executive has national, educational, or 
work experience in the CEE region 
  = 0 otherwise. 
National experience is a binary variable, where 
 National experience = 1 if the executive’s nationality country matches 
the subsidiary country 
  = 0 otherwise. 
Firm-specific experience is measured as the executive’s tenure in years with the 
MNC. 
156 
 
5.4.3.2 Firm information 
For each subsidiary in the sample, the data contain the parent company’s size, scope of 
international operations, and regional presence, and information on the subsidiary’s age 
and acquisition status. 
MNC size is the MNC’s total global assets measured in U.S. dollars, in a given year. 
Scope of MNC international operations is measured as the number of countries 
globally where the MNC is present, in a given year. 
MNC regional presence is measured as the proportion of the number of countries in 
Central & Eastern Europe where the MNC operates through wholly-owned 
subsidiaries relative to the number of countries globally where the MNC is 
present, in a given year. It is a proxy for the significance of the CEE region 
relative to the overall breadth of global MNC operations. 
Subsidiary age denotes the number of years since the parent company has acquired the 
subsidiary or established greenfield operations in the subsidiary country. 
Subsidiary is an acquisition is a binary variable, which is set equal to 1 if the subsidiary 
was established through acquisition, and is set to 0 if it was developed as a 
greenfield. 
5.5 THE TWO-SIDED MATCHING MODEL 
Job assignments are voluntary, strategic pairings between firms and individuals made 
under competitive conditions, which is why it is intuitive to think of these relationships 
using the equilibrium framework of a two-sided matching model. Agents form matches 
along multiple dimensions with an expectation of mutual gain. Both firms and individuals 
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are comprised of heterogeneous, indivisible bundles of traits for which no separate 
markets exist (Mortensen, 1988). Partner choice is driven by agents’ preferences but the 
choice set is constrained by the decisions of other market actors. The equilibrium 
condition which underlies the framework relies on the plausible assumption that 
executives and firms choose their best available matches. In equilibrium, no executive—
firm pair wishes to deviate from its existing match and form a new match. 
In my model, the market is characterized by two finite, disjoint sets of agents: MNC 
subsidiaries S = {s1, s2, …, si} and executives E = {e1, e2, …, ej}. I assume search is 
costless and both executives and firms are aware of potential partners. Each firm can hire 
multiple executives, but each executive works for only one firm. 
5.5.1 Local production maximization 
To formally define equilibrium, I employ the local production maximization condition 
developed by Fox (2010a), where “production” represents the joint value of the 
executive—firm  match. The production function f(sm, en) denotes the match-specific 
productivity of a pairing between attributes of subsidiary sm and executive en. It is 
formally defined as: 
 f(sB, eD) = Δ V(sB, eD) + Δ U(sB, eD) , (1) 
where Δ V(sm,en) is the value that executive n adds to subsidiary m and Δ U(sm,en) is the 
value that subsidiary m provides to executive n. Although endogenous transfers are 
taking place to clear the market, I do not observe how match participants divide rents 
generated by the realized match. As a consequence, I cannot separately identify match 
preferences for individuals and firms – nor is that the goal of this study. Instead I exploit 
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the assumption that the joint productivity of realized matches exceeds the joint 
productivity of every possible counterfactual match which did not occur. By comparing 
realized matches between executives and firms against possible counterfactual matches, I 
determine which interactions between firm and executive attributes drive match 
productivity, and estimate the relative importance of particular complementarities. 
5.5.2 Production function specification 
I define the match value (shown in general form in Equation (1)) as a function of five 
interactions between firm and executive attributes. The interaction terms capture the 
match specificity in productivity, as follows: 
f(sB, eD) =  +4 +  !+!4! + '+'4' + E+E4E + F+F4F + G*HIJ, 
  (2) 
where sm = (S1m, S2m, S3m, S4m, S5m) are vectors of firm attributes (MNC-level and 
subsidiary-level) and en = (E1n, E2n, E3n, E4n, E5n) are vectors of executive characteristics.  
S1m is MNC size, E1n is executive educational attainment.  
S2m is the MNC’s scope of international operations, E2n is executive international 
experience.  
S3m is the MNC’s regional presence in CEE, E3n is executive regional experience 
in CEE.  
S4m is subsidiary age, E4n is executive nationality.  
S5m is the subsidiary’s acquisition status, E5n is executive tenure in the MNC. 
Control variables (such as executive or firm fixed effects) which would enter the 
production function as non-interactive terms could contribute to match productivity. 
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However, non-interactive terms enter into the objective function on both sides of the 
inequality, are differenced out, and therefore remain unidentified. 
5.5.3 Maximum score function 
Suppose we have two subsidiaries, s1 and s2, and two executives, e1 and e2, and we 
observe realized pairs (s1, e1) and (s2, e2). The local production maximization condition 
states that a match is pairwise stable if neither the firm nor the executive wishes to 
exchange partners. Formally, the following is assumed to hold true and underlies the 
solution concept: 
 f(s, e) +  f(s!, e!) ≥ f(s, e!) +  f(s!, e)  . (3) 
This means that the sum of match-specific productivities of two realized matches {(s1, 
e1), (s2, e2)} must be greater than the sum of match-specific productivities of 
counterfactual matches {(s1, e2), (s2, e1)}. 
I invoke the local production maximization condition for all combinations of two 
realized executive—firm pairs and their counterfactual pairings, setting up a system of 
inequalities. I then apply maximum score estimation (Manski, 1975) where the objective 
is to maximize the total number of inequalities (3) which are satisfied in the system. The 
maximum score function is a consistent, semi-parametric estimator that requires the 
production function to be specified, but makes no assumptions about the distribution of 
the error terms. This study uses information on observed executive appointments without 
including transfer data on compensation, which is sufficient for implementing the 
multinomial maximum score estimator. For a proof of set identification and consistency 
for maximum score estimators in a two-sided matching game without transfers, see Fox 
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(2010b). In the case of executive—firm matching without transfer data, the objective 
function Q can be written as: 
 L(M) =  ∑ 1[M(9P, 
) + MQ9R , 
S ≥ MQ9P, 
S + M(9R, 
)]{P,R,,}∈WX  , (4) 
where {a,b,i,j} is a realized quartet of two matched executive—firm pairs in the observed 
market x. Function 1[.] is the indicator function that is equal to 1 when the inequality in 
the bracket is true. The maximum score estimator can be any production function f whose 
parameters maximize the score function Q(f). For this study, the maximum score 
estimator serves to identify parameters β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 (see Eq. 2), which maximize 
the objective function (Eq. 4) in terms of the production function specified in Equation 
(2): 
 β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 =  argmax[L(M)]  , (4) 
5.6 ESTIMATION 
5.6.1 Procedure 
In this section, I describe the estimation procedure. 
Step 1: Construct variables. Transform variables defined in 5.4.3 in terms of each 
variable’s cumulative distribution function (CDF) to reflect the ranks of 
player attributes on both sides of the market. 
Step 2: Define markets. Separate the full sample of observed executive—subsidiary 
pairs and their attributes into groups by functional role (monitoring-oriented 
functional role and implementation-oriented functional role) and by year. 
Executives in the same functional role category during the same year are 
considered at risk of being appointed to subsidiary sm in a given year. 
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Step 3: Generate interaction terms for observed executive—subsidiary matches. 
Multiply each transformed variable from the vector of firm attributes sm with 
its hypothesized counterpart variable from the vector of executive attributes 
en. 
Step 4: Construct exchange pairs. In each market, create an exhaustive list of all 
possible executive—subsidiary dyads. A dyad consists of two executives e1 
and e2 and two subsidiaries s1 and s2, where {(s1, e1), (s2, e2)} are the two 
realized matches, and {(s1, e2), (s2, e1)} are their respective counterfactual 
matches. For each realized and counterfactual pair, the dataset contains 
attribute variables and the interaction terms calculated in Step 3. 
Step 5: Generate interaction terms for counterfactual executive—subsidiary matches. 
For the counterfactual pairs {(s1, e2), (s2, e1)}, multiply variables from 
executive e1’s vector of attributes with variables from the counterfactual 
subsidiary s2’s vector of attributes. Then multiply executive e2’s vector of 
attributes with the attributes of the counterfactual subsidiary s1. 
Step 6: Invoke the differential evolution method.  Perform a search algorithm using 
the differential evolution method to identify parameters β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 
(see Eqs. (5) and (2)), which maximize the objective function Q(f) given in 
Equation (4). Calculate confidence intervals for parameter point estimates 
using a sub-sampling procedure. 
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5.6.2 Differential evolution method 
The objective function described in Equation (4) was optimized using the differential 
evolution algorithm for global optimization (Storn & Price, 1997), for which an 
implementation exists within the statistical programming environment R in the form of a 
well-validated and cited toolkit “DEoptim”. The objective function of the maximum 
score estimator is a step function and therefore many local optima may exist in the 
solution set. The differential evolution (DE) approach is well suited for the optimization 
problem at hand, as it does not require continuity or differentiability of the optimization 
function. As opposed to “hill-climbing”, it combines and alternates between local search 
(evolutionary selection of candidate solutions) and distant search (mutation-based 
alteration of candidate solutions) to explore the solution space, and converge upon a 
global optimum. 
The DEoptim toolkit is a set of general-purpose optimization algorithms, consisting 
of multiple variants on the optimization method. The exact behavior of the program can 
be controlled by a number of parameters. After careful analysis of available options 
during which I experimented with step iteration sizes, optimization strategies, and 
iteration counts, I ran the final optimization processes within the empirically determined 
(“lower”, “upper”) coefficient limits on my parameters of interest β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 of 
(-5,5), with population size of 80 evolving solutions, and cross-over probability of 90% 
(CR=0.9). I completed 10,000 iterations for each process which invariably yielded 
convergence. Using Windows 8-64 operating system, 8-core i7 3.4 GHz CPU, and 12 GB 
of RAM, each individual optimization process (10,000 iterations) required about 4 hours 
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of CPU time to complete. 
Because maximum score estimation does not assume any particular distribution of 
error terms, I repeated the optimization procedure using subsampling techniques in order 
to determine confidence intervals for individual solutions. I used a “leave 10% out” 
subsampling strategy 10 times by randomly selecting a 90% of the dyads in the dataset. 
The left-out 10% subsets were non-intersecting. The initial population of candidate 
solutions is always determined randomly, and therefore no two repeated runs give 
absolutely identical results. As a consequence, the presented point estimates need to be 
viewed as statistically valid within a 90% confidence interval. 
5.6.3 Identification 
The identification strategy which underlies the matching method in this study depends on 
the assumption that the labor market is in a pairwise stable equilibrium where neither 
executives nor firms which are currently matched would gain from forming a 
counterfactual match. By observing active players in the market and their attributes, the 
matching method quantifies firms’ preferences in the context of limited human capital 
availability. However, because the observed executive—subsidiary pairings do not 
represent the universe of executive appointments to MNC subsidiaries, my model is 
missing some subset of possible jobs that actually are in a given executive’s set of 
employment options, and some subset of possible job candidates that are in a given 
subsidiary’s set of potential hires. In other words, the set of counterfactual appointments 
is incomplete, which potentially influences the parameter estimates provided by the 
matching model. 
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In order for inference to be valid, we have to believe that the attributes of the missing 
counterfactual partners are sufficiently similar to those of the executives and subsidiaries 
that are in the sample. As shown in the descriptive statistics in the next section, the 
observable characteristics of executives, subsidiaries, and the associated MNCs are quite 
heterogeneous. Therefore, the sample participants may in fact accurately represent 
executives’ and firms’ choice sets of potential partners, and not having access to the 
complete universe of executive—subsidiary appointments is perhaps immaterial to the 
results.  
5.7 RESULTS 
In this section, I summarize key features of the dataset and present the matching patterns 
identified by the maximum score estimator. 
5.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the number of executive—subsidiary matches by year and functional 
role, both prior to and following restrictions based on data availability of executive or 
firm characteristics. 
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for the raw data on subsidiaries, MNCs, and 
executives, and demonstrates the heterogeneity of firm and individual characteristics in 
the sample. For example, MNCs in the sample range from $2 billion to $3 trillion in 
assets, and have an international presence ranging from 5 countries to 100 countries 
worldwide. Some MNCs focus exclusively on the CEE region, while for others it 
represents a very minor proportion of global operations. MNC subsidiaries range in age 
from 1 to 24 years. 76% are acquisitions while the remaining 24% are greenfield 
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developments. The executives in the sample have an average of 1.6 educational degrees, 
83% have experience in the CEE region, 62% are local managers from the subsidiary 
country, and the length of their tenure with the MNC ranges anywhere from 1 to 41 years, 
with an average of 10 years of firm-specific experience. 
Table 4.3 presents correlations between firm and executive attributes in their CDF 
forms. The pairwise correlation results show that for observed executive—subsidiary 
partnerships, there is very little correlation between the five relationships that I test using 
the matching model (correlations between hypothesized relationships are highlighted in 
bold). However, pairwise correlations between individual attributes of existing 
partnerships do not inform our understanding about the drivers of match formation 
because simultaneous multi-attribute matching occurs within a system and is co-
determined by the actions of other players in the market. Executives and firms each 
possess heterogeneous bundles of indivisible traits. Therefore a “perfect” match along all 
attributes is often not feasible. Instead, executives and firms evaluate which attributes are 
more important for achieving overall job fit for their own individual case, and then make 
the necessary compromises on the remaining attributes. To find out which attribute 
combinations drive executive selection in MNC subsidiaries in the context of an 
interdependent system, we have to examine the estimated parameters provided by the 
maximum score estimator function. 
5.7.2 Findings 
Executives and MNC subsidiaries match along multiple attributes simultaneously in an 
effort to optimize overall executive—firm fit. To determine which attribute interactions 
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drive the matching process, how these patterns change under different economic 
conditions, and how they differ for the two types of functional roles, it was necessary to 
examine the five matching dimensions simultaneously. The maximum score estimator 
allows for simultaneous estimation of multiple parameters. The parameter estimates, 
which correspond to the cross-partial derivatives of the production function, quantify the 
relationship between executive—firm attributes and allow for comparison of the strength 
of each relationship relative to others in the model. Because the variables have been 
translated to their CDFs, the signs and magnitudes of the parameter estimates provide 
information on the strength of complementarities/substitutions between executive—firm 
attribute pairs. Furthermore, the relative magnitudes of parameter estimates reveal which 
attribute pairs are the strongest determinants of a job match.  The point estimates are 
considered significant if the 90% confidence interval does not include zero. 
5.7.2.1 Monitoring roles 
Table 4.4 summarizes the results of the study. Focusing on results for monitoring roles in 
the subsidiary executive team (which include CEOs, Deputy CEOs, and CFOs), the 
results show that during an economic boom (2005–2007), executive—subsidiary 
matching is driven by complementarities between MNC size and executive education (H1 
supported), complementarities between scope of international operations and executive 
international experience (H2 supported), substitution between MNC regional presence 
and executive regional experience (H3 unsupported), substitution between subsidiary age 
and executive national experience (H4 unsupported), and complementarity between 
acquired subsidiaries and executive tenure with the MNC (H5 supported). With a 
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parameter value of -4.75, the strongest determinant of executive—subsidiary job 
matching is negative sorting on subsidiary age and executive nationality matching the 
subsidiary country. In other words, the older a subsidiary is, the less often it selects 
executives who are subsidiary-country nationals. The second strongest determinant, with 
a parameter value of 3.90, is acquired subsidiaries selecting longer-tenured executives 
than greenfield subsidiaries. The weakest driver of an executive-subsidiary match is 
complementarity between MNC size and executive education. 
Relative to the selection patterns observed during 2005–2007, two major differences 
arise for monitoring roles during an economic crisis (2008–2010), providing support to 
Hypothesis 6. The strongest determinant of executive—subsidiary matching is now 
complementarity between MNC size and executive education (parameter value of 4.45). 
In contrast to an economic boom, the older a subsidiary is, more executives are from the 
subsidiary country (parameter value of 1.43) during an economic downturn. H1, H2, H4, 
and H5 are supported. H3 which predicts complementarity between MNC regional 
presence and executive regional experience remains unsupported for monitoring roles 
under both sets of economic conditions. 
5.7.2.2 Implementation roles 
Turning to implementation roles (which include COOs, legal executives, and sales 
executives), executive—subsidiary matching is driven by substitution between MNC size 
and executive education (H1 unsupported), substitution between scope of international 
operations and executive international experience (H2 unsupported), substitution between 
MNC regional presence and executive regional experience (H3 unsupported), 
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complementarity between subsidiary age and executive national experience (H4 
supported), and complementarity between acquired subsidiaries and executive tenure 
with the MNC (H5 supported). These observations apply to both bull and bear markets. 
During a bull market, at a parameter value of 4.82, the strongest determinant of an 
executive—subsidiary match is a complementary relationship between acquired 
subsidiaries hiring executives with longer MNC tenure. During a bear market, at a 
parameter value of 4.59, the strongest determinant is complementarity between subsidiary 
age and the appointed executive being from the subsidiary country. These differences 
between appointment patterns in bull and bear markets in the implementation role 
provide further support for Hypothesis 6. 
5.7.2.3 Types of functional roles 
The performed analysis revealed a different selection pattern for different functional 
roles, i.e., for monitoring and implementation roles, thus supporting Hypothesis 7. The 
support was present during both bull and bear market conditions. Table 4.5 summarizes 
the support or lack thereof for all seven tested hypotheses. 
5.8 DISCUSSION 
The results of this study on the determinants of executive—subsidiary matching show 
that the relationship between human capital and the firm’s resource base is largely 
complementary. However, the value of general human capital and firm-specific human 
capital shifts depending on external conditions and depending on the type of functional 
role appointment. 
For monitoring roles (CEOs, Deputy CEOs, CFOs) and implementation roles (COOs, 
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legal executives, sales executives) alike, firm-specific human capital dominates 
educational general human capital in match formation during an economic upswing. 
However, during an economic downturn, firm-specific human capital is now a 
comparatively weak determinant of match formation and educational general human 
capital dominates executive selection – but only for monitoring roles. 
As such, these results make an important contribution and respond to recent calls for 
specifying the relationship between human capital and firm resources (Mackey et al., 
2014). After methodologically accounting for selection and labor availability, both firm-
specific human capital and general human capital function as complementary resources. 
However, their importance for executive selection shifts depending on external 
circumstances. Firm-specific human capital is the dominant determinant of an executive 
appointment during an economic upswing for both types of roles, but during an economic 
downturn firm-specific human capital is nearly four times weaker in driving an 
executive—subsidiary match than general human capital (for monitoring roles, parameter 
values of 1.53 versus 4.45 in bottom left quadrant of Table 4.4). These results corroborate 
the findings reported in executive succession literature, which show that firms appoint 
outsider CEOs without firm-specific knowledge following negative shocks (Datta & 
Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie & Datta, 1998). 
In examining how the determinants of executive—subsidiary matches differ between 
monitoring roles and implementation roles, the results point to a difference in 
appointment strategies. While candidates for monitoring roles are being selected based on 
complementarities with MNC tenure (firm-specific human capital) and international 
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experience (multicultural human capital), implementation roles are in contrast being 
selected on complementarities with national experience (country-specific human capital). 
It is also of note that the advanced hypotheses are supported to a greater extent by the 
data on monitoring roles (H1, H2, H4, H5), than by the data on implementation roles (H4, 
H5 only) (see Table 4.5 for a summary). Because many of the hypotheses were 
formulated based on previous research findings, this could indicate that executive 
selection research disproportionately focuses on CEO appointments, and comparatively 
little attention is being paid to appointment patterns in the rest of the top management 
team. 
Upon examining the relative weights placed on the different types of general human 
capital during the appointment process, the results show that broadly relevant general 
human capital is a comparatively weaker determinant of executive—subsidiary matches 
than general human capital which is expressly relevant to subsidiary operations. The 
absolute magnitude of the parameter on country-specific human capital is the largest, 
followed by regional human capital, international human capital, and educational human 
capital. These matching results suggest that more specific types of general human capital 
offer greater value than broadly applicable general human capital, and hold true with one 
exception. In the case of CEO, Deputy CEO, and CFO appointments during economic 
downturns, education – which is the most broadly applicable human capital – trumps all 
other types of general human capital in determining an executive—subsidiary match. 
These findings have useful implications for the current debate in strategic human capital 
theory about the firm-specific value of general human capital. The results imply that in 
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foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks, executive selection is driven by 
considerations regarding relevant country experience more so than by international 
experience or educational attainment.  
5.9 CONCLUSION 
Using a unique dataset on subsidiary executive appointments in multinational banks, my 
research investigates two-sided matching in the international labor market. By employing 
a competitive assignment model of executive selection and explicitly accounting for the 
availability of job opportunities and human capital in executives’ and firms’ choice sets, 
this study addresses the endogeneity problem underlying the hiring process. 
The international research context is characterized by heterogeneous firms with 
varied human capital needs, allowing for a nuanced examination of the determinants of 
executive—subsidiary matches along multiple human capital dimensions, with a 
particular emphasis on firm-specific versus general human capital. The study explores (i) 
the determinants of executive selection in MNC subsidiaries, (ii) how these determinants 
shift relative to economic conditions, and (iii) how they differ for two types of functional 
roles. 
The data reveal that for monitoring roles, an executive—subsidiary job match is 
driven by complementarities between (i) MNC size and executive education, (ii) scope of 
international operations and executive international experience, and (iii) subsidiary 
acquisition status and executive tenure with the MNC. However, the relative magnitudes 
of these relationships differ between bullish and bearish economic markets. Most 
markedly, firm-specific knowledge in the form of executive tenure is more important for 
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executive selection during an economic upswing than during an economic downturn. 
Conversely, general human capital in the form of education dominates executive 
selection criteria during an economic downturn. 
For implementation roles, the matching process appears to be governed by a different 
set of selection mechanisms, the most dominant being complementary relationships 
between (i) subsidiary age and executive nationality matching the subsidiary country, and 
(ii) subsidiary acquisition status and executive tenure with the MNC. 
Examining firm-specific human capital and general human capital together enhances 
our understanding of firm hiring behavior, and allows us to determine the relative value 
that firms place on particular types of human capital under different economic conditions. 
As such, this study contributes to our understanding of the determinants of executive—
firm matching, and provides insight into the nuanced relationships between human capital 
and firm resources. 
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Table 4.1 – Number of executive-subsidiary matches by year and functional role 
 
Table 4.2 – Summary statistics of raw data 
 
  
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL
Total number of matches 256 339 345 378 388 357 2063
Total number of matches with full information 124 167 182 203 210 182 1068
of which:
Monitoring role matches 51 65 80 80 80 77 433
Implementation role matches 56 74 79 79 108 90 486
Other 17 28 23 44 22 15 149
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
MNC assets (in USD billion) 1068 464.0 562.5 2.0 3065.1
Scope of MNC international operations 1068 23.3 26.3 5 100
MNC regional presence 1068 0.7 0.3 0.1 1
Subsidiary age 1068 9.8 4.0 1 24
Subsidiary is an acquisition 1068 0.76 0.4 0 1
Executive educational attainment 1068 1.6 0.7 1 3
Executive international experience 1068 64.5 92.6 0 582.8
Executive regional experience 1068 0.83 0.4 0 1
Executive nationality matches subsidiary country 1068 0.62 0.5 0 1
Executive tenure with MNC 1068 10.2 7.2 1 41
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Table 4.3 – Correlation table 
 
  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 MNC assets 1.00
2 Scope of MNC international operations 0.54 1.00
3 MNC regional presence -0.38 -0.70 1.00
4 Subsidiary age 0.15 0.09 0.00 1.00
5 Subsidiary is an acquisition 0.33 -0.12 -0.02 -0.59 1.00
6 Executive educational attainment 0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 1.00
7 Executive international experience 0.12 0.11 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.34 1.00
8 Executive regional experience -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 -0.25 1.00
9 Executive nationality matches subsidiary country -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.55 0.57 1.00
10 Executive tenure with MNC 0.19 0.19 -0.18 -0.01 0.13 -0.07 0.27 -0.03 -0.35 1.00
Bold face denotes correlations between hypothesized relationships.
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Table 4.4 – Maximum score estimation 
  
Point Est 90% CI Point Est 90% CI
Beta1 0.86 (0.64, 0.87) -0.69 (-2.57, 0.40)
MNC size * executive 
educational attainment
Educational general human 
capital
Beta2 1.46 (1.12, 1.51) -1.57 (-1.54, 4.85)
Scope of MNC international 
operations * executive 
international experience
Multicultural human capital
Beta3 -3.19 (-3.34, -2.56) -1.93 (-2.73, -4.25)
MNC regional presence * 
executive regional 
experience
Regional human capital
Beta4 -4.75 (-4.80, -3.81) 1.14 (0.28, 2.31)
Subsidiary age * executive 
nationality matches 
subsidiary country
Country-specific human 
capital
Beta5 3.90 (3.10, 4.71) 4.82 (3.36, 4.88)
Subsidiary is an acquisition 
* executive tenure in MNC
Firm-specific human capital
Number of inequalities 6928 9059
% satisfied 65% 57%
Beta1 4.45 (4.21, 4.93) -2.93 (-4.26, -2.48)
MNC size * executive 
educational attainment
Educational general human 
capital
Beta2 0.39 (-0.92, 0.45) -3.62 (-4.96, 0.35)
Scope of MNC international 
operations * executive 
international experience
Multicultural human capital
Beta3 -1.52 (-1.80, -0.93) -3.84 (-4.48, -3.58)
MNC regional presence * 
executive regional 
experience
Regional human capital
Beta4 1.43 (1.30, 4.20) 4.59 (3.25, 4.92)
Subsidiary age * executive 
nationality matches 
subsidiary country
Country-specific human 
capital
Beta5 1.53 (0.51, 1.74) 1.00 (0.93, 1.51)
Subsidiary is an acquisition 
* executive tenure in MNC
Firm-specific human capital
Number of inequalities 9534 17456
% satisfied 57% 56%
Human capital type
Monitoring roles
Years 2005-2007 
(BULL MARKET)
Years 2008-2010 
(BEAR MARKET)
Implementation roles
Interaction
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Table 4.5 – Results of hypothesis testing 
  
Monitoring Implementation Monitoring Implementation
H1: A subsidiary executive’s educational attainment is 
complementary to the size of the MNC.
YES NO YES NO
H2: A subsidiary executive’s international experience 
is complementary to the scope of the MNC’s 
international operations.
YES NO YES NO
H3: A subsidiary executive’s relevant regional 
experience is complementary to the MNCs’ regional 
presence in Central and Eastern Europe.
NO NO NO NO
H4: A local subsidiary executive (a subsidiary-country 
national) is complementary to subsidiary age.
NO YES YES YES
H5: A subsidiary executive’s tenure with the MNC is 
complementary to the subsidiary being an acquisition.
YES YES YES YES
H7: The joint preferences of MNCs and executives 
along the above-mentioned attributes will differ for 
monitoring-oriented and implementation-oriented 
functional roles.
Bull Market Bear Market Bull Market Bear Market
H6: The joint preferences of MNCs and executives 
along the above-mentioned attributes will shift in 
response to an economic discontinuity.
Bull Market Bear Market
Monitoring role Implementation role
YES YES
YES YES
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has explored human capital appointment patterns to the executive team 
from several different perspectives. In the first study, I analyzed the relationships 
between environmental uncertainty and subsidiary executive team configuration patterns. 
The empirical evidence shows that MNCs segment functional roles and are disinclined to 
appoint local executives to roles that have substantial monitoring responsibilities and 
instead fill these roles with expatriates. Local executives in turn occupy implementation 
roles, thereby providing the organization with resources for local market adaptation. 
These findings offer support for the view that one of the ways that MNCs manage the 
dual pressures of adaptation and intra-organizational coordination is through a balanced 
and deliberate configuration of the subsidiary executive team. 
The second study examines whether parent firms utilize particular types of human 
capital to strengthen the principal—agent relationship between MNC headquarters and 
individual subsidiaries in weak institutional environments. The data show that 
multinational banks deploy expatriate human capital to bolster headquarters’ oversight 
over subsidiary activities in environments with weak institutions. This finding contributes 
to our understanding of how MNCs use human capital to manage principal—agent 
relationships between headquarters and individual subsidiaries. The study also 
contributes to human capital theory by indicating that human capital appointments can 
substitute for weak institutions. 
The third study examines CEO succession in the subsidiary context and asks how 
economic shocks at the national level and at the subsidiary level influence (i) subsidiary 
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CEO turnover and (ii) preference for successors’ human capital attributes. The findings 
suggest that economic shocks at the national and subsidiary levels are both associated 
with turnover in the top subsidiary leadership post, but they prompt different preferences 
with respect to successors’ human capital attributes. Specifically, national economic 
crisis promotes a preference for subsidiary-specific human capital, while performance 
shocks limited to the subsidiary are associated with a preference for MNC-specific 
human capital and for successors with broad international experience. The theoretical 
contribution of this study is a more refined conceptualization and a more granular 
measurement of organizational insiders and outsiders in the MNC setting. 
Finally, the fourth study utilizes the international setting and observed executive 
appointments to subsidiary top management teams to explore executive—firm fit.  The 
purpose of the research is to determine which interactions between firm and human 
capital attributes drive the job matching process, how these interaction patterns change 
under different economic conditions, and how they differ for two distinct types of 
functional roles – the monitoring role and the implementation role. By employing a 
competitive assignment model of executive selection and explicitly accounting for the 
availability of job opportunities and human capital in executives’ and firms’ choice sets, 
this study applies a methodological innovation to model the appointment process within 
the context of an interrelated system. By comparing the relative importance of firm-
specific and general human capital in for the consummation of an executive—firm job 
match, the findings show that firm-specific and general human capital is valued 
differently in good economic times versus bad. Specifically, firm-specific human capital 
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is the dominant determinant of an executive appointment during an economic upswing, 
while firm-specific human capital is nearly four times weaker in driving an executive—
subsidiary match than general human capital during an economic downturn. As such, this 
study not only informs our understanding of the mechanism which underlie executive 
selection and matching, but also contributes to the broader strategic human capital 
literature. 
By utilizing the heterogeneity and complexity of the MNC—subsidiary setting, I 
believe that this dissertation not only fulfilled its aims as sketched out in Chapter 1, but 
also has made several novel and unique contributions to our understanding of executive 
appointment patterns. By analyzing the interactions between human capital, firm 
characteristics, and external environmental conditions, the findings in this dissertation 
serve as a foundation for future work on executive selection and allocation within the top 
management team, and open the door to data-driven and causally-identified empirical 
investigations of the relationship between executive appointment strategy and 
organizational performance. 
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